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
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THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE
AND THE POLICY OF COUNT BEUST.

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[Henry de Wotans
afterwards Baron Pirbright]

J. Samuel Esq
with best Compts
THE

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE

AND THE POLICY OF COUNT BEUST.

A Political Sketch of Men and Events


FROM 1866 TO 1870.

BY


AN ENGLISHMAN.

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1870.

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P R E F A C E.

THERE have been many eventful years in the history of the Austrian Empire which are replete with interest to the statesmen and politicians of our day, and which must become equally so to posterity. Rich in happy events, these years have also been fruitful of many reverses; the latter, however, have had their salutary effect in promoting progress. Since the days of the Pragmatic Sanction—that great pact which settled the hereditary succession in the dominions of the House of Hapsburg—there has been scarcely any period fraught with such importance to the internal development of Austria as the year 1867.

The disasters and defeats of the short war of 1866 shook the Empire to its foundations, depressed

and demoralized its population, and for the time paralysed its resources. Matters had assumed so grave an aspect that it was evident that nothing but the strong hand of an experienced statesman could hope to close the gaping wounds, and once again consolidate the internal affairs of the State by a satisfactory compromise with its conflicting elements. How all this was accomplished is now matter of history. The settlement of the Hungarian claims was happily effected on the basis of dualistic government; new institutions and laws were called into life, conferring absolute civil and religious liberty upon both parts of the Empire; the Austro-Hungarian Charters were remodelled as far as possible upon the principles of our English Constitution, and parliamentary government is now permanently established both in Vienna and in Pesth.

It would be futile to suppose that a few short months could suffice to perfect in the Austro-Hungarian dominions a great constitutional revolution, which centuries of strife, bloodshed, and arduous legislative labour alone consummated in Great Britain. Hence, it ought to surprise no

one conversant with history that the transition in Austria from absolute government to constitutionalism is slow, and attended with difficulties, contests, and crises; nor can any one reasonably expect that this process of development can be smooth or of short duration. It must be borne in mind that there are obstacles to constitutionalism which are peculiar to this Empire. These mainly consist in the diversity of the nationalities (see Note I.), and in the conflicting systems of centralization and autonomy. Similar difficulties may exist to a greater or less extent in other countries; but their prompt solution in Austria is certainly of vital importance. Under such circumstances, it is only natural that crises will from time to time arise, and that, at these periods, unusual demands must be made both upon the wisdom of the Government and the patriotic forbearance of the people. These conditions in times of danger and difficulty are necessarily inherent to the well-being of the State, and form the main guarantees of its constitutional existence.

Two years have scarcely elapsed, and Western Austria has apparently arrived at the turning-

point of her new political life. Although it cannot be denied that much has been done to favour the growth of liberal institutions in Austria, and to promote constitutional ideas, yet it is equally true that everything has hitherto borne the character of incompleteness; and the immediate consequence of such a state of things is, that many are dissatisfied, and pursue a policy of opposition highly detrimental to the best interests of the Empire. The Poles have accepted the constitution, and exercise the rights accruing therefrom. They nevertheless still urge their demands for a more absolute autonomic position for Galicia, as detailed in a special resolution of the Galician Diet in 1868 (see Note II.). The Czechs, on the other hand, absolutely decline to accept the constitution as it now is, arrogating to themselves an amount of importance equal to that of the Hungarians; and, in imitation of the policy so successfully pursued by the latter, they persist in a passive opposition, demanding a federalistic reconstruction of the Empire, so as to secure to themselves a separate and independent *status* in the realm. The Germans, again, are alarmed at the possibility

of having to sacrifice their present supremacy, and at the same time deem it their duty to be mindful of the political position of their compatriots in Bohemia. Believing that the interests of liberty and civilization would rather be menaced than furthered by federalism, they strenuously protest against it, and positively refuse to accede to any modifications of the present constitution, except such as may be carried out in rigorous conformity with its provisions and spirit. Numerous addresses and other manifestations to this effect have proceeded from many towns and corporations. The late disunion in the Cis-Leithan Cabinet is, however, a far more serious feature in the present state of affairs. This Ministry was unfortunately composed of two distinct parties, and the recent ministerial crisis simply resulted in the resignation of the whole Cabinet. Now, if it be asked what was the immediate reason of this split amongst the advisers of the Crown on this side of the Leitha, the answer is to be found in the same momentous cause that agitated the whole of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland from 1832 to 1868, and there proved the means of upsetting many

a Ministry, and gave rise to many violent popular demonstrations: Electoral Reform. At present the members of the Austrian Parliament are not chosen by the direct individual votes of the registered electors, as in England; they are first elected members of the "Landtag," or provincial diet for that division of the Empire where they reside, or which they are anxious to represent. The Landtag then sends from amongst its members those who are to sit in the Imperial Parliament or "Reichsrath;" so that in point of fact the elections are now entirely influenced by the respective Landtags throughout the Empire. The question of electoral reform in Austria is not, as it was in England, one merely relating to the extension of political suffrage. In England the principle of direct election by personal vote had always existed. What had to be determined was simply whether or no the suffrage should, under certain conditions, be extended to classes which had not as yet enjoyed electoral power. In Austria the case is quite different; the Constitution is comparatively new, and opinions are divided on the expediency of altering the present electoral

system. Many maintain that the members of the Reichsrath should only be the delegates of the provincial diets, wishing thereby to avoid the concentration of political power in Vienna which must result from direct election. They think also that the process of sifting the members of the Reichsrath through the Landtags must have a beneficial effect, inasmuch as by that means the best men are elected, who are thoroughly identified with the views and interests of the provinces they represent; and that the people, who are as yet to a great extent ignorant of constitutional rights, ought not prematurely to be entrusted with a power which might become dangerous. Those who are in favour of direct elections, on the other hand, say that, in order to render a government truly constitutional, the great mass of the people must be consulted, and that this can alone be attained by placing in their hands the electoral suffrage.

The late ministerial crisis was, however, not brought about by the question as to whether the franchise should be exercised directly by the people, or through the medium of the provincial

diets. The members of the Cabinet were agreed that it is imperative to free the representation of the realm from the artificial bonds of the Landtags. They also believed that the Reichsrath would gain greatly in power, dignity, and consideration, by an augmented number of deputies, and a consequent probable increase of talent in the House. The differences of opinion had reference mainly to the question, whether the action of the Ministry should, for the present, be limited to a simple measure of Electoral Reform, or whether it would not be expedient to introduce simultaneously such other modifications into the Constitution, as would tend to conciliate the hitherto discontented nationalities.

The majority of the Cabinet, consisting of MM. Giskra, Herbst, Plener, Hasner, and Brestel, were in favour of solving the electoral problem first, without in any way complicating its solution by the consideration of the disaffected nationalities. The direct elections once carried—a consummation from which they augured the most favourable results, viz., the consolidation of the Reichsrath, and of the German Constitutional party—they

would then immediately turn their attention to an amicable compromise with the National Opposition. The minority of the Cabinet, on the other hand, composed of Count Taaffe, Count Potocki, and Dr. Berger, were of opinion that a solitary attempt to carry Electoral Reform, in view of the menacing attitude of the several diets and the respective nationalities, would only serve to incense the latter still more against a mode of procedure which they would consider as a forcible violation of their rights and privileges; and would, in point of fact, weaken rather than strengthen the Constitutional party. They were, therefore, in favour of immediately making conciliatory overtures, and of connecting the question of Electoral Reform with a general revision of the Constitution, in order to appease not only the National Opposition, but also to secure a general recognition of the Constitution, which they regard as an indispensable condition for the consolidation of the Austrian Empire, and as the main task of the statesmen to whose care are entrusted the government and the destinies of the country. Such was the real cause of the late split in the

Cabinet. It is possible that other and personal considerations, perhaps a want of political friendship, might have promoted the outbreak of the crisis; be this as it may, Electoral Reform, *with* or *without* a compromise with the nationalities, is the focal point of the present difficult situation—a solution of which, as a new phase of development, is looked forward to by all parties with the greatest anxiety. This crisis presents certain peculiar characteristics which are worthy of note. On the one hand, there is a sort of vague apprehension of an anti-Liberal reaction; on the other, the fact that at this critical moment the hopes of one ministerial party, and the upbraidings of the other, are both concentrated in, and directed against, the man who occupies the most prominent position in Austria—the Imperial Chancellor, Count Beust.

The limited political education of the masses, and the consequently defective state of public opinion in Austria, are the natural consequences of the long reign of absolutism, engendering a sort of political superstition which has almost become indigenous to the Western half of the Empire. The entangled state of Austrian affairs during

the last ten years, the bitter experience of the past—proving that the authority of the day is the nonentity of the morrow—and the artificially-nourished pessimism, which has so long prevailed, render it intelligible that all political acts in the present day, however worthy of being received with confidence, are treated with distrust. We have before us the anomalous spectacle of a people who, although in possession of extensive constitutional rights, such as may not be inaptly compared with those granted in our own Magna Charta, are so little able to appreciate their political freedom that they indulge in perpetual visionary apprehensions of the possibility of their being any day deprived of it by a mere stroke of the pen. And why? Simply because, as explained above, there happened to be a temporary diversity of opinion amongst the advisers of the Crown. It may here not be irrelevant to remark, in further illustration of what we advance, that the good-natured, most impressionable and light-hearted Austrian, is essentially the creature of the moment, and, therefore, easily given to forget services rendered to him. It is thus

that, although Count Beust has done so much for the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in her hour of dire necessity, reinstating her in her former proud position in the council of nations, the people still give themselves up to the groundless apprehension that that eminent statesman's policy will yet cause the downfall of Austria, and thus verify the malicious predictions of the worst enemies of the country, namely, the feudal ultramontane bigots there and elsewhere. Since Count Beust has assumed the leading position in the Council of the Empire, he has naturally, also, been the prime mover of political life in Austria; at home and abroad he has been generally recognised as the genial promoter of all free institutions. It can be no matter of surprise, therefore, if in the present crisis all eyes in the Austrian dominions are chiefly concentrated upon him.

Time was when Austria and Austrian affairs found but little favour amongst English statesmen and politicians. Our free country could not sympathise with absolute rule. This has for ever passed away—thanks, in a great measure, to the energy and ability of the statesman whose political

career in Austria we propose in these pages briefly to trace—and has given place to a constitutional rule as liberal and as broad as that which has for centuries blessed our own country.

The task we have imposed upon ourselves, in view of the present state of affairs in Austria, is to recall the leading ideas which have hitherto guided Count Beust's internal and foreign policy, as being based upon truly liberal and enlightened principles. In so doing we shall adhere strictly to facts, which we lay before our readers fearlessly and impartially—


“Sine ira et studio.”

London, February, 1870.

PART I.



THE NEW CONSTITUTION.



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE

AND THE POLICY OF COUNT BEUST.

PART I.

THE NEW CONSTITUTION.

BARON BEUST was appointed Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs in virtue of a decree dated Prague, 30th of October, 1866, and signed by the Emperor Francis Joseph I., who was then travelling through that part of his dominions which had suffered the most in the recent disastrous war. This was, however, not the first time that the name of Baron Beust had been connected with the destinies of the Austrian empire. At the Congress of German princes held at Frankfort on the 17th of August, 1863, the attention of politicians was directed, by the public press and otherwise, to the then Saxon Prime Minister, and the idea of one day securing his diplomatic talents and services for

Austria was there mooted. But this idea, like the one which had led to the assembly of the German princes, was not destined at that time to be realized. Count Rechberg was intrusted with the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, and he immediately involved Austria, as the ally of Prussia, in the predatory and unjust war of Schleswig-Holstein. Here, again, the Saxon Minister was called upon to play a prominent part. He was sent by the Germanic Confederation, as their delegate, to the Conference of London, and there won the esteem of all who had occasion to come in contact with him. On the retirement of Count Rechberg from office, the name of Baron Beust was again introduced into the political combinations formed at Vienna, but was set aside by the appointment of Count Mensdorff. At the critical moment when the war of 1866 had become imminent, and when the Prussian armies had already commenced their march upon Saxony and Bohemia, the name of the Saxon statesman was once more mentioned at Vienna. But it was then too late. The events of that disastrous war were far too rapid to admit of the possibility of a change in the Cabinet at such

a crisis. At last the Imperial decree called upon Baron Beust to undertake the ministry of Foreign Affairs. But at what a moment, and under what conditions, did he enter upon his arduous and responsible task! A war had just been waged which, for speedy victories on one side, and fearful reverses on the other, is unparalleled in the annals of history. The din of battle had hardly ceased, its smoke had scarce cleared away, the people's hopes had been replaced by the sullenness of despair; Austria had lost all confidence in herself and her future. An important Vienna journal of the day graphically described the state of affairs as follows:—"M. de Beust, at the moment when he is called upon to take charge of affairs, finds a great empire in a condition of material exhaustion and neglect, and, what is still worse, in a state of absolute and most lamentable prostration." This was a true sketch of the internal state of the country. The wounds the war had inflicted on the material welfare of the Northern Provinces were still gaping. A senseless and unscrupulous paper circulation had caused a stagnation of trade at home, and an improvident

financial policy had greatly injured the credit of the Empire abroad. The conflict amongst the nationalities which had been called forth by the violent suspension of the rights which had been constitutionally guaranteed to them, was still raging ; Austria's power was broken, her authority destroyed, her armies defeated and almost annihilated, the position she had for centuries held in Germany lost. Earnest statesmen already entertained the idea of her dismemberment, which was feared even by those who most wished for her integrity. Without friends, or aid of any kind, her people were helpless, prostrate, and discouraged. Such was the political and social position which Baron Beust had to face on becoming Minister. A sad inheritance indeed, and rendered still sadder by the fact that the political situation imposed upon him the necessity of acting in concert with those very persons who were almost entirely responsible for this lamentable state of things. His advent to office shed a ray of hope through the darkness ; political parties rallied round him, not because they trusted him implicitly, but simply because they looked upon him as the man who alone, in so

fearful a storm, might possibly be able to pilot the ship into harbour and avert its threatened destruction.

No historian has as yet written upon that ^{The "inhibition period."} unfortunate epoch, termed the "inhibition period," when by a stroke of the pen the Constitution of 1861 was suspended. Even at the present day the real motives which caused that Constitution to be done to a sudden death are veiled in mystery. The men of that disastrous period were Count Esterhazy, the Hungarian, and Count Belcredi, the Austrian Minister. It is possible that their intentions may have been good; but they still cannot escape the merited reproach of having been the first to cause general dissatisfaction throughout the empire by suddenly withdrawing the people's newly-acquired constitutional rights, and recklessly involving Austria in a twofold war, at a moment when her material and moral strength were both insufficient for the task. People in Austria have become accustomed to regard Count Belcredi as the father of the Act suspending the Constitution, simply because he countersigned the Imperial decree. Far be it from us to detract

Count Ester-
hazy.

in the least from Count Belcredi's claim to the merit of having originated this extraordinary Act, which, for arbitrariness, might be compared with Cromwell's violent and imperious dissolution of the Rump Parliament. If we assign him a second place in this political drama, it is because "Palmarum qui meruit ferat;" the first belongs of right to Count Esterhazy. It was the latter that conceived the great idea of "inhibition;" when Count Belcredi entered the Cabinet, the Act was prepared, and only required confirmation. Count Esterhazy's statesmanship was as astute as it was energetic. His object was simply to re-establish absolute rule, with its feudo-clerical supporters, as it had existed before 1848. A sort of political Rip Van Winkle, he seemed to have passed the last twenty years in sleepy ignorance of men and events, and to have awoke suddenly in the belief that, as with himself, all had remained in *statu quo*. He was, however, too much of a Hungarian not to know that to set aside entirely the Hungarian Constitution would be a matter of absolute impossibility. He therefore proposed to leave the Hungarian Diet intact as it had existed prior to 1848, taking care not to make

any mention of the other changes and acquisitions which that eventful year had brought about. In the hereditary provinces, on the other hand, parliamentary government was to be entirely abolished, although, to save appearances, the provincial constitutions, as they were previous to 1848, were to be maintained. These constitutions, however, being based on a purely rank and class system of representation, were without influence in the State. Count Esterhazy thought to attain both of the above objects at one blow by suspending the Constitution of February. Credit for a certain amount of acuteness is due to him, for he endeavoured, by alluding to the necessity of constitutionalism, to cover what was really the purest absolutism with a thin varnish of imaginary liberty ; and, strange to say, some few believed in this plausible subterfuge. In their one aim, the creation of an absolute head in the State, both Belcredi and Esterhazy fully concurred, with this difference, however, that the former wished to create a supreme absolute government by means of a Federal partition of the realm, while the latter hoped to attain his object by reviving the Dualism which had existed before

1848. The natural consequence of these concomitant aims was, that Belcredi and Esterhazy both resolutely opposed themselves to the creation of any sort of parliamentary representative power, either on this or the other side of the Leitha. Hence Esterhazy's refusal to accord to the Hungarians a separate Hungarian parliamentary ministry; hence the persistent silence of Belcredi touching the "legal representatives" to whose consideration and votes the compromise with Hungary was, according to the September manifesto,* to be submitted. In the elastic phrase which he employed concerning the "legal representatives," Belcredi imagined that he had found a counterpoise to the claims of Hungary, whose strength had already at that period greatly increased. If, in his estimation, the concessions which Esterhazy proposed to make to the Hungarians should be too sweeping, then these mythical "legal representatives" would be transformed into a predominant Slavonic Reichsrath, which might then be used for the purpose of giving a casting vote for the rejection of the proposed concessions.

Count Bel-
credi.

* See Note III.

But if the concessions to Hungary should be made in the manner which Counts Belcredi and Esterhazy equally approved, then the seventeen Diets in Western Austria would give a tangible form to the "legal representatives;" and their votes would in that case simply be regarded as consultative, and recorded accordingly. The "inhibitory" policy, in a word, consisted of, first, the re-establishment in Hungary of the Constitution which existed before 1848; second, the suspension in Austria of the system of central representation, and an endeavour to patch up the differences of the rival nationalities in the seventeen diets; and, third, the exclusion of anything like parliamentary government, and the ultimate concentration of power in an absolute head. A greater political blunder can hardly be imagined than a policy of undermining the public confidence in legal rights by an arbitrary suspension of the Constitution, and then forcing the powerful German element into the ranks of the Opposition by an entire disregard of its importance. It was only natural that such a policy on the part of the Government should kindle amongst the various parties a spirit of the most determined resistance.

The Hunga-
rians.

In Western Austria Count Belcredi's manœuvres met with nothing but condemnation on the part of the whole liberal German population, as also from the national opposition, who soon perceived that nothing was being done in Vienna for the fulfilment of their political dreams. In Hungarian affairs bore a still worse aspect, notwithstanding that the ministry were disposed to make all sorts of trifling concessions. Every attempt at negotiation with the leaders of the Hungarian party was fruitless, inasmuch as Déak, though willing to accept an arrangement of the minor claims of the Hungarians, yet never ceased to insist upon the establishment of a responsible Hungarian ministry. At that time the principles of the compromise afterwards made with Hungary by the recognition of the laws of 1848, were fully established. In this, again, the then Austrian ministry committed a great blunder, for by admitting, even in principle, the restitution of the laws of 1848, and the consequent autonomical existence of Hungary, the projected financial arrangement between Austria and Hungary was greatly prejudiced, as it was evident that the moment Hungary was independent

of Austria, she would demand as a right that which she would previously have accepted as a concession. Déak immediately foresaw this result, and said "that Hungary would meet the question of finance in an equitable spirit, and with due political consideration, but that she did not in the least regard it as a matter of obligation." From this it will be seen how unjust it is to blame Count Beust exclusively for the financial arrangement which he long afterwards carried out with Hungary, and which was attended with such heavy sacrifices on the part of the western half of the empire. He expected only to be called upon to direct the affairs of the country abroad, whereas he also had to rectify the grave errors committed by his predecessors in office at home.

The hopes of the liberal German party in Western Austria were now concentrated in the new Minister. In political circles it was predicted that he would restore the Constitution on both sides of the Leitha, and make the German liberal element the political centre of Western Austria. This opinion was strengthened by the dismissal of Counts Esterhazy and Mensdorff. Men of experience felt that

the new minister could not possibly support that absolute bureaucratic policy which had so long stifled all national feelings and impeded all progress in Austria, and that he intended to strike once more into that constitutional path which represents the only form of government compatible with the dignity, interests, and destinies of a great nation. The reaction from Absolutism to Constitutionalism was very strong. Once freed from the supporters of the former system, the people looked with the greatest anxiety and confidence to the man who was to restore the latter, and with it political and religious freedom. Such were the sentiments which greeted Baron Beust on his appointment. "Liberal Constitutionalism" was inscribed on his shield when he entered the political arena; the many sharp blows aimed at him have not effaced this motto, and we trust and believe he will remain unshaken at his post so long as he continues the champion of such thoroughly English principles. Hungary afforded him almost the first field for his labours. That country having already enjoyed a foretaste of constitutional independence, was unwilling, even in the face of

Appointment
of Baron
Beust.

so great a misfortune as Sadowa, any longer to delay the settlement of its claims; and the conviction became general that this should be effected immediately. Déak and his party were decided that the only possible arrangement was the institution of a complete *dualistic* government. They urged that both the history and geographical position of their country were in favour of such a system; that, by deputing certain members of both parliaments, to be chosen by the Austrian and Hungarian chambers (afterwards called the "delegations"), to meet alternately at Vienna and Pesth, questions of common interest to the whole empire could be discussed and settled as well as if a central general parliament existed; and the centralists eagerly favoured this idea, in the hope that the delegations would become the germs of a new united parliament. Déak's dualistic policy rapidly gained ground. The National Party, and more especially the Czechs, strenuously opposed it, clearly foreseeing that with its adoption all hopes of a federal government would at once vanish. The German liberal party, on the other hand, approved of Déak's views,

The "dualistic" policy.

and held a meeting in Aussee, in which they accepted them in principle, and pledged themselves to prevent the provincial diets from entering upon useless discussions on the Hungarian question. They also recommended the concentration of their party in opposition to the policy of Count Belcredi.

The dismissal of Esterhazy now rendered Belcredi's position more difficult than ever. He saw himself compelled, at the very moment when the aspect of Hungarian affairs was becoming more favourable, to abandon his vacillating policy and proclaim a definite programme. Baron Beust, to whom the ground was entirely new, was obliged to proceed slowly and with the greatest circumspection; and thus was Belcredi enabled, though only for the time, to keep pace with him. It was evident to Baron Beust that the Hungarian question could no longer be shelved, and that its solution must be attended with considerable sacrifices on the part of the western portion of the empire, for which the restoration of a parliamentary and constitutional government could alone compensate. This task of rehabilitation was what he proposed to accomplish. Three days after his assuming

office, the "Wiener Abendpost" (the evening edition of the official Austrian paper) published a sort of programme of the constitutional question, which, it asserted, "must rapidly advance on the path of liberty," at the same time calling attention to the existence of many identical interests in the western half of the empire, and the necessity of a union of the various parties.

The idea of a constitutional Reichsrath now ^{A constitutional Reichsrath.} began to assume a positive form, and it was clear to all that Belcredi's famous "legal representatives" would never be called into existence. Meanwhile, on the 19th November, 1866, the Hungarian parliament was opened, and the Imperial rescript read. It admitted that the project of a compromise originated by the Déak party afforded a suitable starting-point for further negotiations, and held out hopes of the appointment of a responsible Hungarian ministry; but, at the same time, it announced the resolve of the Crown to carry out the system of responsible government, not only in Hungary, but also generally throughout the empire.

Shortly after this, Baron Beust, accompanied

by the President of the Hungarian "Chancellerie," M. de Mailath, proceeded to Pesth, where he had a long conference with Déak. The result of this conference enabled the "Pesti Naplo" (the Hungarian organ of the Déak party) to state, a few days before the close of the year, that Baron Beust had held out the positive assurance that the speedy nomination of a Hungarian ministry was contemplated. But no sooner did Belcredi see that the compromise with Hungary was likely to be carried out, than he endeavoured to oppose it by what he termed the "Equiposing vote of the legal representatives," in order at least to save this one political idea of his September policy. The positive dualistic form of government which the Germano-Austrian Diets had accepted in their addresses, rendered it clear to Belcredi that he needed a Slavonic majority, in order to enable him to modify the concessions granted to Hungary, and, in case of need, to counteract them entirely. With this object he urged the convocation of an assembly of the collective representatives of the Cis-Leithan division of the Empire. This body, called the "Extraordinary Reichsrath," was to be

The "Extraordinary Reichsrath."

composed mainly of Slaves, and assembled for the purpose of determining on what principles the Austrian State should be reconstructed. He felt convinced that the further execution of the scheme which he had originally concocted with Esterhazy had now become impossible, and hoped that by this means, although the arrangement with Hungary could no longer be prevented, it might, perhaps, be paralysed. At the same time, by proposing the "Extraordinary Reichsrath," Belcredi stultified the whole of his past federalistic policy, for the new representative body was only to be elected from that portion of the empire which is on this side of the Leitha, and thus excluded Hungary altogether. It cannot be doubted that Baron Beust insensibly led him on to adopt this plan, in order that the way might once more be cleared for the erection of the parliamentary tribune in Western Austria. The political short-sightedness of many who did not perceive the true object of these diplomatic tactics, has since led them to accuse Baron Beust of inconsistency, because he had signed his name to the patent calling together the "Extraordinary

Reichsrath." They forgot that he had only been a very short time in the service of Austria,—that he was not the omnipotent statesman whose will was alone decisive,—and that, notwithstanding, he had managed so cleverly that in the face of the "September Patent," which was still in existence, the first step had been taken to rehabilitate a constitutional central parliament in Cis-Leithania. Count Belcredi, as we have seen, took this step with a very different object—that of bringing about the rejection of the compromise with Hungary. His line of conduct and that of Baron Beust were in direct antagonism; and the latter carried his point by ultimately getting rid both of Belcredi and his "Extraordinary Reichsrath." The solidarity which had developed itself between Baron Beust and the constitutional parties since his entrance into the Austrian Cabinet, became manifest by their jointly combating the "Extraordinary Reichsrath," and the credit of Belcredi's downfall, which he modestly attributed to the opposition of the German party, really belonged to him. His object was simply the restoration of a constitutional régime; and this he attained when, simultaneously

with the dismissal of Belcredi, Western Austria was once again placed in possession of her parliamentary rights. If Count Belcredi, on the one hand, imagined that he could use the Slaves in the "Extraordinary Reichsrath" as a sort of counterpoise to the Hungarians, Baron Beust, on the other, conceived the idea, which was politically correct, that, like the Magyar element in Hungary, the German element in Western Austria, by virtue of its superior civilization, historical traditions, and, above all, the duration of the rights to which it laid claim, was essentially adapted to assume a prominent leading position. He deemed, and rightly, that there was no necessity, nor was there time in the then urgent state of affairs, to reconstitute Austria either by making a *tabula rasa* of its past and present political institutions, or by creating and establishing new principles of government by means of a constituent assembly. The first step to be taken was to effect the compromise with Hungary; and this, according to the tenor of the project which then already existed, was based upon the principle of a dualism which as clearly defined the position of the Germans in

Western Austria as that of the Magyars in Hungary. Public opinion was neither prepared for, nor favourable to, the idea of a federalistic formation of the Cis-Leithan Empire, which would have rendered a compromise with Hungary impossible. Political creations in constitutional states are always the result of the situation for the time being, *i. e.*, the expression of the political exigencies of the moment. It was therefore necessary to hold fast to that which existed—the Constitution of February—and to that which was already projected—the compromise with Hungary. Thus that continuity of rights, upon which the German party so strenuously insisted, would be re-established, and the February Constitution at the same time modified in accordance with the new dualist organization. The German party demanded the restoration of the Constitution and the immediate convocation of the ordinary Reichsrath, declaring that their participation in the “Extraordinary Reichsrath” was altogether out of the question, as the proposal to summon the latter was nothing but a futile attempt to compensate them for the “inhibition policy.” Here we may ask, Were

these demands unreasonable? was it possible or right to disregard them at a moment when the sad events of 1866 had severed that connexion of the German element with their mother-country which had existed for a thousand years—when the verdict had been pronounced excluding them from any further participation in its destinies?

Meanwhile, Count Belcredi still continued to pursue the *ignis-fatuus* of his “Extraordinary Reichsrath,” in the hope, by attaining it, of succeeding in his design to create a predominant Slavonic representative body, and thereby prevent the Hungarian compromise, which Baron Beust had now seriously taken in hand. But Count Belcredi, whilst reckoning upon the Slavonic opposition, lost sight of the heterogeneous nature of the elements and opinions which composed it, and which had, consequently, never yet contributed to any statesmanlike calculation, or assisted in the achievement of any positive result. Both Czechs and Poles resolved to bide their time; and being certain, in consequence of the electoral agitation which had been powerfully influenced

by Belcredi, of the majority in the diets of Bohemia, Moravia, Carniola, and Galicia, they scrupulously abstained from pledging themselves to send delegates to the "Extraordinary Reichsrath," though they insinuated that they might possibly do so, provided that body, by its exclusively consultative character, should not have the power to prejudice the resolutions of the Diets. While everybody was preparing for the approaching electoral contest, the negotiations of Baron Beust for the compromise with Hungary were making great progress, and the deputation of the Hungarian Diet, which was received by the Emperor on the 8th of January, 1867, although ostensibly charged to present the congratulations of the country, was really sent only to further and assist in the completion of the work. This deputation—which was headed by the most prominent of the Hungarian leaders, Count Andrassy—after reporting its success to Déak on the 14th of January, 1867, returned to Vienna on the 19th of the same month. Already, on the 23rd, the Emperor declared, in reply to the address voted by the Hungarian Diet against the *octroyé* supplementary

army law, that "He would be ready to accede to the wishes of the country so soon as the difficulties which still hindered the formation of a responsible Hungarian Ministry were removed." These obstacles soon began to vanish before the united action of Beust and Andrassy, and with them passed away the feeling of distrust against the Hungarians which Belcredi had endeavoured to instil into the minds of men of the highest position in the State. The Diet at Pesth, or rather the Committee of sixty-seven members of the Lower House, basing their deliberations upon the agreement come to at Vienna, commenced the discussion of the project concerning the State affairs which were to be regarded as common to both halves of the Empire, and thus, to a certain extent, endeavoured finally to establish the wording of the enactment for the compromise. Events in Western Austria kept pace with those in Hungary. For although, in consequence of the influence brought to bear by Count Belcredi upon the great landed proprietors and upon the legion of State officials, the elections for the Bohemian, Moravian, Carniolan and Galician Diets resulted in a decided

victory of the National and Federalistic party, the Count could not rely upon the majorities of these Diets sending their delegates to the "Extraordinary Reichsrath." They maintained an obstinate silence as to their intentions, and their electoral speeches, in so far as they contained protests against the compromise with Hungary, mostly indicated the existence of Federalistic tendencies. The recognition, on the other hand, of the necessity of such a compromise, assumed a more decided character at the elections in the specifically German provinces, and in the ranks of the Germano-Bohemian Constitutional party. In conformity with the *mot d'ordre* of the day, the elections in these parts of the Empire were carried through in a manner decidedly favourable to Hungary; and, although it was insisted upon that to render the compromise with Hungary perfect, it would be necessary to submit it to the approval of the Cis-Leithan Empire, yet many symptoms were observable in these quarters which led to the conclusion that the final acceptance of the project, the conditions of which had become public, might safely be calculated upon. Count

Belcredi was completely checkmated. He could not win the game with the last piece he had played, the "Extraordinary Reichsrath," for the Germans declined all participation in it, and the Slaves remained passive spectators, so that in the most favourable event he could only have got together a "Rump Parliament." In like manner, his former line of policy prevented him from being able to convoke the ordinary Reichsrath. It was evident that both himself and his notions of government had become political impossibilities which must be at once removed; and the Emperor accordingly, on the 7th of February, 1867, signed the decree depriving him of his office. Simultaneously with the dismissal of Belcredi, Baron Beust was appointed Prime Minister, with the charge of the Ministry of Police and the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. Matters now progressed with extraordinary rapidity. On the 18th of February, an Imperial message was communicated to the Diets, stating that the idea of an "Extraordinary Reichsrath" had been altogether abandoned; that the Constitutional Reichsrath would be convoked

Dismissal
of Count
Belcredi, and
appointment
of Baron
Beust as
Prime
Minister.

on the 18th of March, 1867; and that the following important bills, among others, would then be brought in:—1st. For the necessary modifications in the Constitution consequent on the compromise with Hungary. 2nd. For the creation of a responsible Ministry. 3rd. For the extension of autonomical government in the provinces. 4th. For the alteration and improvement of the system of National Defences. 5th. For the amelioration of the mode of judicial procedure.

Baron Beust had now established the two leading features of his policy: the compromise with Hungary, and the restoration of parliamentary rule throughout the Empire. What remained for him to do was to carry out the details of these great changes, so that the burthens as well as the advantages of them should be distributed equally between Hungary and Western Austria. And here he showed remarkable tact, for, having once more recalled to life the Parliamentary Government of the country, he abstained from further interference, and left the finishing strokes to the great assemblies of the people. The dismissal of Belcredi greatly facilitated the final

arrangement of the Hungarian compromise. At the request of the Emperor, Déak came to Vienna, and was able to assure the monarch, in the name of his party, of the complete acceptance by the Hungarians of the project of 1867, in the event of the creation of a responsible Hungarian Ministry. Déak's visit banished from the minds of the people in Vienna every lingering remnant of distrust towards Hungary; and on the 11th of February, Count Andrassy, whom public opinion in Hungary had designated for the post of Minister President, arrived in the capital, and received from the Emperor the decree appointing him to that high office, and at the same time intrusting him with the formation of a Hungarian Ministry.

Formation of
a responsible
Hungarian
Ministry.

The Imperial and Royal rescript officially published on the 17th of February, conferred upon Hungary the restitution of her full parliamentary rights. It now became her duty to realize the pledges given by her leaders, and, by making concessions to the unity of the Empire, to assist in consolidating its existence and power. These concessions, which are contained in the project of

the Committee of sixty-seven above alluded to, consisted of the definition of the affairs which were to be regarded as common to both halves of the Empire, and of the creation of a common medium for their constitutional management. Hungary was thus to be joined to Western Austria by an indissoluble tie, and the principle of the Pragmatic Sanction, which recognises the legislative and administrative independence of Hungary, and at the same time declares the indivisibility of the countries belonging to the House of Hapsburg, was clad in a new form. "Affairs in common" were defined to mean the direction of the foreign policy of the Empire, together with its diplomatic representation abroad, and a joint army under the supreme command of the Emperor. Both parts of the Empire were to contribute proportionately to the cost of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the Army. Hungary was likewise to contribute to the interest of the State debt. All international treaties were to receive the sanction of both legislatures. All affairs requiring equal consideration, such as the Customs dues, indirect taxes, and the currency, were also to be

regulated by treaties, subject to the approval of both moieties of the realm.

In order to regulate the proper constitutional management of the affairs "in common," the institution of the "delegations" was introduced. Each legislature annually elects a delegation consisting of sixty members (forty of whom are elected by each of the lower houses, and twenty by each of the upper houses). These delegations assemble alternately at Vienna and Pesth for the purpose of confidentially discussing the analogous bills or propositions of the Government, and of communicating to each other the resolutions come to thereon, exchanging views on points of difference, and, in case no agreement is arrived at, proceeding to a division without a debate. The concordant resolutions of both delegations are sanctioned by the monarch as common laws, the execution of which is intrusted to the ministries of both countries. Finally, the joint Austro-Hungarian Ministers are responsible to the delegations, which also vote the Budget. This is the substance of the principal resolutions of the commission of the "sixty-seven," which were accepted on the 30th of March by the

The "delegations."

Hungarian Lower House, and on the 3rd of April by the Hungarian Upper House. Thus were the pledges of the Hungarian leaders faithfully redeemed, and the rejoicings which resounded far and

Coronation
of the Empe-
ror as King
of Hungary.

near on the Coronation of the Emperor Francis Joseph I. as King of Hungary, at Buda-Pesth, in June, 1867, presented to Europe the spectacle of a contented Hungary and a resuscitated Austria. The tranquillity which the consummation of the compromise brought about in Hungary did not, however, extend to the Cis-Leithan portion of the Empire, where, on the contrary, affairs now became even more complicated than before. The Federalistic majorities of the Bohemian, Moravian, and Carniolan Diets were resolved to send their delegates only to Count Belcredi's abortive "Extraordinary Reichsrath;" and they were consequently at once dissolved. The Galician Diet also manifested symptoms of resistance, but was deterred by the energetic conduct of the Government towards the other Diets. The remaining provincial assemblies proceeded, without raising any difficulties, to the election of their delegates to the Reichsrath, and, after the lapse of a few

weeks, the newly-elected Diets of Bohemia, Moravia, and Carniola did the same. The termination of the elections, however, and the meeting of the Reichsrath, only represented a partial solution of the difficulty. The resistance of the national and federalistic opposition was certainly broken up; but, on the other hand, the German Constitutional party was in a state of utter disorganization, and could not agree upon unanimous action, as the centralists continued their agitation against the Hungarian compromise. This state of political atrophy (as the present President of the Lower House, Dr. Kaiserfeld, very aptly designated the then state of things) had to be overcome. It was necessary that confidence in the intentions of the Government should be re-established, and proofs be adduced that the liberal reforms which the Emperor had already announced in his messages to the Diets, were not merely to be carried out for the purpose of gaining willing shoulders to bear the burthens imposed upon Western Austria by the compromise with Hungary, but also to create and insure to this side of the Leitha a state of affairs which should be strictly liberal

Opening of
the Reichs-
rath.

and constitutional. The Austrian Parliament reassembled for the first time, after a lapse of two years, on the 22nd of May, 1867. On the opening of the Reichsrath, Baron Beust, true to the constitutional idea which guided his policy throughout, intimated that the moment had arrived when parliamentary government should be once more firmly established in Western Austria, by the introduction of a responsible ministry chosen from amongst the party represented by the majority of the House. This was not the first attempt on the part of Baron Beust to form a parliamentary cabinet. He had tried in the preceding month and had failed, because the leader of the German party in Bohemia, to whom he had addressed himself, had refused his assistance. He then opened negotiations with some of the parliamentary majority, with the view of inducing them to form a cabinet, as the Hungarians had done—but in vain. They categorically refused to join a ministry until the arrangement with Hungary should have been formally accepted in Cis-Leithania, and until the existing state of things should have so far become settled that they could

in full confidence reckon upon its solidity and permanence. The difficult task which Baron Beust had undertaken of reintroducing parliamentary government into Western Austria was rendered still more arduous by the national opposition, headed by Galicia, who demanded for herself a special separate position. To accede to these demands was of course out of the question ; but the Minister saw that it was necessary to enter into negotiations, and to make small concessions in order as soon as possible to arrive at the consolidation of the new constitutional system. It is not our object in these pages to write a panegyric of Baron Beust, but the simple facts in themselves show how entirely and successfully he devoted himself to the regeneration of Austria. The hearty and repeated *elzens* with which the Hungarians greeted him when he rode through Pesth among the staff of the Emperor on the day of the coronation, afforded ample proof of how thoroughly his labours on behalf of the Hungarian compromise were appreciated. In Western Austria, too, the last trace of distrust vanished from the minds of the people when the announcement made by the Emperor in

his speech from the throne, that in future there would be a responsible government, was realized by the bill being laid on the table of the House in which he granted a general amnesty to all political offenders. Thus the past was for ever to be forgotten, and an entirely new liberal era inaugurated. His Majesty also availed himself of this momentous occasion to testify his high appreciation of the signal services rendered by Baron Beust to the Empire in her hour of need, as well as his unbounded confidence in his continued zeal. This could not have been done in a more striking manner than by his conferring upon the Minister, on the 23rd of June, 1867, the rank and title of "Chancellor of the Empire"—a dignity which had been given only twice before in Austria, and on both occasions to statesmen of the highest political and social standing, viz., Prince Kaunitz and Prince Metternich.

Appointment
of Baron
Beust as
Chancellor
of the
Empire.

Some delay necessarily ensued in the election of the members who were to constitute a commission for the purpose of arranging the financial portion of the compromise with Hungary, and determining the quota it should contribute to the common

expenses of the realm and the payment of the interest of the State debt. On the 3rd of July the Lower House passed the revised laws, and elected ten deputies to carry out the details; thus for the first time acknowledging the dualism of the Empire as an established fact.

The changes which Baron Beust was introducing into Austria were so rapid and sweeping that the country was hardly recognisable to those who knew it in the days of Absolutism, supported by a mixed rule of soldiers and bureaucrats. It seemed to have passed through a long and dangerous illness, ending in a crisis which was once more to restore it to convalescence and health. That such radical reforms should meet with opposition from a portion of the great hereditary aristocracy is not to be wondered at. Feudo-clerical ideas had been instilled into them from their birth, and they naturally looked with dismay at the broad liberal views of the strange minister who, without pandering to democracy, was yet determined to break down every barrier to progress, and give the people the rights so long withheld from them. But the reactionists were disappointed in their hopes

The reactionary party.

of the support of one upon whom they reckoned for the frustration of what they considered the wicked machinations of the Saxon minister. They felt sure that the representative of the House of Hapsburg would veto this bloodless revolution, which, by diminishing the privileges of their caste, was, in their eyes, to bring ruin to the land. They were happily mistaken. The Emperor, from the moment when he wisely decided that Absolutism should make way for parliamentary rule, unflinchingly and consistently maintained and facilitated the latter system of government, and never, either then or since, held out the slightest encouragement to the reactionary party. The Liberals, who comprised the majority in the House, seeing that the principles they advocated were daily taking deeper root in the hearts of the people, now grew bolder, and proceeded at once to the discussion of those questions which they deemed of the most vital import. First and foremost amongst these was the Concordat. They felt that if Austria was really once again to become vigorous and truly liberal, she must be freed from this hurtful and obnoxious convention, and from the undue inter-

The Em-
peror.

The Con-
cordat.

ference of the Roman clergy. To this end two bills were laid before the House—one by Dr. Mühl-^{Religious and Military Reform.}feld, termed a “Religious Edict,” cancelling all existing relations between Church and State; the other by Dr. Herbst, the present minister of justice, less sweeping and more diplomatic in its details, termed the “Confessional Laws.”* The office of Adjutant-General to the Emperor† was also abolished at this time (the 11th July, 1867), as it was proved beyond doubt that it was the real cause of most of the abuses of the military system in Austria.

The idea of a parliamentary ministry, which Baron Beust had twice broached without success, owing to the opposition of the parliamentary leaders, now again arose. This time it emanated from the Finance Commission, who were most desirous that such a ministry should be formed, in

* See Note IV.

† The office of “Adjutant-General” (“General Adjutantur”) must not be taken in the English sense of the word. It here means a military cabinet, in which the supreme military influence was in immediate and constant contact with the sovereign. It may be added that this influence was not always exclusively confined to military affairs, but also interfered to a lamentable extent with civil matters.

order to protect the interests of the western half of the empire in the arrangement with Hungary. Baron Beust on this occasion reminded the House that his previous attempts to create a responsible cabinet had been frustrated by its leaders, who had maintained that the question should be adjourned until the Hungarian compromise should have been accepted by Cis-Leithania. Owing to their opposition, the matter had hitherto remained in abeyance, and they would, therefore, still be able to enjoy the advantage of participating, as members of the Reichsrath, in the constitutional regeneration of their country, without incurring any other than a moral responsibility for their acts. The House then steadily resumed its labours. It passed the law establishing ministerial responsibility, and a most liberal enactment relative to the "right of association;" and on the 25th of July, 1867, adjourned to make place for the Cis and Trans-Leithan Commissioners who were to complete the financial arrangements of the Hungarian Compromise. The meeting of this Commission was a source of great anxiety and difficulty to Baron Beust, for he had to act as mediator, and as such it

Ministerial
responsi-
bility.
Right of
meeting.

Financial
arrange-
ments
between
Hungary and
Western
Austria.

was his duty to be most careful lest he should lay himself open to the slightest charge of partiality. The Hungarians were quite unanimous in relying upon the concessions settled under the ministry of Esterhazy and Baron Beust, and honestly and ably supported by the late finance minister, Baron Becke, who had been obliged to do his utmost to diminish their claims. After very long and protracted negotiations, the final proportion of the contributions of the two halves of the Empire was determined upon. The amount was arrived at by taking the average for ten years of the sums paid by the Hungarian provinces, which gave a proportion of 28 per cent. It was decided, on this basis, that Hungary should pay 30 per cent. and Western Austria 70 per cent., and that Hungary should contribute annually a sum of 30,200,000 florins towards the payment of the interest of the State debt. This arrangement was, of course, far more favourable to Hungary than to Western Austria, as by it nearly the whole burden of the Austrian debt fell on the shoulders of the Cis-Leithan provinces. It must be admitted that the Austrian delegation showed great patriotic self-

denial in making this sacrifice to the solidarity of the Empire, for they could, with the same right as the Hungarians, have taken their stand against an excessive contribution to the interest of the national debt, on the ground that this debt had been contracted by an absolute government, and had never received the sanction of their Diet. In this manner the Cis-Leithian Commissioners agreed to the Hungarian proposals, and thereby contributed their share to the work of reconstructing the Austrian empire. On the 23rd of September, 1867, the final protocol of the financial arrangement was ratified, and the compromise with Hungary, subject to the decision of the Reichsrath, completed. The heavy financial burthen which Western Austria had so willingly accepted as her share, although it was, in fact, the only possible means of settling with Hungary, was attended with one most unfortunate result. Austria found herself in the painful necessity of reducing the interest payable on her debt, not that she for a moment conceived the idea of repudiating her responsibility, but that it was out of her power—though, let us hope, only for a time—strictly to fulfil her engagements. We will

Reduction of
the interest
on the State
debt.

not attempt to discuss the expediency or rectitude of this step. It appears to us to have originated in a choice of evils ; for had the arrangement with Hungary not been carried out, Austria would have been compelled, by the force of circumstances, to reduce, not the interest of her debt alone, but the capital also. As this question of Austrian finance has been discussed with considerable acrimony in our journals, it may not be uninteresting to our readers to know all the facts in connection therewith. We therefore subjoin the following despatches, which prove how deeply the Austrian prime minister regretted the course he was obliged to adopt, though at the same time he held out the hope that at some not far distant day he would be able to indemnify the foreign holders of the Austrian loan of 1865 for the loss they have suffered :—

Le Baron de Beust au Prince de Metternich à Paris.

“ Vienne, le 26 mai, 1868.

“ Parmi les mesures financières soumises à la considération du Reichsrath et qui doivent prochainement faire l’objet des délibérations de cette Assemblée, se trouve le projet d’un impôt sur la rente dont toutes les valeurs publiques autrichiennes seraient frappées sans exception.

“ L’annonce de cette mesure a provoqué de nombreuses

réclamations, surtout de la part du gouvernement français, en faveur des porteurs de titres de l'emprunt autrichien de 1865, qui a été émis en grande partie en France avec l'autorisation du gouvernement français.

“ M. l'Ambassadeur de France m'a adressé à ce sujet, le 18 mars dernier, une Note dans laquelle, s'appuyant sur certaines conditions de l'émission du susdit emprunt, il revendique pour les coupons de cette valeur le droit d'être exemptés de toute charge ou retenue. Cette note a été suivie de plusieurs autres où M. le Duc de Gramont renouvelle ses observations, en me transmettant différentes réclamations individuelles envoyées de France à l'Ambassade.

“ Votre Altesse m'a également fait parvenir, de son côté, des protestations relatives au même objet et, en conséquence de ces démarches, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal n'a pas manqué de vouer la plus sérieuse attention à l'examen de cette question.

“ Après la plus mûre délibération, les Ministres de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique ne croient pas pouvoir modifier la nature des mesures financières proposées à l'adoption du Parlement, et ils ne regardent pas comme possible de soumettre à un traitement exceptionnel les titres de l'emprunt de 1865.

“ En invitant Votre Altesse de porter ce qui précède à la connaissance du gouvernement français, je résumerai ici les motifs principaux qui ont guidé les déterminations du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal.

“ Nul ne doutera, je pense, de la nécessité absolue où se trouve le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal d'aviser à tout prix au moyen de rétablir l'ordre dans les finances du pays. Des efforts constants ont été faits pour atteindre ce but, sans manquer à aucun des engagements contractés

envers les créanciers de l'Etat. Malheureusement, les crises que l'Autriche a dû traverser dans ces dernières années et qui étaient pour la plupart le fruit de complications européennes produites en dehors d'elle, à ses dépens, ont placé le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal dans l'impossibilité de supporter en entier le fardeau de la dette dont ses finances sont accablées. Après avoir imposé aux contribuables les plus lourds sacrifices, l'Etat se voit encore obligé de faire peser sur tous ses créanciers, sans distinction d'origine, une partie des charges destinées à rétablir l'équilibre financier. Les mesures à prendre dans ce sens sont, d'ailleurs, exclusivement du ressort de la législation intérieure, et nous ne saurions reconnaître en principe à un Gouvernement étranger le droit d'exercer une ingérence sur des dispositions générales appliquées aux porteurs de titres de rente sur l'Etat. En souscrivant aux emprunts contractés par l'Etat, ou en achetant des titres de ces emprunts, les étrangers savent d'avance qu'ils s'assimilent aux régnicoles, qu'ils s'exposent aux mêmes risques, comme ils recueillent les mêmes bénéfices, et qu'ils n'ont pas à prétendre à un traitement particulier.

“Il ne me paraît donc pas possible, en thèse générale, de réclamer pour les créanciers étrangers une position privilégiée, et je ne crois pas avoir à entrer sur ce point en discussion avec un autre Cabinet.

“En ce qui concerne l'emprunt autrichien de 1865, j'admets, toutefois, qu'il se trouve placé dans les conditions particulières qui justifient les démarches du gouvernement français et appellent un sérieux examen. Si le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne pense pas qu'une exception puisse être faite en faveur de cette catégorie d'obligations, il puise surtout cette conviction dans le

sentiment de sa situation vis-à-vis des Corps Représentatifs. Depuis que les pays qui forment l'Empire d'Autriche sont entrés en pleine jouissance des institutions constitutionnelles, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique est tenu, particulièrement en matière de finances, à se conformer aux vues des Corps Représentatifs, et il ne peut se borner à consulter sa seule volonté, ou ses seuls désirs. Quand même le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal aurait l'intention de complaire en cette circonstance aux vœux de la France, il rencontrerait un obstacle insurmontable dans les dispositions du Reichsrath. Il ne faut pas oublier, en effet, que l'emprunt de 1865, contracté à une époque où le contrôle exercé par la Représentation du pays était suspendu, n'a pas été revêtu de la sanction légale exigée par les lois constitutionnelles, et que la validité de cette opération n'est donc pas à l'abri de toute contestation.

“ Plus d'une objection a déjà été élevée, par ce motif, contre les charges que cet emprunt fait peser sur l'Etat, et si le Gouvernement voulait affranchir les détenteurs de cette valeur de l'impôt prélevé sur tous les autres créanciers de l'Etat, on risquerait fort de mettre entièrement en question les droits de cette catégorie de créanciers.

“ Nous recommandons cette considération à l'attention particulière du gouvernement français. Il a lui-même, ainsi que toute l'opinion publique en France, salué avec joie, comme un symptôme de progrès et de régénération, l'entrée de l'Autriche dans des voies libérales et constitutionnelles.

“ En acceptant les bénéfices d'un ordre de choses qui doit fortifier dans l'Autriche un allié sympathique à la France, il faut supporter en même temps les suites inévitables d'un

pareil système là où il froisse des intérêts que nous aurions aimé à ménager.

“ Le projet d'impôt frappe sans doute aujourd'hui d'une manière sensible les porteurs de titres de rente. Ce n'est assurément qu'à regret et sous l'empire d'une urgente nécessité que nous avons recours à des mesures dont nous ne cherchons pas à pallier la rigueur. Mais, en se rendant un compte exact de la situation, il est impossible de ne pas voir que des mesures radicales peuvent seules rétablir l'ordre dans nos finances, que les mesures en question présentent toutes les conditions voulues pour atteindre ce but, et qu'enfin le rétablissement des finances de l'Autriche fournira aux créanciers de l'Etat une compensation pour la diminution de leurs revenus, en augmentant et consolidant la valeur de leur capital. Le fait que le cours des valeurs publiques est loin d'avoir subi une dépréciation depuis que les mesures projetées sont connues du public, me paraît venir à l'appui de ce que j'avance. Il est évident par là que le jugement de la Bourse n'est point défavorable au nouveau plan financier, et qu'on en attend un heureux résultat pour la situation générale des finances.

“ Je puis encore remarquer ici que l'état fâcheux de nos finances contribue à entretenir le malaise et l'incertitude qui pèsent si lourdement sur toute la fortune publique de l'Europe.

“ Si nous parvenons à surmonter ces embarras intérieurs qui paralysent nos forces et étendent leur influence bien au delà de nos frontières, nous aurons rendu à la prospérité générale un essor capable de dédommager nos créanciers d'une perte momentanée. D'ailleurs si, comme je l'espère, une ère plus heureuse devait s'ouvrir pour les

finances de l'Autriche, et si elles redevenaient assez florissantes pour supporter des charges qui excèdent aujourd'hui ses forces, je serais très-disposé à recommander la prise en considération de mesures destinées à indemniser les porteurs de titres de l'emprunt de 1865 des pertes qu'ils auraient eu à subir.

“Veuillez soumettre ces observations à l'appréciation du gouvernement français. J'espère qu'il ne refusera pas de les juger avec l'impartialité amicale et éclairée que nous sommes habitués à trouver en lui. Qu'il soit surtout bien persuadé que nous avons tenu le plus grand compte de ses réclamations et des intérêts dont il s'est fait le représentant. Il n'a fallu rien moins que l'importance suprême de remédier à notre détresse financière et l'impossibilité d'amener la Représentation du pays à consentir à exempter une catégorie des créanciers de l'Etat des charges imposées à tous les autres pour décider le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal au maintien des mesures projetées. Il me paraît difficile de croire que les exigences de notre position ne soient pas comprises et qu'on ne sente pas que la meilleure volonté est parfois impuissante en face de la pression irrésistible des événements.

“Recevez, etc.”

Le Baron de Beust au Comte Apponyi à Londres.

“Vienne, le 9 juin, 1868.

“Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a approuvé la réponse préalable que Votre Excellence a faite à l'adresse que plusieurs banquiers de Londres Vous ont présentée dans la bonne intention de nous prémunir contre l'effet que les mesures de finance dont le Reichsrath est saisi en

ce moment pourraient exercer sur notre crédit. Des manifestations semblables, Votre Excellence le sait, nous sont parvenues d'autre part, et Vous aurez puisé dans les dépêches que j'ai adressées à ce sujet au Prince de Metternich, des arguments pour combattre des appréhensions exagérées.

“Pénétré de l'importance qu'il y aurait à nous assurer du bon vouloir et de la confiance de la cité de Londres, ce grand baromètre des fluctuations monétaires du monde, je crois devoir ajouter quelques remarques générales aux observations spéciales consignées dans nos dépêches précitées, afin de Vous mettre à même de défendre des mesures dictées par une nécessité pénible, mais urgente et de bien préciser le point de vue où s'est placé le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal vis-à-vis des créanciers de l'Etat.

“Appelé au pouvoir par la confiance de l'Empereur-Roi, notre Auguste Maître, dans des circonstances rendues encore plus critiques par le défaut de confiance que Gouvernants et Gouvernés, le lendemain d'une sanglante catastrophe, manifestaient en eux-mêmes, j'ai trouvé dans les commencements de mon Ministère l'Europe préparée au spectacle d'une banqueroute morale, politique et financière. L'Empereur-Roi seul nous donna alors l'exemple d'un courage et d'une énergie que les historiens de notre époque apprécieront mieux que ne le peuvent les contemporains. La guérison des plaies saignantes que Sa Majesté Apostolique avait entreprise dépendait en premier lieu d'un arrangement définitif avec les peuples qui relèvent de la Couronne de St.-Etienne. Rendre justice pleine et entière à la chevaleresque nation à laquelle Vous êtes fier d'appartenir, M. le Comte, ce fut le premier désir de notre

Auguste Souverain, le premier ordre qu'il daigna me donner lorsqu'il m'appela dans son Conseil.

“ On a bien voulu reconnaître que je n'ai pas perdu mon temps pour obéir à cette auguste inspiration. Le rétablissement de la paix intérieure fut le premier fruit de nos labeurs, et les amis de l'Autriche voulurent bien me féliciter dans le temps de la promptitude avec laquelle les négociations furent conduites, qui aboutirent au couronnement de l'Empereur-Roi. L'arrangement dû à la modération des parties intéressées eût été impossible, si l'on avait voulu en exclure les questions de finance. Il était urgent, quitte à ne pas réussir, d'aborder sur-le-champ ces problèmes épineux qui auraient exigé des études plus approfondies que les circonstances ne le permettaient. Il fallait trancher des questions vitales et les résoudre de manière à exclure la possibilité d'y revenir au risque de compromettre le tout.

“ L'arrangement où nous sommes entrés avec la Hongrie est toutefois la première cause de la situation anormale où s'est trouvé le Ministère Cisleithanien le jour même de sa formation. Ministère constitutionnel avant tout, représentant de la majorité du Reichsrath, le Gouvernement formé par le Prince Auersperg a dû compter avec le fait accompli d'un arrangement indispensable avec la Hongrie tout aussi bien qu'avec les passions et les exigences d'un parlement jeune et se montrant pour cela même jaloux de ses prérogatives. On peut admettre, sans faire tort au patriotisme éclairé d'assemblées qui débutent en pleine liberté dans l'arène parlementaire, que le Reichsrath, en abordant les questions de finances, n'a peut-être pas toujours fait preuve de ce calme que l'expérience donne en pareil cas à la Chambre des communes dirigée par des

sommités financières telles que M. Disraëli ou M. Gladstone.

“ Il n'en est pas moins vrai que nos députés ont prouvé toute l'importance qu'ils attachent aux enseignements tombés des lèvres éloquentes de ce membre du parlement anglais. Nul plus que lui n'a dénoncé avec autant de verve le funeste système des emprunts ! Nul n'a prémuni l'Europe et l'Amérique avec plus de franchise contre les conséquences inévitables de cette terrible habitude de grever les générations futures pour échapper à la nécessité d'écraser les contemporains d'impôts excessifs ! Payer les intérêts de ses dettes, en contractant des dettes nouvelles, n'est-ce pas escompter l'avenir tout en ruinant le présent ? N'est-ce pas détériorer le capital en détruisant cette confiance qui est la source du crédit ? Si donc le Reichsrath de Vienne a tenu à s'arrêter sur cette pente fatale, s'il a résumé son crédo financier en s'écriant : ‘ Nous voulons remplir nos engagements par le travail, nous voulons équilibrer notre budget en développant les ressources de l'Empire, mais sans avoir recours à de nouveaux emprunts en temps de paix ! ’ je me flatte de l'espoir qu'il peut compter sur l'approbation des financiers les plus éclairés de notre époque. Cependant cette patriotique résolution exigeait des sacrifices. Rome n'a pas été bâtie en un jour, et si les peuples libres qui habitent les domaines de l'Empereur-Roi voulaient se mettre en mesure de défendre leur neutralité, tout en marchant résolument dans la voie du progrès et de la civilisation, il était indispensable d'envisager les moyens d'alléger le fardeau d'une dette de 3 milliards, dont les intérêts absorbaient 128 millions par an, 128 millions dont la Hongrie n'avait pu garantir qu'une quote-part qui ne couvrait que le tiers de cette charge.

“En se rappelant que la plus grande partie de notre dette a été contractée depuis 1848, en examinant les taux d'émission des emprunts successifs que les crises qui se sont succédées en Autriche dans les dernières vingt années, ont imposé au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, en étudiant enfin les côtes de la bourse, on ne saurait nier que la grande majorité de nos créanciers, tous ceux qui ont acheté des fonds autrichiens depuis 1848, aient placé leur argent à des intérêts fort avantageux. Or, tout le monde sait que la hauteur des intérêts est toujours forcément en proportion inverse avec la sécurité du capital, et chacun qui nous a confié son argent savait d'avance que pour en tirer sept, huit ou neuf pour cent, il exposait son capital à des vicissitudes auxquelles il aurait pu échapper en se contentant des trois pour cent que lui aurait valu un placement dans les consolidés anglais.

“Les Hollandais, experts de tout temps en matière de finances, ont même, m'assure-t-on, pris soin d'escompter d'avance ces risques et ces chances, en décomptant d'année en année du capital placé en Autriche les intérêts excédant cinq pour cent, et grâce à ce calcul, plusieurs d'entr'eux se trouvent aujourd'hui déjà complètement à couvert, c'est-à-dire en possession d'obligations qui ne leur coûtent presque rien.

“Si donc le Reichsrath propose de prélever un impôt temporaire sur les rentes autrichiennes, il s'arrête à une mesure bien moins radicale que ne le serait une conversion plus ou moins forcée, comme d'autres pays en ont opéré; puisque tout en subissant la loi de la nécessité, les créanciers indigènes et étrangers conservent l'espoir qu'un budget équilibré amènera sous peu aussi l'équilibre entre la valeur réelle et fictive du papier-monnaie, que, en un

mot, avec le déficit l'agio disparaîtra. Les événements décideront de l'époque plus ou moins rapprochée où ces espérances pourront se réaliser. Toujours est-il que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, vu l'impossibilité d'augmenter les charges qui pèsent sur les contribuables, se trouverait dans le dilemme d'un coup d'Etat ou d'une ratification des mesures proposées par la majorité du Reichsrath ; d'un coup d'Etat, dis-je, car une dissolution nous ramènerait une Chambre toute aussi décidée que la présente à refuser, dans les circonstances actuelles, une augmentation de la dette publique. Or, pour l'Autriche, les coups d'Etat n'ont plus de raison d'être depuis que sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique a déclaré et manifesté sa ferme volonté de donner le plus libre développement aux institutions constitutionnelles.

“ Quelque pénible que soit l'aveu de nos embarras, la loyauté avec laquelle nous les exposons et la franchise avec laquelle nous faisons appel à l'équité de nos créanciers, désarmeront la méfiance et déjoueront les intrigues de ceux qui spéculent sur des catastrophes funestes. Car, les possesseurs de fonds autrichiens ne tarderont pas à voir que la patience est souvent la meilleure conseillère, que la confiance qu'ils accorderont à une assemblée librement élue ne saurait être déplacée puisque cette assemblée sauvegarde en définitive les intérêts permanents de l'Etat et de ses créanciers, en soumettant ceux-ci à une perte passagère pour consolider et augmenter la valeur réelle du capital qu'ils ont confié à un Empire dont les ressources incalculables se développeront d'autant plus librement que les peuples sont appelés à se gouverner eux-mêmes.

“ Voilà, M. le Comte, les idées que je Vous engage à développer dans Vos entretiens avec les hommes d'Etat de

la Nation la plus libre et la plus riche du monde. Je ne doute pas qu'ils apprécieront les exigences d'une situation que nous n'avons pas créée, et j'espère même qu'ils y puiseront cette confiance dans l'avenir de l'Autriche régénérée, cette confiance que nous professons hautement et que nous saurons mériter, en adoucissant autant que possible les sacrifices que nous sommes obligés à réclamer.

"Ma présente dépêche était déjà écrite à la veille des débats de la Chambre des Députés sur les questions de finances. Les efforts énergiques faits par le Ministère pour contenir la mesure de l'impôt sur la rente dans les limites voulues, ainsi que le chiffre important de la majorité lui prêtant son appui serviront à convaincre l'étranger combien le Gouvernement s'applique à atténuer les effets de certaines nécessités qu'il déplore, mais qu'il ne dépend pas de lui de faire disparaître. Les créanciers de l'Etat, je n'en ai aucun doute, ne tarderont pas à reconnaître que la mesure qui soulève aujourd'hui de si nombreuses plaintes est le corollaire indispensable d'une œuvre de réforme et de reconstruction dont ils seront les premiers à recueillir les bienfaits.

"Je Vous prie, M. le Comte, de lire cette dépêche à Lord Stanley et de lui en laisser copie.

"Recevez, etc."

The Reichsrath, which had remained adjourned during the negotiations with Hungary, had barely resumed its sittings, when the Cis-Leithan Bishops, dreading the debate which was to take place on


Mühlfeld's and Herbst's Bills, presented an address to the Emperor energetically protesting against any and every alteration of the Concordat. This injudicious step produced an effect quite contrary to that which they anticipated. It excited the bulk of the population of Western Austria, and petition followed petition for the abrogation of the obnoxious treaty. The Emperor met this outburst in a wise and most constitutional manner, by referring the Episcopal Address to the consideration of the Reichsrath. Baron Beust, having clearly demonstrated that the existence of the Concordat did not in any way limit the sovereign rights of the Crown, nor the constitutional prerogative of Parliament, the House determined to abstain from any resolutions on the Concordat as such, and proceeded to the discussion of "the four fundamental laws of the realm." The first of these, which clearly defined the rights of citizens, naturally clashed in many particulars with the unfortunate convention with Rome. The others were what are termed the "Confessional Laws : "* these provided, first, for the legalisation under certain

Episcopal protest against the proposed alteration of the Concordat.

Laws affecting the Concordat.

* See Note IV.

circumstances of civil marriages; second, for the establishment of secular education, and the separation of the schools from the direct supervision and interference of the clergy; and, third, for the regulation of the relations between the various creeds, and the removal of all religious disabilities. The stormy debates which took place upon these bills, and the opposition they met with at the hands of the feudo-clerical party in the Upper House, will be in the recollection of our readers. But notwithstanding this, and the still more dangerous action of the Court of Rome (to which we have referred at length in the second portion of this work), they were carried, and remain as lasting memorials of the triumph of liberal progress over bigoted intolerance. The other acts which also passed the Reichsrath at this period were those regulating the executive power of the Government and that of the judges and high court of the whole Empire, and the general revision of the constitution of February, 1861, which, owing to the compromise with Hungary, required many alterations. In the debate on the last of these measures, a most important question arose as to the relations



and respective rights of the Provincial Diets towards the Parliament. The national party, with the Poles in the foremost rank, did all in its power to increase the privileges of the Provincial Diets, and secure their perfect autonomy. The House, in order to promote harmony amongst the nationalities, made great concessions on this point. The February Constitution, which was decidedly centralistic in its tendency, enacted "that all questions relating to public affairs which were not specifically addressed to the Diets, were to be referred to the Reichsrath." This article, on the revision of the February Constitution, was changed thus, viz., "that all questions of State which were not expressly reserved for the Reichsrath were to be decided by the autonomy of the Provincial Diets." The power of the Diets was in this way so far extended that the principle of centralization was virtually abandoned—a result which was achieved mainly through the mediation of Baron Beust, though not without considerable opposition on the part of the German party, who were against the abolition of centralization as endangering the strength of the Empire. At

length the decision of the delegations relative to the Hungarian compromise, which had already been accepted at Pesth, was laid before the Austrian Reichsrath for ratification. A very animated debate ensued, in which the expediency of burdening Western Austria with so large a portion of the debt was much questioned. Ultimately, however, all scruples were removed, and the agreement became law. We question whether history affords any instance of such continued and indefatigable legislative labours, or of such rapid constitutional progress. In the course of a single session the Reichsrath ratified the compromise with Hungary, revised and materially altered the constitution of February, and passed the "Confessional Laws." The Upper House did not keep pace with the Lower in this work of reform, and the conservative and centralistic element in it would undoubtedly have become dangerous, had not Baron Beust, with great tact, succeeded in overcoming its resistance. On the 22nd of December, 1867, the Official Gazette of Vienna published the various laws and the new constitution for Western Austria, which had passed both

Houses, and had received on the previous day the sanction of the Emperor. It would hardly be compatible with the limits which we have assigned to this work to recapitulate in detail all the sweeping reforms passed in this session of the Reichsrath; we can only enumerate them. Equal legal rights for all citizens—their eligibility to all public offices—their right to settle in all parts of the empire—the inviolability of property, domicile, and private correspondence—the free right of association—liberty of the press, religion and education—equality of rights and protection for all nationalities—the separation of the judicature from government administration—the institution of trial by jury for libel and other press offences—and the enforcement of the oath of allegiance upon all government officials. It must be admitted that this catalogue speaks volumes, and fully corroborates the wise, truly liberal, and patriotic statesmanship of the Minister at the head of affairs.

On the 30th December, 1867, Baron Beust was at last enabled to propose to His Majesty the following list of the members of the first responsible

First Parlia-
mentary
Ministry at
Vienna.

parliamentary administration: President, Prince Charles Auersperg; Minister of the Interior, Dr. Giskra; Minister of Justice, Dr. Herbst; Minister of Public Worship and Instruction, Dr. Hasner; Minister of Finance, Dr. Brestel; Minister of Commerce, M. de Plener; Minister of Agriculture, Count Potocki; Minister of Police and Public Defence, Count Taaffe; and Minister without portfolio, Dr. Berger. The 1st of January, 1868, inaugurated the nomination of this ministry, which was hailed throughout the empire with unfeigned joy and acclamation. Baron Beust had completed the first portion of his arduous labours; he had re-established constitutional rule in Austria. The thanks of the people were re-echoed in the heart of their Sovereign, and the Emperor, to prove how thoroughly he appreciated his Minister's services, and how completely he agreed with his policy, addressed to him the following autograph letter:—

“Lieber Freiherr v. Beust! Mit der am 21. d. M. erfolgten Sanctionirung der Verfassungsgesetze und dem vollzogenen Ausgleich mit den Ländern Meiner ungarischen Krone ist der in Meinem Handschreiben vom 23. Juni d. J. bereits in Aussicht genommene Zeitpunkt eingetreten, wo Ihre Wirksamkeit als Minister-Präsident

für die im Reichsrathe vertretenen Königreiche und Länder verfassungsgemäss aufzuhören hat.

“Indem Ich Sie daher von der weiteren Führung dieses Ministerraths-Präsidiums enthebe, kann ich nur in vollem Masse die Genugthuung theilen, mit der Sie auf einen Zeitabschnitt zurückblicken dürfen, in welchem Ihnen durch aufopferungsvolle Thätigkeit die Lösung einer Aufgabe gelungen ist, deren Schwierigkeiten Ich vollkommen zu würdigen vermag.

“Gerne spreche Ich Ihnen für diese Ihre erfolgreichen Bemühungen Meine Anerkennung aus und begrüsse das Erreichte mit umso grösserer Befriedigung, als es Ihnen nunmehr ermöglicht ist, sich den Ihrer Obsorge noch weiter vorbehaltenen wichtigen Geschäften mit ungetheilter Kraft und Hingebung widmen zu können.

“Sie haben sonach die erforderlichen Einleitungen zu treffen, damit entsprechend dem §. 5 des Gesetzes betreffend die allen Ländern der österreichischen Monarchie gemeinsamen Angelegenheiten und die Art ihrer Behandlung vom 21. December 1867 und auf Grund des diesbezüglichen ungarischen Gesetzartikels (P. 27), die Ministerien des Aeussern, des Krieges und der Finanzen als Reichsministerien in verfassungsmässige Wirksamkeit treten.

“Gleichzeitig ernenne Ich den bisherigen Leiter des Finanzministeriums Freiherrn v. Becke zu Meinem Reichs-Finanzminister und werden Sie und Mein Feldmarschall-Lieutenant Freiherr v. John die Ihnen beiden bisher anvertrauten Ministerien als Reichsminister fortführen.

“Wien, am 24. December 1867.

“FRANZ JOSEPH, m. p.”

Translation.

“DEAR BARON BEUST,

“The sanctioning, on the 21st of this month, of the constitutional laws, and the completion of the compromise with the territories of my kingdom of Hungary, have now brought about, as I had already anticipated in my autograph letter of the 23rd of June last, the moment when your activity as Minister-President for the kingdoms and territories represented in the Reichsrath must constitutionally cease.

“In relieving you, consequently, from the further discharge of the functions of Minister-President, I can only share to the full in the satisfaction with which you must look back on a period in which you have succeeded, by your devoted activity, in solving a question whose difficulties I can fully appreciate.

“I readily express to you my recognition of your successful efforts, and hail the result with the more satisfaction that it has now become possible for you to devote the whole of your energies to the important affairs which still remain under your direction.

“You will therefore make the necessary preparations in order that, in accordance with § 5 of the law dated the 21st of December, 1867, relative to the affairs which are common to all the territories of the Austrian monarchy, and the mode of conducting them, and on the basis of the article in the Hungarian laws on this subject (p. 27), the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of War, and of Finance, may enter constitutionally on their duties.

“At the same time I appoint Baron Becke, hitherto Director of the Ministry of Finance, my State-Minister of

Finance ; and you, with my deputy Field-Marshal Baron von John, will continue, as Ministers of State, at the Ministerial posts which have hitherto been intrusted to you.

“ Vienna, 24th December, 1867.

(Signed) “ FRANCIS JOSEPH.”

Thus, with Baron Beust's retirement from the post of President of the Cis-Leithan Ministry, and his consequent relief from the anxious cares which he had thus far devoted to the internal development of constitutionalism throughout the Empire, he was now enabled to give his entire attention to its foreign relations, with the view of once more reinstating its ancient prestige amongst the nations of the world.

PART II.



FOREIGN POLICY.

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WE now propose to lay before our readers an accurate historical account of the diplomacy of Baron Beust as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, to analyse the fundamental ideas of his policy, and to furnish authentic proofs of the effectual manner in which it has been carried out, in view of all the great events that have occurred in Europe, and more especially in Austria, during the last eventful three years. Such a task, difficult as it is, would be almost impossible, had not an entirely new parliamentary system been introduced, both in the diplomatic action and in the administration of the Austrian Foreign Office. The official Red Books which are circulated amongst all the representatives of the

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Upper and Lower Houses, and which are now public property, contain the main features of Baron Beust's diplomatic activity. In writing this work we have drawn deeply on the above sources, and we trust that the data we have collected will (in a necessarily condensed form) furnish an absolutely true and objective picture of the Baron's foreign policy during the last few years. When Baron Beust assumed the reins of office, Austria was, as we have previously stated, in a deplorable condition. No feature in her position was perhaps more discouraging than the fact, that not only had the great powers remained unsympathetic spectators of the conflict with Prussia, at least up to the final catastrophe, but some amongst them had even stipulated for the most onerous terms as the price of their neutrality; and this when Austria was assailed from north and south, and was in a state of isolation rarely equalled in history. This painful situation was greatly aggravated by the alarming consciousness that the isolation of Austria was the result of a widely-spread distrust in her powers of vitality, as well as in her traditional policy, and by the internal pessimism which pa-

ralysed the action of the Government and diminished the political energies of the population. Baron Beust must have been aware when he accepted his post, that besides all the difficulties with which the position was beset, he would have, as a consequence of his previous activity as Saxon prime minister, to struggle against the prejudices of the power which had just conquered Austria and subjugated Saxony. Nothing short of the greatest energy and intelligence could accomplish so herculean a task. He at once saw the necessity of re-establishing the Hapsburg monarchy as an element of the European body politic, and of preserving its strength and position in their integrity amongst the other European nations. This double task of strengthening Austria internally, and raising her external prestige, had to be accomplished simultaneously; for the importance of the external relations of a State must necessarily and to a great extent depend upon its internal vitality. The home policy of Baron Beust we have already traced at considerable length; and we now, therefore, turn to his achievements in the department of foreign affairs.

A policy of peace was as much a necessity for the internal as for the external interests of the empire. This Baron Beust deemed it his duty, both to Austria and to himself, at once clearly to proclaim; and on his installation as Foreign Minister, he accordingly issued a circular despatch, dated 2nd November, 1866, in which he said :—

“ It would be presupposing in me a rare ignorance of my duties if I were deemed capable of introducing” into my policy “any rancour,—a feeling from which I myself am perfectly free. . . . The whole efforts of the Imperial Government must now be directed to efface the consequences of a calamitous war, and it will—this no one need doubt—remain faithful to the policy of peace and reconciliation which it has at all times pursued. If the issue of the last contest renders this a matter of necessity, it also imposes upon the Government the duty of being more than ever jealous of its dignity.”

The tie of legitimist principles, which formerly united the Powers and States in Eastern and Central Europe, was severed by recent events, and stripped of all its practical elements. Austria,

who had made these principles, both at home and abroad, of such paramount importance that she in former years sacrificed at their shrine even the development and progress of her people, was at length obliged to abandon them, and with them every policy that might be based only on sentiments of sympathy or antipathy. The principle which has now become the governing spirit of her foreign relations may be gathered from Baron Beust's despatches and diplomatic correspondence. In one of these despatches he says:—"It must henceforth be rendered impossible that the political forces of Austria should be employed for any other purpose than for the proper (own) interests of the people, ruled over by her Emperor or King" (Red Book I., page 2). He introduced into Austrian policy the very rational axiom that the general welfare and interest of the State itself are the first points to be considered, thus affording a guarantee that Austria will not engage in any warlike combination unless her honour or existence should be at stake. Acting in pursuance of this axiom, it became his duty, as head of the Foreign Office, to establish an *entente cordiale*

with those great powers whose interests in all important questions must of necessity run parallel with those of Austria—viz., England and France.

England.

The traditions of Austria's foreign policy pointed to Great Britain as the power which should be placed in the foremost rank in this respect. Our strict "non-intervention" policy, however, during the last ten years, rendered it impossible for the Austro-Hungarian minister to turn again to Austria's old ally. We do not intend here to enter into a discussion on the wisdom of this policy, or to reopen the vexed question as to whether or no the prestige of our country amongst the nations of the world has suffered by so absolute a neutrality. We are of opinion that it has. Far be it from us to advocate a foreign policy which should identify us with every continental squabble, and plunge us at any moment into a bloody and ruinous war. But there is a great difference between such a policy and one in which the voice, and, if necessary, the powerful arm of Great Britain should be raised to prevent unjust wars and the spoliation and annexation of weaker nations by stronger ones. The first and last im-

pulse of an Englishman is to protect the weak against the strong. Why should the nation belie every tradition of its race, and sanction by a passive neutrality the predominance of might over right? It was necessary, however, in view of the conciliatory attitude which Baron Beust wished to adopt towards Prussia, and of the powerful position of that country since the last war, that he should call the attention of the British Cabinet to the then pending Eastern questions, in order firmly to unite England, France, and Austria—whose interests in those particular questions were almost identical—in a joint endeavour to overcome Prussia's opposition to their policy in that quarter. Baron Beust accordingly addressed the following despatch to Count Kálnoky in London:—

“ Vienne, le 21 janvier 1868.

“ Par Votre rapport du 15 de ce mois Vous me rendez compte d'une conversation que Vous avez eue avec Lord Stanley au sujet des espérances que Sa Seigneurie fonde sur les dispositions conciliantes manifestées dans ces derniers temps par le Cabinet de Berlin.

“ Le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat constate avec plaisir le rapprochement qui semble s'opérer entre Paris et Berlin ; il relève avec encore plus de satisfaction les sentiments

amicaux de la Prusse à l'égard de l'Autriche ; il croit savoir enfin que le Comte de Bismarck n'a nullement l'intention d'appuyer une politique aventureuse en Orient. Lord Stanley voit dans ces tendances une garantie du maintien de la paix générale et il désire tout spécialement voir dans ce but l'Autriche seconder le désir de la Prusse de rétablir une parfaite intelligence dans leurs relations.

“ Je ne puis qu'approuver entièrement, M. le Comte, le langage que Vous avez tenu en réponse aux observations de Lord Stanley. Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal n'a jamais varié dans son désir de contribuer, autant qu'il est en son pouvoir, au maintien de la paix. Il apprécie toute l'importance des bons rapports qu'il entretient avec le Gouvernement Prussien, et a soigneusement écarté de sa politique tout acte qui aurait pu sembler inspiré par un sentiment de rancune. Vous pouvez assurer Lord Stanley que nous comptons agir de même dans l'avenir et que nous accueillerons avec un sincère empressement toute démarche prévenante du Gouvernement Prussien. Nous ne demandons pas mieux que de constater à Berlin des dispositions aussi amicales que celles dont Vous a parlé le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat, mais aucun fait nouveau ne s'est produit dans les derniers temps qui puisse provoquer de notre part un témoignage particulier de satisfaction.

“ Quant à l'intention prêtée à M. de Bismarck de ne pas offrir un appui à une politique orientale contraire à la nôtre, nous souhaitons vivement qu'il en soit ainsi, mais nous ne voyons pas encore que cette supposition soit corroborée par des faits. Lors de la déclaration identique sur les affaires de Crète provoquée par la Russie, la Prusse avait d'abord hésité à se joindre aux trois autres

Cours. Ce n'est qu'après avoir su que l'Angleterre et l'Autriche s'abstenaient de participer à cette démarche, que le Cabinet de Berlin s'y est associé. Depuis ce temps, bien que la France ait témoigné qu'elle se rapprochait du point de vue de l'Autriche et de l'Angleterre, la Prusse n'a pas, à ce que je sache, montré qu'elle suivait cet exemple. J'ignore donc encore sur quelle base Lord Stanley fonde ses appréciations, tout en les apprenant avec la plus vive et la plus sincère satisfaction. J'ajouterai seulement ici, à cette occasion, que l'Angleterre me paraît appelée en première ligne, et plus que l'Autriche, à exercer une influence sur l'attitude de la Prusse dans les affaires d'Orient. C'est surtout en prêchant, pour ainsi dire, d'exemple et en se montrant elle-même disposée à déployer en Orient une action déterminée, comme elle vient de le faire à Belgrade, que l'Angleterre peut rallier la Prusse à une politique conforme à nos vues. Plus l'Angleterre prendra une part active aux efforts qui se font pour maintenir la paix ainsi que l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, et plus le Gouvernement Prussien hésitera à s'engager sur un terrain où des conflits peuvent naître. Là où la Prusse ne verrait peut-être pas d'inconvénient à se trouver en désaccord avec l'Autriche seule, ou même avec l'Autriche jointe à la France, elle y regardera à deux fois avant d'entraver aussi l'action décidée de l'Angleterre. Une initiative plus vigoureuse de cette dernière en Orient, une opposition plus ferme contre toute tendance subversive aurait sans doute pour résultat d'amener le Gouvernement de Prusse à seconder dans ses rapports avec St.-Pétersbourg nos vues et nos intérêts. Le Cabinet de Berlin considérerait assurément toute explosion en Orient comme un danger à éviter, s'il était

persuadé que l'Angleterre ne resterait pas simple spectatrice des événements et prendrait parti contre les perturbateurs de la paix. Du moment où le Gouvernement Britannique fera entrer le Gouvernement Prussien franchement dans cette voie, il nous aura facilité prodigieusement la tâche qu'il nous destine et dont nous comprenons parfaitement l'importance."

From what we have said above, it is self-evident why Austria, after the Treaty of Prague,* which terminated the disastrous war of 1866, and was brought about by French intervention, should attach herself to the Western Powers, and more especially to France.

France.

By the cession of Venetia, and the unreserved abandonment of all the legitimist claims and hopes of the second and third branches of the Imperial house in Italy, a cause of rivalry which had for centuries existed between Austria and France was for ever removed. The events and crises of the last three years, to which we shall recur later, have shown that the interests of Great Britain, France, and Austria, in the East, are identical; and the necessarily energetic diplomatic action of Baron Beust in this all-important ques-

* See Note VI.

tion has met with the approbation and co-operation both of France and England.

Next in importance to the Eastern question, so far as Austria is concerned, is that of the future position of the South German States in the European body politic, bearing in mind the fact that their independent international existence has been guaranteed by the Peace of Prague, of course without prejudice to the alliances which they may contract amongst themselves, or to the national bond which the united South German States may form with the North German Confederation. The exclusion of Austria from Germany had at least this advantage, that it relieved her of all positive legal obligations, which, so long as the old Germanic Confederation lasted, placed the collective power of the Empire at its disposal for the protection of the German Confederate States. As a set-off, Austria had of course to renounce all interference in purely German affairs; and so conscientiously has she pursued this course, that the Austrian Chancellor actually declined to attach any political significance to the expression of sympathy manifested by the better educated classes through-

out Germany (especially in the south) in favour of the rapid development of liberal principles in Austria, or to their feeling of community with the German provinces of the Empire, in all that relates to civilization, literature, and historical progress. Although Austria had ceased after the Treaty of Prague to be a German Power in the precise interpretation of the word, her position as a European Power remained intact. As such, it could not be indifferent to her that Prussia, whose supremacy was (by the aforesaid Treaty) limited to the river Main as a political frontier, should attempt to extend her dominion to the immediate neighbourhood of Austria in the West. This formed a second point of common interest between Austria and France. One of Baron Beust's most difficult tasks was to maintain these delicate connecting links without committing himself to a positive engagement. How thoroughly the *entente cordiale* was brought about between the two Powers is proved by the journey of the Emperor Francis Joseph and his Prime Minister to the Great Exhibition in Paris, and the return visit of the Emperor and Empress of the French at

Salzburg shortly afterwards. This public manifestation of good feeling between the two governments, unfettered by any treaty which might prejudice the peaceful policy of Austria, was received with the greatest satisfaction in both countries, and had the specially advantageous effect of freeing Austria from the dangerous isolation consequent on the disastrous events of 1866. Baron Beust, however, could not fail to perceive that so sudden a friendship immediately after the Treaty of Prague, with a power which on that occasion had excited the jealousy of Prussia, might be falsely interpreted, and once more endanger the peace of Europe; and that this could only be prevented by obtaining further allies. An alliance with Italy thus naturally suggested itself.

The new kingdom of Italy was unquestionably under great obligations to France; from Austria it had obtained all it demanded, and nothing save the fear of a return of the dominating clerical influence in Austria could reasonably prevent her from sheathing her sword and once more tendering the hand of friendship to her old enemy. The presence of a Protestant Prime Minister in

Austria, and the daily increasing enlightened tendencies of the people, favoured by the liberal laws introduced in the Charter of 1867, were sufficient guarantees that clerical ascendancy would be for ever banished. Kaiser and King sealed the pact of friendship by the mutual interchange of their respective orders of knighthood. In order to render this union still more binding, Baron Beust, on the 19th of April, 1869, addressed the following despatch to Baron Kubeck, the Austrian Ambassador at Florence :—

“ Vienne, le 19 avril 1869.

“ S. M. l'Empereur et Roi, qui vient de recevoir des mains de M. le Lieutenant-Général Comte de Sonnaz, envoyé ici à cet effet, le collier de l'Ordre de l'Annonciade, charge Votre Excellence de remettre, à son retour à Florence, le Grand cordon de l'Ordre de St. Etienne à S. M. le Roi d'Italie et l'Ordre de la Toison d'or à S. A. R^{le} Mgr. le Prince Humbert.

“ Cet échange de décorations et les missions de courtoisie remplies par M. le Lieutenant-Général Comte Morozzo della Rocca et M. le Feld-Maréchal-Lieutenant Möring constatent d'une manière assez éclatante combien les relations entre l'Empire austro-hongrois et le Royaume d'Italie ont pris un caractère de cordiale amitié.

“ Nous nous félicitons sincèrement de cet état de choses et nous croyons pouvoir le faire avec d'autant plus de droit que ce rapprochement entre les deux pays n'est

point un fait accidentel ou nouveau, mais bien une des conséquences de la politique poursuivie avec persévérance par le Gouvernement actuel de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique. *Depuis que la paix a rétabli les rapports si longtemps interrompus entre les cours de Vienne et de Florence, tous mes soins se sont appliqués à effacer la trace des anciens dissentiments et à prouver que nous acceptions loyalement, sans la moindre arrière-pensée de rancune, la position que les événements nous avaient faite.*

“ Appelé à être le premier Représentant à Florence de S. M. notre Auguste Maître, Vous savez mieux que personne, M. le Baron, à quel point nos efforts ont constamment tendu vers l'entretien et le développement des relations amicales que le voisinage des deux pays rend si utiles à leurs intérêts mutuels. Je me plais à reconnaître combien l'attitude personnelle de Votre Excellence m'a aidé dans l'accomplissement de cette tâche ; mais ce que je dois surtout relever ici, c'est l'empressement avec lequel le Gouvernement Italien est allé au devant de mes vœux, en contribuant de son côté, autant que possible, à rendre notre réconciliation sincère et complète. Dans toutes les occasions, le Roi Victor Emanuel et ses Ministres ont témoigné un vif désir de voir la meilleure harmonie régner entre l'Autriche et l'Italie. Dans les derniers temps surtout, M. le Général Menabrea a particulièrement facilité le rétablissement des bons rapports par sa politique conciliante et le soin qu'il met à aplanir toutes les difficultés qui découlent de l'exécution de certaines stipulations de la paix de 1866.

“ La ligne de conduite suivie invariablement par les deux Gouvernements depuis près de trois ans fournit donc l'explication tout naturelle des démonstrations amicales

qui viennent d'être échangées entre les deux Souverains. Il ne faut pas y chercher le prélude de combinaisons politiques nouvelles, d'une portée alarmante, mais bien le couronnement d'une oeuvre de paix et de réconciliation qui donne une solide garantie de plus au maintien de la tranquillité en Europe. A ce point de vue, nous comprenons que ces manifestations attirent l'attention de l'opinion publique et des Cabinets. Mais, loin de provoquer aucune inquiétude, elles doivent être accueillies avec satisfaction par tous les esprits éclairés.

“ En effet, puisque l'inimitié de l'Autriche et de l'Italie était une cause permanente de trouble et de malaise pour l'Europe, la cessation de cet état de choses sert puissamment à raffermir la paix générale. Si un accord assez intime venait à succéder à l'ancien antagonisme, il n'y aurait là rien de suprenant, ou qui pût inspirer de la méfiance aux autres Puissances. Occupés, l'un et l'autre, de travaux d'organisation intérieure qui absorbent à un haut degré leur attention, l'Empire austro-hongrois et le Royaume d'Italie sont, plus qu'aucun autre pays, intéressés à se soustraire aux secousses et aux périls de toute complication européenne. Guidée par cet intérêt commun, la politique des deux Cabinets est naturellement appelée à se diriger souvent vers le même but, quand il s'agit de donner un ferme appui aux idées pacifiques qui répondent aux besoins des deux nations.

“ Cette considération a pu, sans doute, influencer sur les tendances vers un rapprochement qui se sont fait sentir à Vienne, aussi bien qu'à Florence. Nous y voyons assurément un motif de plus pour cultiver et consolider des relations dont les effets promettent d'être aussi salutaires. J'espère que le Gouvernement Italien partage nos appré-

ciations et qu'il envisage comme nous les conséquences qu'on doit tirer de notre attitude réciproque depuis le rétablissement de la paix.

"Veuillez-Vous exprimer dans ce sens envers M. le Général Menabrea et lui dire que je m'estimerai toujours heureux de pouvoir m'entendre avec lui, afin de mieux assurer à nos deux pays les bienfaits du repos qui leur est si précieux.

"Recevez, etc."

All this was only to be brought about by most sagacious and temperate statesmanship, for the liberal enactments of 1867* naturally met with considerable opposition on the part of the Holy See. Baron Beust had to do his best to prevent a rupture with Rome, and at the same time disarm his many powerful adversaries in Austria. He had to avoid the danger of a quarrel between the Church and the State, and this he effected by convincing all those whose opinions were of any value that the proposed reforms were indispensable to Austria's welfare.

The Spanish Revolution of September, 1868, Spain. which deprived the Bourbons of the throne, afforded another opportunity to Austria of showing

* See Note V.

the great change which had taken place in her political views. Many years ago she long refused to recognise Queen Isabella, and declined any official political intercourse with Spain. This was because the then Austrian Government placed a stricter interpretation on the laws of succession than the Cortes themselves, and wished to uphold the Salic law in all its integrity. The revolution of 1868 resulted in the expulsion of the whole dynasty, and subjected the continuance of Spain as a monarchy to the votes of the people. Notwithstanding this radical change, Baron Beust instructed the Austrian ambassador in Madrid to remain at his post, and to carry on diplomatic relations on the same principles as those adopted by the representatives of France and England, as will be seen from the following despatch :—

(Translation from the German.)

Baron von Beust to Baron von Lago, Madrid.

“ Vienna, 5th October, 1868.

“ TELEGRAM.

“ You will remain at Madrid, and, on the formation of a new Government, as well as in matters of social intercourse, you will be guided by the example of the repre-

sentatives of the other powers, especially of France and England. In other matters you will request telegraphic instructions."

This promptitude of action is worthy of note, and proves how thoroughly Austria's policy aimed at conforming itself with modern ideas. The new revolutionary Government had hardly been established, and the destinies of the nation confided absolutely to a National Assembly, when the following despatch was addressed to the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires :—

Le Baron de Beust au Baron de Lago à Madrid.

"Bude, le 24 octobre 1868.

"J'ai reçu avec Votre rapport Nr. 27 du 13 de ce mois la lettre que M. J. Alvarez de Lorenzana a bien voulu Vous adresser pour Vous faire part de sa nomination au poste de Ministre des Affaires Etrangères et Vous annoncer que la constitution définitive du Gouvernement du pays sera fixée par une assemblée constituante issue du suffrage universel.

"Vous voudrez bien, M. le Baron, informer M. de Lorenzana, en réponse à cette lettre, que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique, fidèle aux sentiments de sympathie qui n'ont jamais cessé de l'animer envers la nation espagnole, forme les vœux les plus sincères pour un prompt dénouement de la crise qu'elle traverse aujourd'hui.

"Très-éloignés, quant à nous, de toute préférence pour

telle ou telle solution de la question gouvernementale qui va s'agiter dans la Péninsule, nous attendons qu'un ordre de choses définitif se soit établi.

“ D'ici-là, l'occasion d'accréditer un Représentant officiel à Madrid ne nous est pas encore offerte ; mais nous sommes tout disposés à établir des rapports diplomatiques avec le pouvoir qui, d'après la communication de M. Lorenzana, doit sortir du scrutin des mandataires de la nation, aussitôt qu'il nous aura notifié son avènement.

“ En attendant Vous entretiendrez à titre officieux avec le Ministre nommé par le Gouvernement provisoire, les relations qu'exigeront le soin des affaires courantes et la protection de nos nationaux. Je m'en rapporte, pour la conduite que Vous aurez à tenir pendant cet intervalle, aux instructions que je Vous ai transmises par télégraphe, à la date du 5 octobre.

“ Recevez, etc.”

This despatch is by no means an isolated example of the sweeping reforms which had been and were still to be introduced into Austria under the new constitutional régime. Freedom, toleration, and progress were henceforth to be the principles by which both her foreign and her home policy were to be guided. Notwithstanding the length of the following despatch, we venture to give it *in extenso*, as it appears to us to afford the most conclusive proof of the sincerity of purpose with which these great and important changes were ushered in.

(Translation from the German.)

*Circular of Baron Beust to the Representatives of Austria
abroad.*

“Vienna, October 22, 1868.

“The forthcoming renewal of the debates of the Delegations also marks outwardly the conclusion of the first phase of our newly-regulated constitutional life, and permits an unprejudiced consideration of the effects it has produced in the internal development of the Austro-Hungarian state. It is known that the State relations of the empire have not been placed on a new basis by the laws of 1867. By recognising the dualistic principle, the historical foundations of the monarchy were reverted to—those foundations which had proved not only strong enough to support efficiently a powerful and orderly state organization on a permanent footing, but also to present an effectual resistance to all open or secret attempts tending to their destruction. But an external restoration of political forms could not suffice: it was important that they should be given new substance. The constitutional principles which were the origin of the creation of the laws of 1867, the liberal ideas by the help of which the adoption of those laws was secured, give them a prominent rank in the list of modern constitutions. And all these circumstances taken together made them much more than a temporary reconciliation of the opposing elements in the State, and showed that they were what they have already proved to be—the starting-point of the political future of the monarchy, the only form in which it can acquire a solid, orderly, and powerful liberal development.

“Certainly no one could indulge in the expectation that

the mere existence of the constitution would be sufficient to put an end to the internal discord of our political life. Fresh seeds can thrive but slowly in a soil which is in all directions harrowed up by political trials and experiments. In the disturbance of the national elements, in the opposition of the once privileged classes, in the conflicts which must naturally arise between the powers of the State and the Church, there were influences and dangers which could not be ignored, and which required the most earnest attention. But these dangers did not originate with the new arrangements; it was necessary to meet them, if the regeneration of the monarchy was to be carried out in conformity with modern political ideas and with the just claims of popular freedom; and it required a positive legal ground to meet them with success and effect. To maintain and to defend this legal ground, and thereby to raise up a barrier against the tendencies which seem to be directly opposed to the general interest of the nation, is now our earnest duty.

“We may here look with some satisfaction upon the results which have accrued from our efforts in this direction. In the countries of the Hungarian crown the administration rests in the hands of a government which owes its origin to a parliamentary majority that acts in the sense of the maintenance of the existing common institutions. The national discord, which showed itself with the greatest force in these countries, has given place to an intense desire of compromise and adjustment of differences; the most important of the home questions, that of Croatia, has been arranged by a decision unanimously accepted on both sides. We are justified in hoping that the next elections will strengthen the position of the Government.

“The often-expressed apprehensions that the dualism will produce a weakening and not a strengthening of the whole monarchy have been clearly proved to be false by the discussion of the Bill for the Recruitment of the Army in the Hungarian Diet, which will certainly be supported by the Reichsrath; the uninterrupted friendly relations, too, between the Royal Hungarian ministry and the common cabinet and the ministerial department for the countries represented in the Reichsrath, justify us in entertaining the best hopes for the confirmation of the new institutions.

“The working of the constitution in the kingdoms and countries represented in the Reichsrath is met by greater difficulties and stronger powers of resistance. Although we have succeeded almost entirely in annihilating the tendencies of a one-sided centralization, and in laying down the connecting links for the formation of a firm constitutional element in the midst of the late centralist party, still there are not wanting parties that have placed themselves outside of the constitution, seeking the realization of their desires and the protection of their interests by unconstitutional means. The national party which advocates the political independence of Bohemia and the political autonomy of Galicia, the conservative autonomists in the Tyrol, the party of the clerical reaction, all pursue tendencies which are more or less directed against the constitution and against the ideas of the councils of his Majesty the Emperor and King. It is, however, an undeniable progress of the last year that these tendencies have gradually become more isolated, and that all attempts to give them a bond of union have failed.

“The Czechian question has been detached from the

great background of a national-Sclavic question, and has rather become a matter of state detail. The question of Polish autonomy has, from the beginning, appeared as a proper subject of legislation, and has been treated as such. If such riots as those of Prague, or a more pointed manifestation of the ideas of the opposition, such as the debates in the Diet of Lemberg, have of late placed these questions more prominently in the foreground, no serious cause for apprehension can arise therefrom. On the contrary, this is a proof that the constitution is strong enough to show at least that the policy of political abstinence, of passive resistance, is barren. And this allows the farther inference to be drawn, that the constitution has sufficient power in itself to admit of a reconciliation being effected with the opposition if the latter will once place itself upon the ground of positive right.

“The opposition of the clerical party is, of course, a phenomenon to be lamented, and it will be the earnest duty of the Imperial Government to remove it. But it is to be expected that the moderation and spirit of reconciliation which characterise its attitude will not fail to exercise a favourable effect upon a conflict the present dimensions of which have not been brought about by the fault of the Government.

“We cannot deny, without shutting our eyes to the actual state of things, that the activity and exasperation of the opposing parties have not diminished in the course of this year; but we may boldly assert that none of these parties have increased in power and authority, although the agitation was sustained from without—perhaps, and that would be a greater gain to us, *because* the agitation had this support. The ecclesiastical reforms have been

carried out more peaceably than friends and opponents expected, in spite of all the obstacles which were raised up by the excitement of the minds of the people. The uncompromising tone which has been given to the programme of the aspirations of the autonomists, too, has completely shaken the faith in their realization instead of strengthening it; and the national agitations have led to extremes in comparison with which the protection of the Imperial power becomes a benefit, even for the autonomists themselves. But it is just this course of events which enables us to entertain the hope that the more vigorously the constitutional development advances, and the more decidedly the efforts of the Government are manifested to complete the work of the constitution, the more certain will be our success in solving the problem of gradually reconciling the opposing principles, and furnishing evidence that the constitution is not destined to serve as a handle for the domination of one party or nationality, but to become the common palladium of patriotism, of respect for the laws, of order and progress. There cannot be the slightest doubt, therefore, that it is the unchangeable resolve of our August Sovereign to deduce the first principles of the administration of the empire solely from the constitution, and that the Crown will never give encouragement to tendencies which are directed against constitutional rights. Under the protection of the Crown, supported by the judicial and political conscience of the great majority of the people of Austria, the constitution advances—perhaps slowly, but surely—towards its general recognition and practical acceptance. If the past year has in this respect to chronicle not only no retrogressions, but very important advances towards the

realization of the above ideas, this may be considered as a most gratifying result.

Those who would judge our affairs with an unbiassed mind, should not pay attention to momentary phenomena and the often very superficial and malignant commentaries upon them in a part of the daily press. They must estimate the value of what has been done and attained in proportion to the difficulties we had to overcome, and thus measure the expectations of the future by the progress which has been actually achieved. The decided improvement of our finances and credit, the brilliant rise of our commerce and industry, are results the possibility of which has been likewise doubted; yet who will deny that they are mostly due to the confidence which the commercial world has shown in the constitutional state of things, and connects with its continuance?

“You will, as often as you find an opportunity, express yourself in the sense of the above observations. By so doing you will act in accordance with the truth, and at the same time with a duty which, I think, is imposed upon all servants of the Imperial and Royal Government.

“Accept, etc.”

By such instructions to the accredited representatives of Austria throughout Europe, the Chancellor endeavoured to consolidate cordial relations, and at the same time to record, so to speak, the regeneration of Austria.

Russia.

It now remained for him to place the relations of the Vienna Cabinet with Russia on a more

friendly footing. This could alone be effected by removing the distrust which had been excited by the Crimean war, and which now manifested itself in the Eastern policy of that power. It may be well to remind our readers that during the momentous events of 1854-5-6, in which England played so conspicuous a part, Austria's policy towards Russia was not, in the strict interpretation of the word, one of absolute neutrality. She prevented Russia from stirring up an insurrection in Servia, and limited her operations by imposing a strict cordon, any violation of which she declared would be regarded as a *casus belli*. It is not to be wondered at that the recollection of this fact, together with the humiliating conditions of the Treaty of Paris—to which Austria was also a party—limiting the maritime power of Russia in the Black Sea, should have continued to rankle in the breast of the Russian nation. Baron Beust sought the first opportunity of ameliorating this state of things, and found one in the Cretan insurrection. He foresaw in this revolutionary movement the commencement of more serious troubles, and at once proposed the adoption of a system of preventive

measures, and the revision of the Treaty of Paris, with the view of expunging therefrom the clause which fettered Russia's naval power. In this sense he wrote as follows, on the 1st of January, 1867, to Prince Metternich, the Austrian ambassador at Paris:—

“Extrait.

“A côté de cet objet principal qu'une révision du traité de Paris doit avoir en vue, il en est un autre, non moins important à nos yeux : celui de s'assurer du concours loyal et sincère de toutes les parties intervenantes. A ce point de vue, on ne saurait nier que le traité de 1856 n'a pas atteint complètement son but. Comme ce traité était destiné à terminer une guerre que la Porte et ses Alliés avaient soutenue avec succès contre la Russie, il devait paraître indispensable d'y introduire des clauses restrictives de la libre disposition d'une partie des moyens d'action que cette dernière Puissance pourrait, dans un cas donné, vouloir diriger contre l'Empire ottoman. On s'y sentait d'autant plus disposé que, pour tout le reste, on entendait épargner à la Cour de St.-Pétersbourg des conditions trop onéreuses. Aussi fut-elle ménagée en ce qu'on ne lui demanda qu'une cession de territoire de peu d'importance, et le prix de la lutte se résuma dans les entraves imposées aux mouvemens de la Russie du côté de la Turquie. On espérait, par là, garantir l'Europe, pendant un long délai, des complications dont la menaçait la question d'Orient. Tout en rendant justice aux motifs qui, à cette époque, ont dicté les déterminations de l'Europe, on ne saurait se dissimuler que c'est aller contre la nature des choses que

d'interdire à un Etat d'une étendue et d'une population aussi immenses sa liberté d'allures dans le cercle de son action légitime. Une pareille interdiction était peu propre à détourner, à la longue, les complications que l'on avait à cœur d'éviter. Toute compression excessive a pour effet de provoquer l'expansion de la force comprimée dans une autre direction et, de toute manière, en agissant comme on l'a fait, on a rendu difficile au Gouvernement russe de prendre de bon cœur sa position dans le concert européen nouvellement établi pour les affaires d'Orient.

“Autant qu'il s'agit donc des restrictions dont nous venons de parler, il importe de distinguer ce qui est possible de ce qui ne l'est pas. A notre avis, il y a lieu de tenir compte, dans une mesure convenable, du rôle naturel qu'assure à la Russie en Orient la communauté des institutions religieuses et de se ménager, par une attitude conciliante, le concours sincère de cette Puissance dans les affaires du Levant.”

The salient ideas in this despatch are—first, that no permanent solution of the Eastern Question can be arrived at without enlisting the sympathies of Russia both for the Christian and the other inhabitants of the Turkish Empire ; and, in the second place, that the existence of Turkey under the conditions required to insure its dignity as an independent State is a political necessity.

We have given two reasons for Russia's reserve towards Austria ; there is, however, also a third.

The liberal and tolerant Government of Austrian Poland, and the determined rejection by Baron Beust of every attempt at Russian influence in that portion of the Empire, added to the appointment of Count Goluchowski as Governor of Galicia, caused great dissatisfaction at St. Petersburg. On the other hand, the Government at Vienna was well aware of the moral support the discontented Slaves sought for, and to a certain extent received, from Russia; and was also thoroughly acquainted with the Pan-Slavonic agitation and its origin. Baron Beust showed considerable astuteness in defeating these intrigues, which threatened to endanger the internal peace of the Empire. He first conciliated the Servians, by taking the initiative in the solution of two questions which were of the greatest importance to the people and their dynasty. The first was the removal, with the consent of the Turkish Government, of the Turkish garrison from the fortress of Belgrade; the second, the recognition by the Western Powers of the newly-elected Prince. Afterwards, in the Cretan question, he combated the proposal, which had been favoured by Russia, of separating that island

from Turkey. It was evidently his policy to prevent every moral triumph on the part of Russia, in order by so doing to counteract her influence and ascendancy amongst the Southern Slaves, who would then naturally be less inclined to make the Russian Government the confidant of their separatist plots. At an interview which he had with Prince Gortschakoff, at Ouchy, in Switzerland, in the summer of 1869, cordial diplomatic relations were once more established. We may reasonably suppose that what then took place was not without its influence on the conduct of Russia in the late insurrection in Southern Dalmatia; for that Power on the latter occasion directed very serious remonstrances to Montenegro, and held herself entirely aloof from the attempt to raise a general rebellion amongst the Southern Slaves.


We cannot, however, bring ourselves to believe Prussia. that the now more friendly feeling of Russia towards Austria is as yet shared by Prussia. That self-satisfied and adventurous nation, judging others by herself, cannot imagine that her late foe has banished all ideas of vengeance. Perhaps, indeed, the Prussian *rulers*, intent on finding a

mote in their neighbour's eye, ignore the beam in their own. The mote would in this case be a pardonable longing for retaliation—the beam, an entirely unwarrantable rapacity; a wish to ignore the territorial line determined by treaty, and thus once more to give free scope to an insatiable ambition. This is but hypothesis on our part, and we can only justify it by the recollection of the now famous despatch from Count Usedom—Count Bismarck's agent in Florence—to General La Marmora,* in which the Prussian statesman suggested that Austria should be “stabbed to the heart.” The energetic Prussian Prime Minister must have been much surprised at the tough cat-like vitality of Austria after the blow which was to have been fatal to her. His astonishment must, we think, greatly have resembled that of the spectators of the Indian basket trick, when, after the juggler has made the fearful thrust, the supposed victim walks away unhurt. But let us be charitable, and assume that Count Bismarck's dismay at the unexpected result was greater than his anger, and that he is inclined to look upon Count Beust rather in the

* See Note VII.

light of a political conjuror than in that of a diplomatic adversary. It was not easy for a statesman in Austria, more especially for one who was not Austrian born, to introduce at once a forget-and-forgive policy amidst a nation still smarting under defeat, without rendering himself liable to the reproach of bartering its dignity. To make humble overtures to the Court of Berlin, and obsequiously solicit an alliance, was naturally not to be thought of; and, even for argument's sake, putting the national honour out of the question, overtures were rendered absolutely impossible by the very principle which Count Bismarck had made the *sine quâ non* of the Treaty of Prague: "that common interests between Austria and Prussia should cease to exist." All that the Austrian Prime Minister could do was to endeavour to pour oil on the troubled waters, and avail himself of every opportunity, consistent with the dignity of the State intrusted to his care, of once again promoting friendly feelings between the rival powers. In November, 1866, Baron Beust expressed, in the following despatch to Count Wimpffen, the Austrian ambassador at Berlin, the

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wish for the speedy revision, agreeably with Art. XIII. of the Treaty of Prague, of the commercial treaty of the 11th April, 1865, in order to reduce the customs dues and facilitate trade :—

(Translation from the German.)

Baron Beust to Count Wimpffen at Berlin.

“ Vienna, November 8, 1866.

“ Since it is provided by Art. XIII. of the Treaty of Prague that negotiations should as speedily as possible be entered into for a revision of the Commercial and Customs Treaty of the 11th of April, 1865, in the sense of granting increased facilities to the mutual intercourse of the two countries, and as it cannot be desired on either side, in view of the stipulated period of six months, that industrial circles should be allowed to remain in uncertainty any longer on this point, you will on an early occasion bring this important question to the consideration of the Prussian Government, and endeavour to ascertain whether, and how soon, it would be disposed to give effect, on its side, to the above agreement.

“ It is not necessary for me to point out to you, that the wish lately expressed in the highest quarters for a restoration of the friendly relations between Austria and Prussia could be thus fulfilled in the easiest way, and at the same time in that which would most rapidly impress itself on the public feeling of both countries ; and we doubt the less of the inclination of the Prussian Government to give a ready assistance to this work, as according to trustworthy accounts the parties concerned, both in Prussia and in Austria, wish these negotiations to be opened as soon as possible.

“I look forward with great interest to your report on this subject, and am, etc.”

The friendly negotiations suggested in this despatch were postponed from circumstances of no political import. We cannot, however, doubt that the *entente cordiale* was delayed by the publication of the *secret* treaty, offensive and defensive, made between Prussia and the Southern German States in August, 1866.* The sagacity of Baron Beust at once discovered that the tendency of this secret treaty was to nullify one of the most important clauses in the *subsequent* Treaty of Prague, inasmuch as it bound the weaker power to be entirely subservient to the stronger in all future wars, whereas the Peace Treaty expressly stipulated the independent international existence of the Southern German States. The natural consequence was that he unhesitatingly expressed his opinion on this palpable contradiction, in as temperate a manner as could be expected. His views hereon are clearly stated in the following despatches to Count Wimpffen, in Berlin, dated March 28th, 1867, to the Imperial

* See Note VIII.

Missions in London, Paris, and St. Petersburg, dated April 9th, 1867, and, lastly, to Count Trauttmansdorff, in Munich, dated 15th of May, 1867 :—

(Translation from the German.)

Baron Beust to Count Wimpffen in Berlin.

“ Vienna, March 28, 1867.

“The publication of the hitherto concealed treaties of alliance concluded between Prussia and the South German States, in August, 1866, could not take place without leaving a profound impression on the whole political world.

“As regards ourselves, our feeling was neither that of surprise, nor of an increase of the natural regret with which the loss of our former position in Germany, after the catastrophes of last year, must have inspired us. We know and accept the political situation whose consequences are being developed before our eyes. Nothing has been altered in it since it has become publicly known that Prussia has formally secured to herself alone, before sealing her reconciliation with us, the federal allies who were formerly those of both powers. As little has our desire been altered to remain in peaceful and harmonious relations with Prussia in the new state of things, so far as is consistent with our interests.

“It is, in general, not easy to characterise alliances which go beyond defensive engagements as guarantees of peace. We, on our side, are meanwhile ready to believe—and will at any rate gladly be convinced—that the object of the above treaties was merely to secure a common

means of defence against foreign attacks. The Berlin Cabinet has therefore no declaration to expect from us on this point. On the other hand, we are fully conscious that we are not without a *right* to express our views thereon, and we cannot allow it to appear that we are not aware of the contradiction which undeniably exists between Article IV. of the Treaty of Prague, and the offensive and defensive alliances of Prussia with Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, and Hesse. An alliance not confined to specified objects, but permanently established for every warlike contingency, between a weaker and a stronger State, undoubtedly deprives the former almost entirely of the conception of an independent international existence; and the provision that an independent bund of the South German States shall be established, can therefore no longer reasonably find a place in the Treaty of Prague, seeing that the Treaties of Berlin preceded it.

“The above remarks will indicate to you the attitude which we have assumed in regard to the treaties of alliance between Prussia and South Germany. We do not enunciate any protest, and we do not draw any inferences from the existing state of things; but we cannot admit that there is any real conformity between the conditions of our treaty of peace with Prussia, and the situation which the treaties in question have created. We have no reason to conceal our views on this subject, but we do not intend to provoke barren discussions which might interfere with our sincere wish to preserve friendly and advantageous relations with Prussia and the other German States. You will speak in the spirit of these remarks whenever you may happen to touch upon the subject in question in your confidential conversations. Nor have I

any objection to your reading this despatch for the information of those concerned.

“Accept, etc.”

*Le Baron de Beust aux Représentants Impériaux à Paris,
Londres et St.-Pétersbourg.*

“Vienne, le 9 avril 1867.

“La publication des traités d’alliance conclus entre la Prusse et les Etats de l’Allemagne du Sud m’a engagé à ne point laisser ignorer au Cabinet de Berlin le point de vue auquel nous jugions ces actes. Je joins ici, pour Votre information personnelle seulement, copie de la dépêche que j’ai adressée sur ce sujet à M. le Comte de Wimpffen.

Ainsi que Votre Altesse (Votre Excellence) le verra par cette pièce, j’ai cru devoir m’abstenir de formuler aucune protestation.

“En conservant à mon langage le caractère d’une explication franche et amicale, je n’ai cependant nullement dissimulé que, selon l’impression du Gouvernement Impérial, certaines stipulations de ces traités n’étaient pas entièrement d’accord avec les dispositions du traité de Prague.

“Je m’empresse d’ajouter que M. le Comte de Bismarck a parfaitement accueilli la communication dont j’avais chargé M. le Comte de Wimpffen. Loin de se livrer à des récriminations et à repousser nos observations, M. de Bismarck a plutôt cherché à atténuer la portée des traités conclus avec les Etats du Sud. Il a surtout insisté sur le caractère purement défensif de ces alliances, qui n’avaient en vue que d’assurer le maintien de la paix générale. Cet incident n’a donc eu aucune suite, et n’a modifié en rien l’état actuel de nos relations avec le Cabinet de Berlin.

“Recevez, etc., etc.”

(Translation from the German.)

Baron Beust to Count Trauttmansdorff in Munich.

"Vienna, May 15, 1867.

"Through the kindness of the Prince of Hohenlohe, you have already been made acquainted with the substance of the confidential communication which the Munich Cabinet proposed to direct to us for the purpose of consulting us about the negotiations into which it intends to enter with the North German Bund. The Royal Ambassador has left copies in my hands, one of a ministerial declaration which proves an agreement between Bavaria and Würtemberg on this subject, and another of a letter of the Royal Bavarian Cabinet addressed to the grand ducal governments of Baden and Hesse, whereby the latter are invited to accede to this proposal. I do not hesitate to communicate both documents for your personal information.

"As announced by your despatches, Count Bray has made known to me the desire of his Government to hear our opinion on this proposition before actually commencing the negotiations with Prussia, and, if possible, to be assured of our consent.

"With the greatest respect for the motives from which this desire originates, and with the fullest acknowledgment of the confidence placed in us, I could only give the Royal Bavarian Ambassador, on this as on other occasions, the answer that the situation in Germany is controlled by certain facts which we may regard as deplorable, but which we cannot ignore without dangerous consequences. One of these facts is, that the course which Bavaria wishes to be able to pursue in the interest of the whole of Germany, as also in the interest of its own safety, is opposed to the

stipulations of the Treaty of Prague. The treaties of alliance between the South German States and Prussia have violated these stipulations, even before they were written, and I could not possibly forget or conceal that the project which bears the signatures of the Prince of Hohenlohe and the Baron of Varnbüler would still further aggravate this contradiction, and make it more apparent. There is not a trace in the proposals of Bavaria and Würtemberg of such a confederacy as, under the Treaty of Prague, was to enter into national connection with North Germany, and at the same time to retain by the side of the latter its national independence. Instead of this, they propose an organization in which—with or without a common parliament—every independent movement of the several South German States must regularly be made subservient to the will of the North German Bund. The fiction that, for instance, Southern Hesse, as a member of the South German Bund, is to have equal rights with the whole of the North German Bund, will evidently make very little difference. As regards Austria's position, it is certainly deserving of our gratitude that the Cabinet of Munich wishes to proceed only in concert with us. The request, however, that Austria should give an opinion about the constitutional formation of Germany, transgresses in some measure the barriers of the treaty by which peace was established in Germany last year; and this circumstance—even more than the reserve thereby imposed upon us—makes it a necessity for Austria to have a very clear comprehension of the state of affairs, and to use a corresponding openness of language.

“I accordingly spoke with all frankness to Count Bray on this point, reiterating what I had stated on former occasions

concerning the relations in which we stand with regard to the facts, past or future, that are incompatible with the Treaty of Prague. I explained to him that considerations of convenience may provisionally determine the Government of his Majesty the Emperor to ignore such facts, and that this Government also willingly allows that the German sympathies which it has retained should exercise an influence upon its conduct, so long as it need not consider the interest of its own empire as thereby endangered.

"On the other hand, the desire that the Imperial Cabinet should give its consent to the treaties of alliance which it has hitherto passed over in silence, and even to the other still more extensive violations of the Treaty of Prague, was frankly designated by me as quite incapable of fulfilment; and I pointed out that Austria, in her present position, must rather be cautious not to give up in any way, by word or deed, the right of appealing at the proper time to the articles of the Treaty of Prague.

"Furthermore, I did not conceal from Count Bray that I am unable to understand how they could think of inducing us to alter our attitude in this matter, by making such vague proposals as that of Bavaria, that an alliance with Austria should be concluded or negotiated. If the word "alliance," according to the common usage of international law, is to be understood to mean a transitory league for definite objects, then there is the objection that such objects have not been pointed out, and it is not likely that they can be pointed out at present. But if a lasting league is thought of, by which the Imperial Government would give up its liberty, not for a definite action, but indefinitely and for ever, and which is to form one of the

essential parts of the political renovation of Germany, then there would be, in the first instance, the necessity of formally dispensing us from the obligation not to take part in this renovation; and, secondly, it could not be overlooked that a great power can neither be subordinate to another, nor serve foreign objects, nor bind itself beforehand to decrees which have been brought about without its participation. I doubt whether the Cabinet of Munich is able to offer us an equally privileged position to that of Prussia in a new confederacy of the whole of Germany; but if such is not the case, the statesmen of Austria are obliged to return to the full freedom which they have exchanged for their former rights in the Bund.

“The conclusion which I must draw from all these considerations, placing myself in the position of Bavaria, can be no other than that which I have already made the basis of my manifold utterances on former occasions. Being asked for my opinion, I can only say that I believe Bavaria would do well to remain in a merely observant attitude, and to abstain from all further steps which would lead it beyond the line drawn by the Treaty of Prague. Austria has not come forward with protests against the treaties of August; but we cannot deceive ourselves that these treaties have contributed not a little to the dangerous strife of the last month. The exertions of the London Conference have just dispersed the grave apprehensions which had been raised, and we cannot advise the creation of a new situation, by which the clouds that have scarcely disappeared might only too easily return in more menacing proportions than before. Our efforts for peace have, on the other hand, fully proved that it is not our will to use our independence to the disadvantage of Germany; and this

also strengthens our claim not to be made to encounter a position which is still more difficult, and deviates still farther from the state of affairs stipulated by the treaty. I cannot comprehend why, under present circumstances, a difficult position should be created for the South German Governments which would leave them no choice. It seems to me that the condition of Europe gives a sufficiently distinct warning to beware of every step by which, instead of the Luxemburg question, we might precipitate conflicts which would be still more serious, and, perhaps, could not be removed by the best-intentioned mediation.

“In the above remarks I have noted down the substance of the reply which I had to give to the Bavarian Ambassador on receiving his communication. It confirms, indeed, only that which is already known to the Royal Cabinet, especially by the reports of Count Tauffkirchen; yet I deem it my duty to authorise your Excellency to show this despatch confidentially to the Royal Minister, the Prince of Hohenlohe.

“Accept, etc., etc.”

All the European courts were astonished at the contents of this extraordinary secret treaty, and the parliaments of the South German States demanded an explanation of it. The Foreign Ministers of Würtemberg and Bavaria answered that, in the case of offensive wars, the existence of a *casus fœderis* would have to be decided upon by

the respective Governments. Prussia's very questionable proceedings in this matter could not fail to exasperate France. She conceived that, after the annexation of Hanover, Electoral Hesse, and the Duchy of Nassau, she also had a right to compensation, and this gave rise to a feeling that France, and not Austria, had been beaten at Sadowa.

Luxemburg. The Luxemburg controversy fanned this spark of rivalry into a flame, which, had it not been opportunely extinguished, might have had the most disastrous results. The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg is one of the *disjecta membra* of the Germanic Confederation which was dissolved by the Treaty of Prague. It is situated between the two great powers who were arming for war, and actually intercepts their strategical routes. The King of Holland, who is Duke of Luxemburg, feeling, and not without good cause, that the geographical position of the Duchy must some day or other make it a bone of contention, and that it would then suffer the fate of the grain of corn between two millstones, determined to treat with France for its cession. Until the struggle of 1866, the town of Luxemburg had been a fortress

of the Confederation, garrisoned by Prussian troops. But after the war, Luxemburg declined to continue a member of the new Germanic Confederation under the supremacy of Prussia; and here arose the difficulty, for Prussia maintained, under the pretext of guarding Germany, that she still had the right to garrison the town, although the old Germanic Confederation had been dissolved. Of course, in the face of such a state of things, any cession to France was out of the question. An angry diplomatic correspondence ensued, which bid fair once more to plunge Europe into a sanguinary war. At this critical moment Baron Beust offered his services to both parties, and was accepted by them as mediator. By a series of very able diplomatic notes he succeeded, without wounding the honour of either of the dissentients, in bringing about the Conference of London, which was composed of the representatives of the signatories of the Treaty of Vienna of the 9th of June, 1815. The result of the Conference was, that France gave up the idea of enlarging her possessions by the purchase of Luxemburg, and that Prussia waived her imaginary right

to garrison the town, which was henceforth placed under the protective guarantee of the Powers, Great Britain categorically declaring that she was only a party to a passive guarantee, and not to one *vi et armis*. Thus was a great danger averted ; and as our own country took an active part in the negotiations which led to this favourable result, we will lay before our readers the following extracts from the diplomatic correspondence, presuming that they will not prove uninteresting :—

Extract from a private letter from Baron Beust to Prince Metternich, Austrian Ambassador at Paris :—

Le Baron de Beust au Prince de Metternich à Paris.

“ Vienne, le 8 avril 1867.

“ Extrait.

Lettre particulière.

“ Vos derniers télégrammes nous dépeignent la situation comme devenant plus critique. La question du Luxembourg commence à produire une certaine tension des rapports entre la France et la Prusse. En même temps on se préoccupe à Paris des bruits d’alliance entre Vienne et Berlin. On en ressent quelques alarmes et vous me prévenez que l’Empereur Napoléon pourra bien faire une tentative pour se rapprocher de l’Autriche.

“ Depuis que l’affaire du Luxembourg est sur le tapis, il me semble que toute notre attitude n’est pas de nature à justifier ces inquiétudes. Ma lettre particulière du

22 mars en fait foi et je n'ai même pas jugé nécessaire de m'étendre davantage sur cette question dans ma correspondance officielle. Le Cabinet Impérial a conservé sa liberté d'action et d'appréciation parfaitement intacte ; il ne s'est engagé d'aucun côté et n'a préjugé ses déterminations dans aucune direction.

“ Vis-à-vis du Cabinet du Berlin nous avons observé la même réserve, je pourrais dire la même abstention. Il est vrai que depuis les proportions plus sérieuses que cette affaire a prises, on nous a fait quelques avances de Berlin, aussi bien que de Munich.

“ Nous y avons répondu poliment, mais plutôt évasivement, en évitant soigneusement de nous engager à quoi ce soit. Je joins ici copie de la dépêche que j'ai adressée à ce sujet au Comte Trauttmansdorff, et vous verrez que mon langage ne compromet en rien la pleine liberté que je tiens à me réserver.”

Despatch from Baron Beust to Count Wimpffen, Austrian Ambassador at Berlin, which the latter was authorised to communicate to Count Bismarck.

“ Vienna, April 17, 1867.

“ We desire too strongly the maintenance of peace not to rejoice at the favourable reception which has been given by the two powers chiefly concerned to our mediatory declarations on the Luxemburg complication. According to your reports, Count Bismarck regards the proposal to unite Luxemburg to Belgium, and at the same time satisfy France by restoring to her the now Belgian territories, which were united to the kingdom of the Nether-

lands in 1815, as a compromise acceptable to Prussia; and, according to the reports of our ambassador in Paris, the Marquis de Moustier has accepted the proposal with expressions of equal approval.

“We have hailed with real satisfaction the hopes of peace based on these declarations, and you will not cease to express yourself in this sense to the Royal Minister-President in the name of the Imperial Cabinet.

“At the same time, however, you will make it your duty to urge more strongly than ever the definitive acceptance of the proposed solution, and warmly and decisively oppose any warlike proclivities which might, contrary to our hopes, stand in the way of so salutary a conclusion.

“Let us place ourselves for a moment in the position of Prussia. We entirely understand that, in case of a war, this power can find strong grounds for confidence in its strength and the completeness of its warlike preparations, and in the high *morale* and superior armament of its troops; and we certainly do not also undervalue the support which the excited national feeling both in the south and the north of Germany would give her, all opposing elements notwithstanding. But we think, on the other hand, that at least equal weight must be given to the considerations which make it a great risk for Prussia to make war on France. An explosion of the hitherto hardly-suppressed dissatisfaction of the French nation would be connected with the greatest political and social dangers; and, although these dangers are such as affect all Europe, the first effects of the storm would have to be resisted by Prussia. Moreover, France has a decided advantage in her fleet, which this time, unhindered by the English

navy, would play a part which it was unable to undertake in former Franco-German wars, and would give occupation to no small portion of the Prussian forces. Thirdly, Prussia would be prevented by this diversion from giving effectively, and at the right time, that protection to the South German States which it has secured to them by formal alliances; and all these dangers and disadvantages are at the same time of such a kind that they could not be averted at the decisive moment by an alliance with Russia.

“It must certainly be admitted that these circumstances fall with some weight in the balance to the advantage of France. Had we contemplated a policy of reprisals against Prussia, it must have been a certain temptation to us rather to fan than to extinguish the sparks of danger. If we, nevertheless, eagerly strive for peace—if we advise the Court of Berlin to make the concessions to France which have become necessary—we thereby give the best proof that we feel no such temptation; and you should with all frankness claim from Count Bismarck a recognition of this fact.

“Prussia’s leading statesman, it is true, tells us that at this moment a close alliance with Austria would be even more welcome than the good-will with which we strive to preserve Europe from the misfortune of a new war.

“You know what are our views on this important question. That it would have been necessary for us in such a case to lay a corresponding *price* on our assistance I need not repeat, for Count Bismarck himself is not ignorant of it. But he is also certainly unprejudiced enough to admit that we are not in a position to *specify* what this price is to be, but that the same would have to be *offered* to us.

This is not arrogance on our part; it is simply the consequence of the situation, and especially of the great position which Prussia has assumed in Germany since the Treaty of Prague, and against which we neither can nor will give ourselves even the appearance of setting up any definite pretensions. *I will not conceal from you that Herr von Werther indicated to me, in precisely the same sense as Count Bismarck did to you, the wish that a great Germano-Austrian alliance should be re-established.* I even heard him use expressions, which seemed to mean that Austria must regain the position she has lost in Germany. But how could I answer otherwise than by the question whether Prussia was thinking of going back to the old bund? It must undoubtedly be understood at Berlin that this question is a very serious one, and that it is for Prussia to leave fruitless generalities, and tell us on what bases the new federal relations she wishes for should rest, in order that Austria may find in them as good guarantees for her security, influence, and interests, and better guarantees for her living in harmony with Prussia, than were afforded by the former bund.

“I need not add that the object of this despatch is merely to serve as a guide for your further verbal declarations; and I have, in conclusion, only to repeat that it must be the first object of your efforts to develop the now existing germ of a peaceful solution of the Luxemburg question.

“Accept, etc.”

As will be seen from the above despatch, Count Bismarck took the opportunity afforded him by the Luxemburg difficulty of saying that he pre-

ferred an alliance with Austria to her mediation ; and Baron Werther, the then Prussian ambassador at Vienna, let fall several hints as to the advisability of re-establishing Austria in her former position in Germany. But all this was far too vague to induce Baron Beust to enter upon any serious negotiations. He had reason enough to fear that if any proposition of this kind were sanctioned by him, this would immediately be construed into a wish to meddle in German affairs. The South German States, however, seized with avidity on the idea of restoring Austria to her former position in Germany, and conferred together at Vienna over the project of uniting Prussia and Austria with themselves in one and the same alliance. The following despatches show the plans they had adopted for this object, and Baron Beust's reception of them :—

(Translation from the German.)

Baron Beust to Count Trauttmansdorff at Munich.

“ Vienna, April 6, 1867.

“The Bavarian ambassador has given me, in a confidential conversation, certain indications as to the views and wishes of his Court in the German question, which I

think I ought not to withhold from your personal knowledge. The communications he made to me on this subject, doubtless under instructions from Munich, were somewhat to this effect:—

“It is considered at Munich that it will not be possible for any time to stop short at the conventions between the individual South German States and Prussia. The re-establishment of closer federal relations is wished for, and the idea has accordingly been revived of uniting the South German States in a bund among themselves, which should be as strong and close as possible; after which a new State-federation should be created between the northern and southern bunds for the defence of the national interests. This new German bund would then enter into an international alliance with Austria, and in this manner would be obtained the equivalent, which, as it seems, has hitherto been wanting, for the guarantees which were contained in the old federal treaties, but which had lost their validity by the events of the past year.

“It is to be inferred from these declarations that Prince Hohenlohe wishes to obtain assurances as to whether he could give himself up to the realisation of such a programme with the hope of being secure in the concurrence and approval of Austria.

“In the first place, as you will understand, I could not refrain from expressing my surprise to the Bavarian ambassador at overtures having so soon been made from Germany to that Austria which had been so thoroughly set apart from all participation in German affairs, and whose exclusion from the bund had even been declared by solemn treaties to be the chief condition of the future organisation of Germany. For the rest, I confined myself

to a few general considerations, for Count Bray could, of course, not expect of me for the present any declaration which could have the character of an engagement.

“In regard to the relations between Prussia and South Germany, I neither could nor would make any statement of a nature to impose on the Imperial Cabinet any degree of responsibility for a further departure from the provisions of the Treaty of Prague, which had already been prejudiced by the conventions of August. We do not wish to exercise our influence in any direction on the considerations which may be put forward on this subject at Berlin and Munich. I was obliged, therefore, to treat the question of an alliance between Austria and a new German bund under the direction of Prussia as a simple question of interest, though one of the highest class. Neither passion, nor sentiment, nor historical recollections—whether of the year 1866 or of the last ten centuries—will determine our future resolutions; our first object will be the security of the Austrian monarchy, our second object its advantage. In matters which would impose upon us engagements and burthens without the fullest compensation, the Imperial State can no longer interfere even in favour of its former German confederates. When the language and the conduct of German Governments testify to their friendship, and their desire to be of use to Austria, this will always find in us a response, and it may contribute towards preparing more fortunate conditions for the future than those which now exist. But we require very solid guarantees against tendencies which are not friendly, but dangerous to us: and no service should be demanded from us which is not to be repaid by an equivalent service. I have not concealed from Count

Bray that such guarantees and reciprocal services, considering the position in which the South German States have placed themselves with regard to Prussia, and which we are far from contesting, cannot be offered to us at Munich, but only at Berlin; and that we must therefore look primarily to Prussia, if the question should ever be raised whether we believe in the possibility of a reciprocally useful, earnest, and honourable alliance between us and Germany, and whether we should sacrifice to it our present freedom of action.

“You will conclude, from what I have here sketched out, that you have nothing whatever to alter in the attitude you have already taken up on this question. You may suggest similar remarks to the above in your conversations with Prince Hohenlohe, at the same time always expressing our unchanged good wishes for the prosperity of Bavaria and her dynasty. These wishes are real; but if Prince Hohenlohe should show any disposition to resume that part of mediator between Austria and Prussia which was undertaken by Bavaria during the events of the last year, I cannot at present call upon you to encourage the royal Minister in this project.

“Accept, etc.”

(Translation from the German.)

Baron Beust to Count Wimpffen in Berlin.

“Vienna, April 19, 1867.

“The political tour of Count Tauffkirchen to Berlin and Vienna has already excited attention in many quarters, and will probably form the subject of many a commentary

more or less rash. I therefore consider it the more necessary to inform your Excellency explicitly and accurately of the course of the conversations which I have had with this confidential envoy of the Munich Cabinet, and also with the royal Prussian ambassador, Baron Werther, on the subject of the Count's mission.

"Count Tauffkirchen introduced himself to me, not only as the plenipotentiary of his Government, but also as the bearer of important proposals made by Prussia.

"The object of his appearance in Berlin was alleged to be the desire of Prince Hohenlohe to come to a clear understanding as to the eventual issues of the Luxemburg question; to preserve, in concert with Prussia, the interests of peace; and especially to ascertain, in regard to these interests, whether the influence of Bavaria could succeed in contributing towards a *rapprochement* between Austria and Prussia. He said that he had obtained very extensive concessions from Count Bismarck. He had been enabled to bring forward the preliminaries to the conclusion of an alliance between the two powers—an alliance which would extend to all the States of Germany. He added that the preservation of peace would be secured by such a league; that it is not denied in Berlin that Austria is entitled to ask compensation for the obligations which she would undertake; and that Prussia was ready to go as far as possible in this respect.

"However, what Count Tauffkirchen further said concerning this last point, was not, unfortunately, the most perspicuous part of his communications.

"He spoke of a guarantee of our *German* possessions. He intimated that there might be also temporarily offered to us every desirable security against possible dangers with

regard to our non-German provinces. He mentioned Russia as the third party in the league, and was of opinion that the security in question would naturally follow upon the re-establishment of an alliance of the three powers. Lastly, he pointed out—as had been already done by the Munich Cabinet—that a treaty of amity between Prussia and Austria would afford to the South German States the possibility of maintaining themselves in greater independence; and that an international alliance of Austria with the North German and South German confederations might ultimately be the transition to lasting and more intimate relations, which would replace the former confederacy, with advantage for Austria as well as for the German nation.

“I believe I have thus faithfully described the substance of the offers of Count Tauffkirchen, without in the least depreciating their real significance.

“From the declarations of Baron Werther, and a confidential despatch which he read to me, it appeared that Count Bismarck had certainly given the royal Bavarian ambassador a right to transmit these communications to Vienna. Baron Werther supported the representations of Count Tauffkirchen in this matter; but I must observe that the Baron’s expressions were not of a binding character. We could only, therefore, have listened to the above proposals of alliance at the risk of knowing that they had not been previously approved of at Berlin.

“I shall now have the honour to acquaint your Excellency with the substance of my replies.

“When several interested parties have to negotiate on important business, it is desirable that they should sometimes mentally put themselves in each other’s position, in order to arrive at a fair and impartial decision. This was

the first remark I made to Count Tauffkirchen. 'Allow me,' I said to him, 'to put the following case:—You are the bearer of proposals of an alliance, not from Berlin to Vienna, but, on the contrary, from the capital of Austria to that of Prussia. Suppose that, after the Crimean war, Austria had retained the right of putting a garrison in a Moldavian fortification, which is at the same distance from the Russian frontier as Luxemburg is from that of France—suppose, further, that the Imperial Government had taken measures in Galicia by which it had called forth as great an agitation in Russia, as Prussia did in France by her conduct since the preliminaries of peace of Nikolsburg—suppose that Russia should then find our neighbourhood in Moldavia dangerous; that a war was in prospect; and that you had to offer an alliance at Berlin in the name of Bavaria and of Austria,—if you were to plead at Berlin that, after all, Austria is only acting in the interest of Germany against Russia; that the Court at Vienna finds an alliance with Prussia to be adapted to the spirit of the times; that Austria is ready to guarantee the German possessions of Prussia; and, lastly, that Prussia, in league with Austria, need not for the present have any great apprehensions about Posen,—do you believe they would find in Berlin these motives sufficient for entering into a league with us against Russia?'

"I did not, however, intend by this simile to evade the request that I should state openly my opinion on the case actually in question. On the contrary, I did not decline to enter into the most candid examination of Count Tauffkirchen's proposals. I was, moreover, obliged to do so by the feelings which are at all times awakened in us by the idea of our natural solidarity with Germany.

“‘You expect’—I remarked—‘that the alliance of Austria with Prussia will secure the maintenance of peace. Assuming that this is a correct inference, what would be the position of Austria, which is not at all threatened, if she were to enter into this new pacific era? She would have to pay for doing so by the animosity of France, which would be dangerous to her in two respects, since it would at the same time lead to an almost unconditional dependence of Germany on the good-will of Prussia. We do not doubt this good-will; but you cannot deny that circumstances are sometimes stronger than the intentions of leading statesmen, and that Austria requires, in return for incurring the animosity of France in presence of the unionist movements in Germany, and the still possible conflicts with Italy, more solid guarantees than the promise that her possessions would not be disturbed—at least not too soon.

“‘But it is not even yet proved,’ I continued, ‘that the proffered alliance would really signify the maintenance of peace.

“‘Our power, and the fear it inspires, should not be esteemed too highly; and the prospect of a participation of Austria in the war would not, at least at present, prevent France from risking a campaign if she were only ready to exercise the necessary moral and material power for carrying it on against Prussia and Germany. On the other hand, the word *coalition*, which is now thrown out against France, would be far less adapted to calm awakened passions than to inflame them to a most violent outburst. France does not feel herself completely isolated, even against a Northern coalition. She has some promises in store for the kingdom of Italy, and still more

for the revolutionary parties in the countries of her opponents; and she is too well aware of the real or presumed power of these allies not to prefer—perhaps to-day or to-morrow—the risk of war to a yielding policy which would wound the national pride and endanger the dynasty.

“Let us now, in conclusion, look at the various possible issues of a war. You will grant that it would not be a gratifying result to succumb in common with Prussia, and to be compelled to accept the rule of the victor in the countries on the Rhine, among the Alps, and on the Adriatic. But let us set aside this case as improbable; let us imagine France to be the vanquished party—could we run the risk of afterwards receiving as our recompense the document of the Treaty of Prague with thanks for its successful defence? Far be it from me to awaken the recollections of our common victory over Denmark, but you know that we had to take beforehand our measures of security even for that most favourable of possible cases.’

“Count Tauffkirchen could not, of course, say that he was prepared to give a reply to all these questions, or to diminish the force of the scruples and objections brought to his consideration. He only expressed his regret at being obliged to take it for granted, from what I had said to him, that Austria *declines* the proposals which he had brought from Berlin. Baron Werther also, on his side, repeated to me the same expression. I, however, warned them of the danger of using such an expression, and entreated them not to speak of a refusal of the Prussian proposals on the side of Austria, since the explanations thereby occasioned could only have a prejudicial effect, and also because we must look to the future,

it being a fact that Austria will always cherish a desire to be able to offer a helping hand to a *rapprochement* with Prussia and Germany.

“I do not doubt that what I have here repeated in its main features will be fully brought to the knowledge of the Prussian Cabinet by the reports of its ambassador. However, it will also be your duty to take care that no misunderstanding should take place as to the expressions which I really used. I think, too, that it will be worthy of the sincerity and honesty which will always be found to characterise our conduct, and will not be prejudicial to the interests of a *rapprochement*, if I authorise your Excellency to read this despatch to Count Bismarck in its integrity.

“Accept, etc.”

The Bavarian diplomatist, Count Tauffkirchen, after having discussed this important question with the Cabinet of Berlin, proceeded to Vienna to communicate to the Austrian Chancellor the views of his Government and those of Prussia. The latter were so vague that the Austrian minister had to guess at their real object, which was to ascertain the possibility of an alliance between Austria, the Northern Confederation under Prussia, a similar confederation of the South German States, and Russia. Baron Beust rightly interpreted the Prussian proposition as meaning that

Austria should exchange the *friendship* of France for the *patronage* of Prussia. The result of this would have been to stir up by the word *coalition* the warlike passions of France, and probably of Italy also, and to gain, in the event of a favourable issue to a general war, a questionable concession from Prussia in the shape of the revocation of the Treaty of Prague. To the propositions of the Bavarian Government the Austrian minister replied that the word alliance was capable of two interpretations. Either it meant "an union of two or more powers for the joint accomplishment of a specific object," or it conveyed the idea of "an union of two or more powers for an indefinite period." Taken in the first sense, it was in the present case unnecessary, for there existed no definite common object; and in the second, it was evidently inexpedient for a great power to bind herself to other powers without any limit of time or absolute purpose. As to the South German Confederation, which, though projected by the Treaty of Prague, was never realised, the Austrian Foreign Office expressed its opinion to the foreign ministers of Bavaria and Würtemberg, as early as

November, 1867, that such a combination would be advisable, but it avoided using any direct influence, in order not to incur any moral responsibility. Baron Beust never abandoned this attitude of passive observation; and in his instructions to the Austrian ambassadors in Munich and Stuttgart, dated the 4th of April, 1869, he thus lays down the principle of his policy: "It may be in our interest to wish for the existence of a South German Confederation; perhaps we sincerely desire it; but we will not create it, nor help to do so. If it be realised, it shall not be said that this was the result of Austrian intrigues. But if my opinion is asked, I can only say that Bavaria will act wisely in adopting a position of absolute reserve, and in carefully refraining from taking any steps which might lead her to overstep the line drawn by the Treaty of Prague." We cannot pretend to say whether the advice given in this despatch, the general European situation, or the voice of the Bavarian Parliament, produced the result which followed; it will be sufficient here to remark that the independent States of Southern Germany abstained from passing the line defined

by the Treaty of Prague, except by entering the Zollverein under its new organisation. The restoration of polite, not to say friendly relations between the Courts of Vienna and Berlin was eagerly seized upon by Baron Beust as the propitious moment for invoking Prussian influence with Prince Charles of Hohenzollern in order to admonish that petty sovereign to put a stop to the extravagant projects and disgraceful religious persecutions of the Roumanian Government, and its revolutionary policy among the Roumanians of Transylvania and Bulgaria. On the 5th of February, 1868, the Baron wrote as follows to Count Wimpffen, at Berlin:—

(Translation from the German.)

“ Vienna, February 5, 1868.

“I read with pleasure in your report of the 28th ult. that Count Bismarck confirms the peaceful character of the general situation, and especially that he has also expressed to you the opinion that the dangers existing in the East are not of a kind seriously to endanger peace, if it is preserved in other quarters. This opinion, however, might have been strengthened, if Prussia had joined Austria, France, and England in the representations they made at Belgrade. On this point Count Bismarck expressed himself to you in a manner which shows, perhaps, less a

difference of view than a certain sensitiveness, owing to Prussia not having received at the proper time a definite invitation to take part in the above steps. Our Cabinet, however, is not in any case responsible for this, as the initiative of the admonitions came, not from us, but from France, and simultaneously also from England; we only followed this initiative, and consequently could not consider ourselves called upon to invite other powers to take part in it. Perhaps you will find an opportunity of mentioning the state of the case when you again speak of this matter with Count Bismarck.

“You can also take an opportunity of assuring the Minister-President that, if Prussia should now be disposed to entertain favourably Austrian overtures in regard to Eastern affairs, the Imperial Royal Government would certainly acknowledge this with much gratitude, and rejoice greatly at any *rapprochement* on the question. For the present, the first opportunity of effecting an understanding, which so many conciliatory expressions of Count Bismarck lead us to hope for, would offer itself at Bucharest; for our reports from that town leave no doubt that urgent admonitions not to disturb the interests of peace and the quiet of its neighbours, would be as effective with the Government of Prince Charles as in Servia. Naturally, M. Bratiano, who directs the policy of Roumania, officially denies the Daco-Roumanian intrigues, and declares that the aspirations for a state embracing all the Roumanians are an empty dream; but it is none the less certain that the idea of a great Roumanian crown is secretly favoured by the Government; that it is an object of temptation to the Prince; and that committees exist which labour, with the connivance of the Government, to bring about a revolution

among the Roumanian populations in the neighbouring States, both in Transylvania and in Bulgaria. The utterances of Prussia are, beyond all doubt, of greater weight than any others with Prince Charles; the counsels of M. Bratiano would be powerless against them; and it therefore depends entirely on the Prussian Government to use its influence there so as to give us a certain proof of the value it attaches to the resumption of friendly and confidential relations with Austria. I do not propose to lay these facts formally before the Prussian Government, but I leave it to your tact to call the attention of Count Bismarck, in the above sense, to the events which are now occurring at Bucharest."

There is good reason for believing that this request was made, and that the remonstrances of Prussia had great influence with Prince Charles, and decided him to dismiss Bratiano, and with him all his reckless and unprincipled band. Assuming this really to be due to Prussian intervention, it was the first conciliatory step taken by that power towards Austria. The second step was the visit of the Crown Prince of Prussia to Vienna, the idea of which originated with the Court of Berlin, and was most cheerfully welcomed by the Emperor Francis Joseph as being the means of once again promoting peace and harmony between the two rival powers.

During this visit to Vienna, the Crown Prince must have been convinced that the policy of the Austrian Prime Minister towards Prussia was a conciliatory and not an aggressive one. We must here mention that Baron Beust courteously reminded the Prussian Court that Article V. of the Treaty of Prague, relative to the cession of North Schleswig, did not emanate from Austria. See the following despatch to Count Wimpffen :—

(Translation from the German.)

Baron Beust to Count Wimpffen at Berlin.

“ Vienna, March 28, 1867.

“It is not unknown to you that the stipulation relative to the restoration of the northern districts of Schleswig to Denmark was not introduced in the Treaty of Prague at the instance of the Imperial Austrian Government; yet this stipulation exists, and it enables us in a certain degree to appear as the advocates of a cause whose defence we should otherwise not consider ourselves called upon to take up.

“The Royal Prussian Cabinet will, we are sure, do us the justice to admit that hitherto we have imposed on ourselves the fullest reserve in regard to this matter. When the Royal Government wished to be allowed to choose its own time and opportunity for executing the stipulation in question, no obstacle was raised by us to this wish, though, as will be easily understood, several expressions of regret

at the delay were conveyed to us from another quarter. Lately, however, Count Bismarck expressly pointed out, at a sitting of the North German Parliament, that Austria alone has a lawful right to demand the fulfilment of Art. V. of the Treaty of Prague. We think it may be assumed that this public declaration was intended not only to repel the interpellation of the two deputies of North Schleswig, but that it was also connected with the intention of not permitting the intervention of a third power in this matter.

“This object, however, in which we entirely concur, might be easily frustrated by keeping the question any longer open; and we therefore consider it our duty to instruct you to bring the stipulation referred to confidentially, in the above sense, to the consideration of the Minister President. It seems to us that no more formal step than a confidential mention of this kind is necessary, for, according to the wording of the Article, the vote to be taken in North Schleswig is not made dependent on any special demand to be made by Austria on the subject.

“However, if a written communication of the above remarks should be desired, you may consider yourself empowered confidentially to place in Count Bismarck’s hands a copy of this despatch.

“Accept, etc.”

The first time that Baron Beust mentioned this confidentially was after Count Bismarck had declared in the North German Parliament that Austria alone has the right to urge the fulfilment of the conditions of the fifth Article of the Treaty

of Prague. The second time was after the communication of a despatch by the Danish ambassador, containing the report of the fruitless negotiations of his Court relative to the above Article. Even then Baron Beust repeated, in the following despatch to Count Wimpffen, that he had only broached the affair at all in order to prevent peace from ever being disturbed by the existence of a disputed question. Far from wishing, however, to enter the lists in behalf of a third power, Austria hoped to render it impossible for that power to enter them herself by having the difficulty at once removed.

(Translation from the German.)

"Vienna, April 1, 1868.

"The Royal Danish ambassador, Herr von Falbe, has communicated to me a despatch which gives an account of the course of the negotiations entered into between Herr von Quaade and the Royal Prussian Councillor of Legation Bucher relative to the execution of the fifth Article of the Treaty of Prague. The Cabinet of Copenhagen has only been able to confirm in this despatch, of which a copy is enclosed for your Excellency's information, the fruitlessness of the endeavours hitherto made to arrive at an understanding in regard to the question of North Schleswig.

"This communication was shortly afterwards alluded to in a conversation which I had with Baron Werther, and I consider it advisable to inform your Excellency in what sense I expressed myself as to this reopening of the question.

"I repeatedly pointed out that, notwithstanding the insertion in the Treaty of Prague of Prussia's promise relative to the cession of North Schleswig, we have no wish to interfere in this matter. When Count Bismarck declared in the North German Parliament that we have an exclusive right to act therein, we took the opportunity of making a communication on the subject; but this, as your Excellency will remember, was done without the slightest intention of exercising any pressure on the decisions of the Royal Prussian Government. We contented ourselves with remarking that it would undoubtedly be of importance for the preservation of peace that care should be taken to put an end to disputed questions as early as possible, and to satisfy well-founded claims. Further than this we will not go; still less will we come forward—and indeed there is no occasion for us to do so—in behalf of a third power, or offer it any pledge of our participation in further phases of the question. To this attitude we still adhere, and Baron Werther will doubtless have reported to Berlin that I have been far from wishing to approach the Royal Prussian Government with definite advice; and that, on the contrary, I have only expressed my opinion because I was called upon to do so, and because I had no reason for concealing it.

"After the above preliminary remarks, I thought it necessary to acknowledge to my interlocutor that the delay of the Berlin Cabinet to fulfil a stipulation which

it could not dispute in principle did not appear to me calculated to promote the general interest in the preservation of peace. I observed that, taking the Prussian point of view, the execution of the Article in question seemed to me capable of being effected in two ways. Prussia might, in the first place, adhering to the strict meaning of the Article, adopt the will of the populations, as shown by a free vote, and cede to Denmark all the districts in which the majority of votes should demand union with Denmark. In this case it is conceivable that Prussia should require special guarantees, and also a definite right of protection from the King of Prussia, for the tolerably numerous German minority in those districts. For such exceptional guarantees might perhaps be required under existing circumstances, in order not to revive the inflammable element which lies in the complaints of the German subjects of the Danish Government, and thereby perpetuate the danger of disputes between Denmark and Germany.

“The second alternative seems to me to have a different aspect. Prussia might desire the frontier line not to be fixed entirely according to the position of the two nationalities, but, for reasons whose weight I do not wish to dispute, might require that political, and also strategical matters should be taken into consideration. In this case it would be a question of retaining for Prussia a small strip of land inhabited chiefly by Danes; and I was compelled to admit that I would recommend the statesmen of Prussia, if they should adopt the second alternative, not only to let drop all question of guarantee, but to stipulate that the Danish Government should favour the emigration of the few Germans in the district, in order

that it may be as far as possible purely Danish, and offer no scope for the further introduction of Danish elements. In this way all future misunderstandings would be effectually avoided; and Article XIX. of the Treaty of Vienna has indeed already established perfect freedom of emigration between Germany and Denmark.

"I leave it entirely to your judgment as to what use you may make, if any, of this despatch, or whether you consider that my views on the subject must already be known at Berlin through the reports of Baron Werther.

"Accept, etc."

Of all the delicate and complicated diplomatic Rome. questions Baron Beust was called upon to solve, the negotiations with Rome were unquestionably among the most difficult. The Reichsrath had voted a modification of certain laws;* these had been sanctioned by the Emperor, but were in direct contravention with the substance of the Concordat (concluded on 18th of August, 1855, between Austria and the Pope).

Public opinion, whether rightly or wrongly, attributed all the misfortunes which had befallen Austria during the last twenty years to military rule, and mainly to clerical oppression. The latter had brought about the necessity of dualistic go-

* See Note IV.

vernment, in order that the western half of the empire might to some extent enjoy the religious freedom which the eastern had maintained. Hungary had never accepted the Concordat, having shielded herself against its adoption under some ancient laws which had never been repealed. Strange to say, she was actually protected in her opposition to it by the Hungarian church dignitaries, who knew that its adoption would place them in a subordinate position, by centralising religious rule in Austria in the Cardinal Primate of Vienna. The Emperor, his ministers, and both legislative bodies, felt that the moment had arrived when a more widely-extended religious freedom must be granted, and when the "fundamental principles of the State of the 21st of December, 1867,"* must become law.

The illiberal and intolerant address of the bishops had greatly irritated the people, and Baron Beust wisely advised the Emperor to allow concessions to be made while there was still time, as he foresaw that the speedy granting of just

* See Note V.

demands would prevent others from being forced upon the consideration of the legislature, which would necessarily bring about a rupture between the Papacy and the Austrian Court—such as the cancelling of the Concordat, and the employment of a large portion of the rich benefices of the church in Austria for the immediate necessities of the empire.

The concessions were made and carried triumphantly through both houses, and the joy of the people at this result manifested itself in a general illumination of the city. The reforms ^{Educational reform.} consisted, first, in an alteration of the “Educational Laws.” Formerly all National Schools in Austria were in the hands and under the direct supervision of the clergy, and this had the natural effect of preventing parents who dissented from the tenets of the Church of Rome from sending their children to school. This law was rescinded. The schools were placed in the hands of the laity; religious instruction (which was not compulsory) being alone reserved to the clergy. A very striking similarity exists between this enactment of secular education and the following clauses of

the English Education Bill, prepared by the National Education League, which will, we sincerely hope, be embodied in the Government scheme now before our Parliament :—

Clause 3.—National Rate Schools.

“ No creed, catechism, or tenet peculiar to any sect shall be taught in any National Rate School ; but the School Board shall have power to grant the use of the schoolrooms out of school hours for the giving of religious instruction, provided that no undue preference be given to one or more sects to the exclusion of others, &c.”

Clause 5, as to Existing Schools.

“ Existing schools under Government inspection admitting all children free, and arranging their religious teaching in such a manner that it may be at a distinct time, either immediately before or after school business, and that attendance at such religious teaching *shall not be compulsory, &c.*”

The ranters of Exeter Hall have for years been accustomed to expend their long-winded oratory in

condemning the intolerance of Catholic Austria. May not—ought not—Protestant England to take a lesson from her on this important question? Is it compatible with the first great principle of Christianity, and of every form of religion—"Love thy neighbour as thyself"—to withhold from the people the blessings of education by surrounding it with an impassable barrier of cant and intolerance? The political, social, and moral development of a country depends on the education of the people. Statistics show that the educational status of our country is far lower than that of continental nations: it is for English statesmen who would render themselves worthy the appellation of Liberal, to prove themselves so by granting to the people that which is due to them—an unfettered system of National Education. We owe an apology to our readers for thus diverging from our text; the deep interest we take in the question must be our excuse.

The second concession consisted in the legalisa-
tion of civil marriages before the mayor, or properly-constituted civil authority. This alteration in the law at present extends only to cases of

Civil marriages.

marriage between persons of different creeds, or where peculiar difficulties are raised by the Church. The Government, in the face of the still-existing Concordat, was obliged to be most moderate and careful in the measures it proposed, for it cannot be denied that Rome sees only with the eyes of Rome, and is apt to forget that the days are past when nations blindly accepted her supremacy and infallibility in matters temporal as well as spiritual. Those nations which still recognise her authority can only continue to do so, if she should be willing to make great concessions which are in conformity with the march of intellect and the rapid progress of civilisation. The Œcumenical Council is at this moment discussing the question of Centralisation or Federalism in Catholic affairs, and there exist great differences of opinion on this subject. Many of the highest dignitaries of the Church, such as Cardinal Prince Schwarzenberg and Monseigneur Dupanloup, are in favour of the latter system, whilst the Spanish cardinals advocate the former. In conducting the delicate negotiations with Rome, one would have naturally supposed that Baron Beust must have laboured

under peculiar disadvantages as a Protestant ; such, however, was not the case. It is a singular fact that Rome has always preferred to treat with a Protestant than with a liberal Catholic. Notwithstanding this slight advantage, however, the task was an arduous one ; for not only had the Baron to endeavour to carry the day with Rome, but he was obliged to be especially careful not to irritate the Ultramontane party, and thereby bring about a reactionary opposition in Austria which it would be difficult to quell. All the sagacity and logic of the despatches addressed by him to the ordinary and extraordinary plenipotentiaries, Hubner, Crivelli, Meysenbug, and Trauttmansdorff proved ineffectual. Rome had declared herself infallible ; had protested alike against the Treaty of Peace of Westphalia of 1648, and against the Congress of Vienna of 1815 ; in fact, so far as principle was concerned, she had never yet yielded. Baron Beust perhaps bethought himself of a piece of advice once given by Napoleon I. : " Always to treat with the Pope as if one had an army of 100,000 men at one's disposal." But this could not, under existing circumstances, be risked. He

endeavoured, but in vain, to obtain the Papal consent to the rescinding of the Concordat, under the promise of concluding, as soon as possible, another treaty with Rome based upon the new constitutional institutions of the Austrian empire. On the 16th of December, 1867, he wrote to Count Crivelli, the Austrian ambassador at Rome, as follows :—

“ Vienne, le 16 décembre 1867.

“ Avant de Vous rendre au nouveau poste où la confiance de l'Empereur, notre Auguste Maître, Vous appelle, Vous avez pu recueillir de la bouche de Sa Majesté Elle-même les informations les plus nécessaires pour régler Votre attitude et Votre langage. Vous avez ainsi été déjà éclairé sur les intentions du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, sur le but qu'il entend poursuivre à Rome, et ces instructions ont été complétées par les entretiens que Votre Excellence a eus avec moi.

“ Je me propose donc seulement aujourd'hui de résumer ces indications qui doivent guider Votre conduite dans les débuts de la mission dont Votre Excellence est chargée.

“ En arrivant à Rome et dès Vos premières entrevues avec le Saint-Père, aussi bien qu'avec le Cardinal Antonelli, Vous aurez, M. le Comte, à Vous rendre l'interprète fidèle des sentiments de profond dévouement et d'inaltérable attachement que l'Empereur, notre Auguste Maître, professe pour la religion catholique et son chef vénéré. Votre Excellence voudra bien renouveler en termes chaleureux les assurances de sympathie dont le Gouvernement

Impérial et Royal a déjà fait parvenir l'expression à Rome à l'occasion des dernières épreuves que le Saint-Père a eu à subir. Votre Excellence pourra ajouter que cette sympathie ne s'est pas bornée à des vœux stériles. En effet, l'Empereur, notre Auguste Maître, a profité de son séjour à Paris, à l'époque du plus fort de la crise des affaires de Rome, pour donner un ferme appui à la cause du Saint-Siège. Cette circonstance n'a pas manqué d'exercer une certaine influence sur les déterminations de l'Empereur Napoléon, qui savait que le concours moral de l'Autriche lui était entièrement acquis dans les mesures qu'il prenait pour secourir Rome contre les attaques de ses ennemis.

“ Lorsque la question de la Conférence a été mise sur le tapis, les intérêts du Saint-Siège n'ont pas été perdus de vue par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal. L'attitude que nous avons prise alors, et notre accord avec le gouvernement français, ont certainement contribué à mieux disposer ce dernier en faveur du maintien du pouvoir temporel. Nous croyons donc avoir donné dans ces circonstances critiques quelques témoignages positifs de notre désir d'aider et de soutenir le gouvernement pontifical. Votre Excellence voudra bien faire valoir ces considérations auprès de la Cour de Rome, qui n'en sentira, je l'espère, que plus vivement l'urgence de ne pas repousser les demandes que nous venons lui présenter par Votre organe.

“ En abordant ce terrain délicat, Votre Excellence voudra bien s'appliquer avant tout à combattre les défiances et les préjugés qu'on pourrait nourrir à l'égard des institutions libérales qui se développent en Autriche. On nous représente dans un certain milieu comme entraînés,

presque malgré nous, sur une pente rapide et fatale qui doit conduire l'Autriche au précipice.

“ Si on se plaçait à ce point de vue, on croirait nous rendre service en mettant des obstacles sous nos pas et en nous empêchant de courir à notre propre perte. Ce serait là une erreur d'appréciation également pernicieuse pour nos intérêts comme pour ceux de l'Eglise. Il importe, qu'avant d'examiner nos demandes, on ne s'abuse pas à Rome sur notre véritable situation. Votre première tâche doit donc être, M. le Comte, de bien éclairer le Saint-Siège sur l'état intérieur de l'Autriche, ainsi que sur les causes et la nature de la transformation qui s'opère dans l'Empire. Si notre position est jugée par le Saint-Père telle qu'elle se présente en réalité, il me paraît difficile que Sa Sainteté ne sente pas Elle-même la nécessité de modifier les bases sur lesquelles sont établis jusqu'à présent en Autriche les rapports de l'Eglise et de l'Etat.

“ Nous tenons à le constater ; ce n'est point pour chercher une vaine popularité, ce n'est point pour trouver un appui passager dans les tendances ou les passions du jour, que nous nous sommes décidés à la démarche que nous entreprenons à Rome. Afin de mieux le prouver, je remonterai plus haut et je dirai que la voie libérale dans laquelle est entré le Gouvernement Impérial n'est elle-même aucunement, comme beaucoup de gens se plaisent à le penser, un expédient du moment, ou une concession faite à l'esprit de parti, mais bien le fruit d'une mûre détermination et la conséquence inévitable de l'organisation actuelle de l'Empire d'Autriche.

“ Du moment où l'Empereur, notre Auguste Maître, a voulu mettre fin au démêlé qui subsistait depuis tant d'années avec la Hongrie et paralysait d'une manière si

déplorable les forces de la Monarchie entière, la voie que le Gouvernement devait suivre était toute tracée et ne pouvait varier. La constitution hongroise devait être remise en pleine vigueur et la partie orientale de l'Empire rentrait par le fait même en jouissance de droits et de libertés considérables. Ces mêmes droits et ces mêmes libertés ne pouvaient, à partir de cet instant, être refusés à la partie occidentale de l'Empire, et une parfaite parité devait être établie entre tous les sujets du Souverain. L'évidence de ce fait ne saurait être, il me semble, contestée et telle est, en peu de mots, l'explication aussi simple que claire de la conduite tenue par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal.

“La réconciliation avec la Hongrie impliquait nécessairement le rétablissement et le développement du régime constitutionnel sur la base des institutions libérales en deçà de la Leitha. Il serait trop long d'entrer dans l'histoire des faits qui ont donné, dans la Chambre actuelle des députés, une prépondérance relative aux partis avancés. Mais il n'est pas inutile de relever que l'opposition très-imprudente du parti féodal en Bohême et en Moravie, soutenue en partie par les éléments cléricaux, et qui méconnaissait les sages intentions de notre Auguste Maître, fut la cause principale d'une constellation qui occasionna la défaite de ce parti dans les élections aux diètes et finalement son abstention regrettable dans les discussions du Reichsrath. Ce n'est pas la faute du Gouvernement, si la question du Concordat a été abordée dans de pareilles conjonctures. Certes, nous sommes les premiers à reconnaître tout ce qu'il y a d'exagération dans l'agitation actuelle des esprits. Mais il ne faut pas non plus se dissimuler le côté sérieux de la question, qui consiste dans le conflit entre

certaines exigences de la législation et les dispositions du concordat. Tel est le problème en face duquel nous nous trouvons placés. Nous venons loyalement exposer au Saint-Père notre embarras et nous croyons faire acte de déférence et de bonne foi en exprimant le désir de trouver d'accord avec Sa Sainteté le moyen de sortir de cette difficulté.

“Le Gouvernement Impérial a fait son possible pour concilier les exigences diverses. Il s'est efforcé d'abord de calmer les esprits et d'éviter qu'une lutte ouverte ne s'engageât entre les privilèges accordés à l'Eglise par le Concordat et les besoins de la législation nouvelle. Je puis m'en référer à cet égard aux premières déclarations que le Gouvernement a faites aux Chambres dans cette question. Il y a maintenu, avec une fermeté qui lui a valu de nombreuses attaques, le droit du Saint-Siège d'être consulté dans les modifications qu'on voulait apporter à certaines lois. Malheureusement, le zèle pieux des Prélats d'une partie de l'Empire les a entraînés à méconnaître la gravité de la situation et à tenter une démarche assurément inopportune. L'adresse des Evêques a éveillé toutes les passions hostiles à l'Eglise et a fourni à ses adversaires un prétexte plausible pour insister sur la nécessité de faire cesser promptement la contradiction qui existe entre les institutions nouvelles de l'Autriche et les stipulations du Concordat.

“Le Gouvernement a encore résisté au courant qui grossissait, et il a obtenu, non sans peine, que les lois relatives au mariage et à l'éducation fussent séparées de celles qui règlent la constitution de l'Empire. La Cour de Rome reconnaîtra, je l'espère, que nous avons donné là une nouvelle preuve de nos sentiments de respect pour le maintien de ses droits.

“Cependant, si nous sommes parvenus ainsi à éloigner un peu la décision et à parer à un conflit imminent, nous n'avons point écarté la difficulté ni résolu la question.

“La contradiction que nous avons signalée entre nos institutions et le Concordat subsiste dans toute son étendue et demande impérieusement un remède efficace. Les esprits les plus modérés partagent à cet égard les convictions que je viens d'exprimer et réclament qu'on mette fin à un état de choses dont la durée serait dangereuse. La majorité de la Chambre haute, qu'on ne saurait accuser de parti pris hostile à l'Eglise catholique, ne diffère pas sensiblement d'opinion avec la Chambre des Représentants. Les lois que celle-ci a adoptées, seront sans doute également, bien qu'avec de notables modifications, votées par la Chambre des Seigneurs, et le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se verra placé dans la pénible alternative, soit de proposer à l'Empereur la sanction de lois contraires aux stipulations du Concordat, soit de provoquer un conflit constitutionnel des plus dangereux en conseillant à Sa Majesté de refuser cette sanction.

“C'est en prévoyant cette position fatale aux intérêts de l'Eglise Catholique en Autriche, comme à ceux de l'Etat, que nous venons demander au Pape de nous aider à conjurer ce péril par une résolution toute spontanée qui sauvegarde sa dignité et celle de l'Empereur. *Nous faisons appel à son esprit de justice et à son affection paternelle, en le priant de consentir à ce que le Concordat de 1855 soit d'un commun accord abrogé et remplacé par un nouveau traité conforme à la situation.* Si le Saint-Père y acquiesçait, des négociations seraient aussitôt ouvertes pour la conclusion de cet Acte.

“ Tel est aujourd’hui, M. le Comte, le but de Votre mission. Telle est la demande que Vous avez à présenter au Saint-Père au nom de l’Empereur. C’est à cela que se bornent pour le moment Vos instructions, et je me réserve de Vous donner de nouvelles directions selon l’accueil que Vos démarches rencontreront à Rome. Je compte d’ailleurs adjoindre à Votre Excellence un négociateur spécial chargé d’élucider les questions de droit sur lesquelles la Cour de Rome éprouverait le désir d’obtenir des informations plus détaillées.

“ Ce que je recommande surtout aux soins de Votre Excellence, c’est de présenter sous son vrai jour le côté politique de la question ; d’en faire ressortir l’immense importance pour la réorganisation définitive et la consolidation de l’Empire d’Autriche ; enfin d’appuyer sur les considérations que j’ai développées plus haut et de combattre les idées erronées qu’on peut avoir conçues à Rome sur notre attitude.

“ Nous ne cédon pas, je le répète, à des tendances anti-religieuses, que nous sommes les premiers à déplorer. Nous constatons seulement la nécessité de mettre les rapports de l’Eglise et de l’Etat en harmonie avec les institutions nouvelles dont l’Autriche est dotée, et nous soutenons que l’établissement de ces institutions était la conséquence inévitable, non de l’avènement au pouvoir d’un parti, ou d’un homme, mais du retour au régime constitutionnel en Hongrie. Il y a encore un argument qui vient à l’appui de cette manière de voir et qui plaide en faveur de l’abrogation du Concordat actuel et de la nécessité de le remplacer par un nouvel arrangement. Les stipulations de cet Acte sont déjà légalement inapplicables en Hongrie, depuis que ce Royaume est rentré en possession de ses pré-

rogatives constitutionnelles. Il en résulte que, dans cette partie de la Monarchie, le Concordat n'est pas considéré comme étant en vigueur. Comment serait-il donc possible de maintenir en vigueur dans une moitié de l'Empire un traité passé à l'état de lettre morte dans l'autre moitié ? N'y a-t-il pas dans le simple énoncé de ce fait une contradiction flagrante, incompatible avec un état de choses régulier ? Il me semble difficile que la Cour de Rome n'arrive pas à la même conclusion que nous, si elle examine mûrement la situation.

“ Elle reconnaîtra, j'aime à le croire, combien il serait préférable dans son intérêt, aussi bien que dans le nôtre, de ne pas provoquer un conflit et de sauvegarder tous les principes d'ordre et d'autorité en acceptant notre proposition.

“ J'espère que Votre Excellence réussira à faire entrer cette conviction dans l'esprit du Saint-Père et de ses conseillers.

“ Recevez, etc.”

His Holiness answered that, although he might be willing to negotiate relative to the revision of the Concordat, he would never consent to its being annulled, and that he would publicly protest before the whole Catholic world against its violation by the proposed new Austrian laws. The following was Count Crivelli's report on this subject :—

Le Comte Crivelli au Baron de Beust.

"Extrait.

Rome, le 3 janvier 1868.

"Le 31 décembre j'ai eu l'honneur de remettre mes lettres de créance au Saint-Père qui m'a reçu avec Sa bonté proverbiale. Sa Sainteté a daigné S'entretenir très-longtemps avec moi, me parlant de la politique générale et particulièrement de la situation intérieure de l'Autriche et de la personne de l'Empereur, notre Auguste Souverain, pour Lequel Elle a témoigné le plus sincère et le plus vif intérêt. Arrivant à la question du Concordat, le Saint-Père observa que, depuis que l'agitation contre le Concordat a commencé, l'attitude du Gouvernement Impérial a été équivoque, laissant faire d'un côté, encourageant de l'autre par son silence, se taisant également sur les modifications qu'on réclame pourtant en thèse générale comme nécessaires, sans que depuis plusieurs mois on ait fait la moindre démarche pour entrer dans l'examen des détails. *'Je suis tout disposé à réviser et modifier le Concordat selon les exigences de la situation, à l'amender selon les expériences faites,' a continué le Saint-Père, 'mais je ne pourrai jamais consentir, je ne consentirai jamais à l'abroger; si on l'annule par des lois nouvelles, en face de la catholicité entière, je protesterai hautement contre la violation d'un engagement solennel.'*

"J'ai vu plusieurs fois le Cardinal Antonelli, le Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat, Msgr. Berardi et Msgr. Franchi; tous m'ont parlé dans le même sens. Je crois qu'on est blessé de l'attitude du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal qui n'a rien fait pour calmer l'agitation contre le Concordat, ni pour s'entendre avec le Saint-Siège; en un mot, on trouve que son attitude n'a été ni franche, ni loyale. Evidem-

ment, ces mots ne sont sortis de la bouche de personne, mais il est facile de voir qu'ils sont dans leur pensée. Sans qu'on me l'ait dit clairement, je crois que si en Autriche on passait outre et considérerait le Concordat comme non-avenue, le Saint-Siège revendiquerait *tous* les privilèges accordés au Souverain. Je laisse juger à Votre Excellence la perturbation qui suivrait une séparation *violente* de l'Eglise et de l'Etat en Autriche, où, tant bien que mal, les deux pouvoirs ont marché de concert depuis des siècles. Un conflit avec le Saint-Siège dans ce moment, où les animosités religieuses viendraient s'ajouter aux passions politiques, aurait sans doute des suites incalculables, mais sûrement funestes. Je n'ai pas besoin d'assurer Votre Excellence que je ferai bien certainement tout mon possible pour en atténuer les effets."

In the next despatch the Imperial Chancellor clearly intimated to the Papal Government that it must not hope to prevent the passing of the new laws in Austria by an appeal to the well-known warm Catholic feelings of the Emperor, assuring it that, with all due deference to his Holiness, the wish for the welfare and progress of his people was paramount in that monarch's mind, and that nothing could prevent his carrying out what he considered just. This document is so remarkable and significant as a sign of the times, that, notwithstanding its length, we give it *in extenso* :—

Le Baron de Beust au Comte Crivelli à Rome.

“ Vienne, le 10 mars 1868.

“ Tout ce qui m’était revenu dans ces derniers temps sur les dispositions se manifestant à Rome, à l’égard de l’Autriche et de son Gouvernement, ne pouvait que me faire entrevoir partout une extrême irritation.

“ Tout en tenant compte de mainte circonstance bien faite pour expliquer cette fâcheuse et regrettable situation, il m’a été impossible de ne pas y reconnaître aussi des tendances qui, loin de venir en aide à nos efforts pour prévenir un conflit, semblent plutôt vouloir le précipiter et paralyser toute action modératrice. J’apprends de bonne source que tout dernièrement on s’est emparé des nouvelles télégraphiques portant que le comité de la Chambre des Seigneurs avait voté le projet de loi sur les mariages et que la Chambre se trouvait à la veille de la discussion in pleno pour déclarer toute entente impossible.

“ Il me semble qu’autant que l’on nous parle d’une irritation dirigée contre le Gouvernement, elle ne saurait se prévaloir que d’actes émanant du Gouvernement même et non de faits se trouvant en dehors de sa sphère d’action.

“ C’est dans l’espoir bien légitime que des appréciations plus justes viendraient modifier les premières impressions que je Vous ai engagé à Vous condamner temporairement au rôle de spectateur attentif au lieu de rentrer en scène.

“ Je pense que le moment est venu d’y reparaître, et ma dernière dépêche Vous a fourni les moyens de le faire sans Vous exposer à être trop mal accueilli.

“ Cependant, M. le Comte, je crains qu’on ne se fasse encore à Rome illusion sur l’état de notre régime public et responsable, sur ses conditions irrévocables, comme aussi

sur la force de l'opinion publique parmi nos populations de race Allemande. Permettez-moi donc que j'entre là-dessus avec Vous dans quelques développements.

“ Et d'abord, je Vous avouerai sans hésitation que personne ne déplore plus que l'Empereur Lui-même la situation perplexe qui Lui a été faite, en Le plaçant entre Sa condescendance bien connue pour le Siège Apostolique et les devoirs que Lui impose sa position de Chef d'Etat ; toutefois je vous prie d'être intimement persuadé que quelque pénible, affligeante même que soit cette position, des qu'il sera placé entre le respect filial qu'Il porte au Gouvernement suprême de l'Eglise et Ses devoirs rigoureux de Souverain envers Ses sujets, Sa Majesté n'hésitera pas à faire ce que Sa double profession de Prince et de Législateur exige impérieusement d'Elle dans la conjoncture actuelle. Depuis le commencement de son règne, notre Auguste Maître a traversé de bien grands évènements et subi des épreuves bien rudes et bien diverses, mais ni les séductions des révolutions, ni les exemples des entraînements réactionnaires ne L'ont jamais fait dévier de la bonne route ; Il a fidèlement accompli Sa haute mission et conservé dignement Son caractère historique, et aujourd'hui, sous les auspices de notre nouvel ordre de choses, Il est incontestablement beaucoup plus populaire et beaucoup plus puissant, qu'Il ne l'était pendant les régimes précédents. Le prestige moral qui L'entoure et la profonde vénération dont Il est l'objet parmi Ses sujets et jusque chez les nations étrangères, sont autant de faits que personne n'ignore en Europe. Or, cette position éminente, l'Empereur la doit toute entière à la haute intelligence qu'Il a des besoins de Ses Etats, des mœurs laïques et des conditions honnêtement libérales de notre société, et Il risquerait de perdre le côté le plus précieux

de Sa gloire dès le moment où Il irait se heurter contre le développement intellectuel de Ses peuples et la marche générale de la civilisation moderne. On nous parle souvent de la confiance et de l'affection que le Saint-Père porte à notre Empereur, et Sa Majesté en est on ne peut plus reconnaissante. Que Sa Sainteté daigne donc Lui témoigner ces sentiments quand l'occasion en vaut la peine et que Ses Conseillers fassent donc leur devoir comme l'Empereur fait le Sien, et que, tout en se rappelant que la question couvre pour la Couronne de Sa Majesté les plus hauts intérêts, ils se pénétrant eux-mêmes des vrais moyens de servir dignement et utilement parmi nous la religion, son culte et ses progrès, sa grandeur et sa puissance à l'aide des forces et de l'appui qu'en Autriche elle reçoit et recevra toujours de l'Etat.

“On ne cesse de me dire, M. le Comte, que le Promémoria du 30 Janvier a donné de grands déplaisirs au Saint-Siège. Vous n'ignorez pas qu'en ma qualité de Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, je n'ai pas pu me refuser à Vous transmettre ce memento tel quel pour être communiqué par Vous à Monseigneur Antonelli au nom du Conseil des Ministres cisleithaniens. Ma responsabilité personnelle n'est donc nullement engagée par un acte que je n'ai pas la prétention de juger ici ni en bien ni en mal, et si je ne puis disconvenir qu'il pèche peut-être un peu par la forme, je dois cependant dire que pour le fond la pièce fait ressortir invinciblement la disparité choquante entre notre législation civile et religieuse, en même temps qu'elle reflète fidèlement l'explosion de l'opinion telle qu'elle se propage chez nous sur ce sujet. Et les flots de cette opinion, n'en doutez point, Monsieur le Comte, monteront encore davantage et deviendront de plus en

plus pressants. Au reste, le travail préparatoire des Ministres cisleithaniens ne préjuge en rien la négociation directe que je suis toujours prêt à entamer avec le Saint-Siège sur l'ensemble ou une partie du Concordat.

“La liberté d'enseignement, Monsieur le Comte, et l'incompétence de la société civile en matière religieuse sont au nombre des plus précieuses conquêtes et des principes fondamentaux des temps modernes. C'est d'après ces principes que nous ne pouvons pas plus refuser à l'Etat ses droits, sa place et sa part dans la distribution, la direction et la surveillance de cet enseignement, avec la libre concurrence des Ecoles, des Maîtres et des Méthodes sous l'exigence bien entendue de garanties préalables et efficaces, que nous pouvons permettre que l'Etat en fait d'instruction publique et dans l'organisation de ses écoles de différentes catégories empiète sur le droit des familles et le droit des croyances religieuses. Les enfants appartiennent à la famille avant d'appartenir à l'Etat, et l'Etat n'a pas le droit de s'imposer arbitrairement à ce sanctuaire et de ravir aux familles la faculté de faire élever leurs enfants dans leur foi et par les Ministres de leur foi. Il en est de même des rapports entre l'Etat et les hommes qui, catholiques ou protestants, chrétiens ou non-chrétiens, sont chargés du dépôt des croyances religieuses, de les maintenir et de les transmettre de génération en génération par l'éducation et par l'enseignement. En d'autres termes, le Gouvernement de l'Empereur veut, pour ce qui est de l'Eglise catholique, que les Evêques règnent et gouvernent librement et souverainement dans les séminaires de leurs diocèses, comme l'Etat doit régner et gouverner de la même manière absolue et indépendante dans ses écoles. Il y a nonseulement devoir, il y a intérêt pour la mo-

narchie constitutionnelle à tenir efficacement la main pour que ces deux droits coexistants, celui de la famille et de l'Eglise, comme celui du domaine de la société laïque et de l'Etat, soient tenus entièrement distincts et vigoureusement appliqués.

“Un Projet de Loi sur cet important objet a été voté à la fin du mois d'octobre dernier, par notre Chambre des Députés cisleithaniens. Il se trouve, en ce moment, soumis à la discussion de la Chambre des Seigneurs.

“En vous transmettant ci-joint un exemplaire imprimé de ce dispositif, je le recommande par Votre intermédiaire, M. le Comte, à l'examen sérieux et impartial du Saint-Siège. J'espère qu'on reconnaîtra à Rome que, bien que ce dispositif remplisse les conditions conformes au génie de notre société, il offre aussi toutes les garanties possibles que l'Eglise catholique puisse désirer en face de l'œuvre réformatrice de notre instruction publique. On nous fait craindre que le Pape protestera ouvertement contre cette œuvre et le travail auquel nous nous appliquons à élever ou à relever le niveau des études et des esprits parmi nos populations encore fort arriérées. Je vous confesse que je ne partage pas cette crainte. J'ai, pour mon compte, une idée beaucoup plus haute des lumières et de la justice du Saint-Siège. Il sait fort bien que les anciennes corporations religieuses et enseignantes sont devenues trop étrangères à la société civile et à son Gouvernement, trop dissemblables dans leurs intérêts à ceux de la masse des citoyens, et je dirai aussi en général trop peu versées dans beaucoup de sciences modernes, pour qu'elles puissent désormais retenir à Elles-seules le monopole de l'enseignement et porter exclusivement sur leurs épaules tout le fardeau de l'instruction contemporaine. Et d'ailleurs,

comment serait-il compatible avec l'équité éclairée du Saint-Siège qu'il refusât à l'Autriche les mêmes libertés et immunités accordées en plein, il y a longtemps, à la France, à la Belgique et à la Prusse? Comment admettre qu'il se contredise lui-même à tel point qu'ayant accepté en France la grande institution de l'Université et en Belgique l'Université libre de Bruxelles, il s'opposât aujourd'hui, en face de toutes ces concessions et tolérances du passé, à l'émancipation de nos écoles de la tutelle exclusive et privilégiée de l'Eglise? Une telle supposition n'est pas acceptable, M. le Comte, elle serait également blessante pour l'honneur du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal comme pour l'amour-propre de nos populations.

“Le second Projet de Loi que Vous trouverez ci-joint pour en faire, auprès du Saint-Siège, le même usage que pour l'autre, se rapporte à l'institution des mariages civils.

“Après avoir reçu l'approbation de la Chambre des Députés, il est en ce moment soumis à la discussion de la Chambre des Seigneurs, ayant les mêmes chances d'y passer finalement que le projet sur l'instruction publique.

“Le droit de régler les liens du mariage, de les casser et de les dissoudre, s'il y a lieu, et d'en tenir registre, a été, depuis les temps les plus reculés de l'Eglise catholique, la prérogative exclusive de la Commune. Les anciens canons n'ont jamais considéré le lien conjugal autrement que comme un contrat civil ordinairement béni par l'Eglise; ils ont reconnu dans la promesse formelle et réciproque du fiancé et de la fiancée de s'épouser, le seul titre légitime, efficace et suffisant de la cérémonie nuptiale, entièrement indépendant du concours et de la bénédiction du prêtre. C'est ainsi que les savants auteurs du *Code-Napoléon* ont envisagé et résolu cette question avec la

tolérance du Saint-Siège. Les législations d'autres Etats ont marché depuis, en cette matière, sur les traces de celle de la France consulaire.

“ Toutes les objections qu'on a voulu soulever contre l'institution du mariage civil se trouvent réfutées par les résultats de l'expérience et les faits de l'histoire. On voudra nous faire croire que l'institution minera parmi nous la foi divine et ruinera la sainteté du lien conjugal. Il n'en sera absolument rien. Elle n'a affaibli ni en France, ni en Belgique la foi de l'Eglise et du sacrement du mariage, pas plus qu'en Prusse elle n'a affaibli le sentiment religieux.

“ Je comprends parfaitement, M. le Comte, la résistance que nous rencrontrons à Rome, en demandant au Saint-Siège de reconnaître des faits qui lui déplaisent, et pourtant il ne pourra pas plus se soustraire à la longue aux embarras et aux conséquences de la question dont il s'agit, que nous-mêmes nous pourrions la laisser traîner d'abord et puis tomber. Cette question est sérieuse, elle est de plus urgente, il faut donc la traiter sérieusement et promptement. La politique de l'inaction et de la procrastination, de la résistance passive et du parti pris, derrière laquelle on voudrait peut-être se retrancher au nom du dogme et de la conscience, n'empêchera rien, mais gâtera et perdra tout. Quoiqu'il arrive, nous resterons les tenants de l'arène. Le pouvoir civil du Gouvernement de l'Empereur ne renonce point aux armes légales dont il est pourvu, mais dans l'intérêt de la paix et de la foi, comme de la liberté et de l'influence religieuse en Autriche, il invite le pouvoir spirituel de l'Eglise catholique à le dispenser de s'en servir.

“ Nous ne nous dissimulons pas les difficultés et les em-

barras dont la question peut devenir la source pour nous ; toutefois notre consolation est, que nous ne l'avons pas créée ni provoquée, mais qu'elle nous a été imposée par l'esprit du siècle et la marche des évènements, contre lesquels nous ne pouvons absolument rien. C'est pourquoi nous voudrions la terminer par une composition amiable avec le Saint-Siège. Personne peut nous demander de consumer dans cette tentative notre capital d'excellente position de Gouvernement et de grand ascendant sur l'opinion de notre pays ; au contraire, il s'agit de les garder, de les accroître même dans le double intérêt de la Religion et de l'Etat. Nous attendons donc tout de la haute sagesse du Saint-Père et de Sa juste appréciation des exigences de notre situation et nous attendrons tant que nous conserverons la moindre espérance, car le péril sera tout aussi grand pour les intérêts de l'Eglise, si nous ne réussissons pas à Rome dans cette épreuve.

“Recevez, etc.”

The Papacy, strange to say, turned a deaf ear to the most convincing of all arguments, namely, that it could not in justice withhold from Austria the concession it had granted to France and Belgium. It therefore became necessary for the immediate advisers of the Austrian Crown to demonstrate to Rome that, although the new opposition might possibly retard the sanction of the new laws, it would not prevent their being ulti-

mately adopted. See the following extract from a despatch to Count Crivelli :—

“ Extrait.

“ *Vienne, le 29 mars 1868.*

“ Dans un moment où tant de rumeurs contradictoires circulent au sujet de l'attitude de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique et de Son Gouvernement dans les questions qui touchent au Concordat, je crois devoir donner encore à Votre Excellence quelques indications qui pourront servir de règle à Son langage. J'engage avant tout Votre Excellence à ne pas attacher d'importance aux bruits divers propagés par la presse et à tâcher que l'opinion à Rome ne se laisse point égarer par ces nouvelles qui ne sont que trop souvent dénuées de fondement. Je résumerai brièvement ici la situation telle qu'elle se présente en réalité.

“ La loi relative aux mariages a été votée par les deux Chambres et n'a pas encore reçu la sanction Impériale.

“ La loi sur l'enseignement votée par la Chambre des Représentants va être soumise à la Chambre des Seigneurs.

“ Après cette loi, dont la discussion prendra quelque temps, celle qui doit régler les rapports entre les différentes confessions religieuses passera par l'examen des deux Chambres. Elle offre moins de sujet de contestation et traversera sans doute promptement cette épreuve.

“ Il ne manquera plus alors que la sanction Impériale pour faire entrer en vigueur ces nouvelles lois. Il ne sera procédé à cet acte, Votre Excellence peut en être convaincue, qu'avec mûre délibération, et les résolutions de l'Empereur seront prises en dehors de toute espèce de pression. Je tiens à constater ainsi combien toute précipitation est écartée de la marche du Gouvernement et

combien toutes les mesures qu'il croit devoir prendre dans ces questions sont le résultat d'un examen réfléchi et d'une conviction profonde.

Mais, si une sage lenteur est apportée à l'accomplissement d'actes aussi graves, il ne faut pas y voir un symptôme d'hésitation et supposer que le Gouvernement reculera au dernier moment. Nous désirons laisser aussi longtemps que possible la porte ouverte aux chances d'une entente avec le Saint-Siège, que nous ne cessons d'appeler de tous nos vœux. C'est à ce point de vue qu'il faut envisager le délai qui peut encore retarder la sanction Impériale, mais ce n'est, je le répète, qu'une question de temps et on s'abuserait à Rome, si on y doutait de la ferme volonté qui existe d'apporter des changements effectifs à l'ancienne législation sur ces matières."

On the 26th of May, 1868, the Papal Nuncio, Monsignor Falcinelli, presented to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Vienna a formal protest against the above laws, which had then already received the Imperial sanction, and been promulgated. Their application was declared to be a direct violation of the Concordat, an attack upon the sovereign rights of the Pope as the head of the Roman Catholic Church, and a violation of all divine and canonical enactments. Although so solemn a protest on the part of the Holy See must of necessity have commanded consideration, par-

ticularly in Vienna, still the Austrian Chancellor strongly felt that he ought not for a moment to shrink from the duty imposed upon him of maintaining at any price the rights of the Austrian people, even in the face of the Papal allocution of the 22nd of June, 1868, which completely condemned and ignored the introduction of the new laws, notwithstanding the following exceedingly moderate despatch which preceded it:—

Le Baron de Beust au Baron de Meysenbug à Rome.

“ Vienne, le 17 juin 1868.

“ C’est avec le plus vif intérêt que j’ai pris connaissance des rapports de Votre Excellence.

“ La manière dont Votre Excellence a été reçue semblait, en effet, indiquer que la Cour de Rome était animée à notre endroit de dispositions plus conciliantes et que, tenant un juste compte des difficultés de la situation, elle ne les aggraverait pas par quelque démonstration inopportune.

“ Votre télégramme du 14, annonçant que l’allocution préparée par le Souverain Pontife contiendrait cependant des expressions sévères à l’égard du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, nous a causé une impression assez pénible et a déçu notre attente. Nous voulons encore espérer que le Saint-Père écoutera avec bienveillance les nouvelles observations de Votre Excellence et qu’Il sentira le poids des raisons alléguées en faveur d’une attitude plus prudente. Sa Sainteté a daigné reconnaître que mes efforts

personnels avaient toujours tendu vers l'apaisement mutuel des partis et que dans ces circonstances délicates ma conduite avait été plutôt celle d'un ami de l'Eglise catholique.

“ Encouragé par cette appréciation indulgente que je crois, d'ailleurs, avoir méritée, je désire faire encore une fois appel, par l'intermédiaire de Votre Excellence, à la sagesse du Souverain Pontife. Je me permettrai de prier Sa Sainteté de vouloir bien examiner si les intérêts catholiques en Autriche, qui lui sont si chers, n'auraient pas de dangers à courir par suite d'une manifestation venant raviver des passions en ce moment assoupies. Le Saint-Siège qui est si exactement informé de ce qui se passe dans ce pays-ci, ne doit pas ignorer combien les esprits violemment excités à l'époque de la discussion des lois religieuses dans les Chambres, se sont subitement calmés depuis. Les populations les plus profondément dévouées à la religion catholique, celles qu'on représentait comme prêtes à s'agiter, ont accueilli les nouvelles mesures législatives sans murmures, et cette absence d'opposition a refroidi dans une égale proportion l'ardeur des adversaires de l'Eglise. Cet apaisement réciproque était si réel, que la sanction donnée par l'Empereur a passé presque inaperçue et n'a nulle part éveillé les crises qu'on avait pu d'abord redouter. Une pareille situation nous paraît heureuse à la fois pour les intérêts de l'Etat et ceux de l'Eglise. Leurs rapports mutuels se développent avec plus de liberté et de sécurité n'étant pas entravés par les froissements qui accompagneraient la lutte des passions contraires.

“ Il me semble que le Saint-Siège doit, tout autant que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, désirer que cet état de choses se prolonge et permette ainsi de régler de part et

d'autre, sans aucune animosité, les conditions nouvelles dans lesquelles on se trouve.

“ Je ne sais si une allocution sévère du Souverain Pontife produirait parmi les populations catholiques de l'Empire des résultats dont l'Eglise aurait à se louer, et sans que je me permette d'empiéter sur les appréciations plus élevées du Saint-Siège, je ne saurais admettre qu'il puisse rester indifférent à la question de savoir si l'attitude des populations sur lesquelles on compterait de préférence serait de nature à justifier cette attente. Mais ce qui est certain, c'est que les ennemis de la Cour de Rome puiseraient dans ce fait des armes pour recommencer une campagne virulente contre l'Eglise et la religion.

“ Les journaux s'empareraient des paroles du Saint-Père pour les commenter dans un esprit haineux, ranimer les passions anti-religieuses et entraver ainsi la marche du Gouvernement lorsqu'il voudra agir dans un esprit favorable à la liberté de l'Eglise. En créant ainsi des embarras sérieux au Gouvernement et en lui rendant plus difficile la tâche de maintenir les libertés de l'Eglise, le Saint-Siège ne rendrait assurément pas service à la cause qu'il défend.

“ Je ne parle pas ici des ménagements que peuvent mériter les sentiments personnels de l'Empereur, notre Auguste Maître, pour lesquels le Saint-Père Vous a dit vouloir observer des égards spéciaux. Bien que cette considération soit digne d'attention, je ne fais que l'effleurer en passant et ne désire insister que sur le côté vraiment politique de la question. Je ne pense pas que son Eminence le Cardinal Antonelli puisse en méconnaître l'importance et contester la valeur de mes suggestions.

“ Soit que la prochaine manifestation de Rome ne ren-

contre qu'indifférence parmi les populations, soit qu'elle produise une fermentation conduisant à des conflits, je ne suppose pas que l'autorité du Saint-Siège puisse en retirer quelque fruit. Les nouvelles lois n'en subsisteront pas moins, mais, si l'agitation religieuse renaît, leur application ne pourra se faire que bien difficilement avec l'esprit impartial et conciliant qui est dans les intentions du Gouvernement.

“Tels sont les points de vue que je Vous demande, M. le Baron, de développer à Rome avec le zèle et l'habileté dont Vous nous avez déjà donné des preuves. J'aime à espérer que les efforts de Votre Excellence ne resteront pas inutiles. C'est, je le répète, au nom des intérêts catholiques que je crois surtout parler en cherchant à contenir dans les bornes de la modération les représentations que le Saint-Père compte adresser au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal.

“Recevez, etc.”

Baron Beust answered the Papal allocution by the following communication, in which—after expressing his just surprise that Rome should adopt such a line of conduct towards Austria, who had hitherto always respected her laws and protected her interests—he denied the right of the Vatican to meddle in matters which in no way concerned it :—

Le Baron de Beust au Baron Meysenbug à Rome.

“ Vienne, le 3 juillet 1868.

“J’ai reçu avec Vos rapports du 22 et du 23 juin le texte de l’allocution prononcée par le Saint-Père dans le Consistoire du 22.

“J’ai déjà fait connaître à Votre Excellence par le fil électrique la fâcheuse impression que cette manifestation a produite ici. Les explications que donne Votre expédition du 23 ne sauraient mitiger l’effet des paroles du Saint-Père.

“Nous apprécions assurément les égards observés pour la personne de l’Empereur, et Sa Majesté n’est certes pas insensible à cette marque de déférence. Nous voulons croire, ainsi que Votre Excellence nous l’affirme, que l’allocution pontificale, comparée à beaucoup d’autres documents de même nature émanés du Saint-Siège, ne laisse pas que de porter l’empreinte d’une certaine tendance à tempérer les expressions autant que le point de vue l’Eglise le permet.

“Il n’en reste pas moins avéré que le langage dont Sa Sainteté s’est servie à l’égard du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal et des nouvelles institutions de l’Autriche est d’une sévérité dont nous pensons avoir quelque droit de nous plaindre. Je ne voudrais pas entrer à cette occasion dans une polémique peu conforme à mes sentiments de respect pour le Saint-Siège et à mon désir de conciliation. Toutefois, je ne puis me dispenser de quelques observations que j’invite Votre Excellence à porter à la connaissance de la Cour de Rome.

“Nous ne saurions, en premier lieu, reconnaître l’obligation où le Saint-Père se serait trouvé de suivre certains

précédents et d'user envers l'Autriche des mêmes procédés qu'envers d'autres pays dont le Gouvernement pontifical à eu à se plaindre.

“ Est-il possible, en effet, d'établir ici une comparaison ? Avons-nous porté atteinte [au territoire ou aux biens de l'Eglise ; avons-nous opprimé la religion catholique et ses Ministres ?

“ En mettant même de pareils exemples hors de cause, nous pouvons, je crois, hardiment avancer qu'il n'y a pas de pays en Europe où l'Eglise catholique ait encore une position aussi privilégiée qu'en Autriche, malgré les lois du 25 mai. Cette circonstance aurait pourtant mérité qu'on en tint compte et qu'on ne confondît pas le Gouvernement Impérial dans la même réprobation que celle dont on a frappé des Gouvernements bien autrement en opposition avec l'Eglise et la religion catholique.

“ Nous comprenons fort bien que le Saint-Père ait jugé indispensable de protester contre des lois qui modifient la situation créée par le Concordat de 1855. Nous nous attendions pleinement à une démarche de ce genre et nous aurions pu l'accepter en silence lors même que sa forme eût été moins conciliante qu'il nous était permis de l'espérer. Mais, ce que nous ne pouvons laisser passer sans objection, c'est la condamnation lancée contre les lois fondamentales sur lesquelles reposent les nouvelles institutions de l'Empire. Ces lois n'étaient pas en cause ; en les attaquant de la sorte, le Saint-Siège blesse profondément le sentiment de la nation et donne au différend actuel une portée des plus regrettables, même dans l'intérêt de l'Eglise. Au lieu de contester simplement telle ou telle application des principes qui servent de bases au Gouvernement actuel de l'Autriche et qui sont le fruit du plus heureux accord

entre les peuples de l'Empire et leur Souverain, ce sont ces principes eux-mêmes qui sont réprouvés. Le Saint-Siège étend ainsi ses représentations à des objets que nous ne pouvons en aucune façon regarder comme relevant de son autorité. Il envenime une question qui n'excitait déjà que trop les esprits, en se plaçant sur un terrain où les passions politiques viennent se joindre aux passions religieuses. Il rend enfin plus difficile une attitude conciliante du Gouvernement en condamnant des lois qui renferment le principe de la liberté de l'Eglise et lui offrent ainsi une compensation pour les privilèges qu'elle perd. Il n'est pas inutile non plus de remarquer ici que ces lois garantissent expressément à l'Eglise la propriété des biens qu'elle possède en Autriche. Cette stipulation prouve que les lois en question ne portent pas un caractère hostile à l'Eglise, puisqu'elles la maintiennent dans des droits dont elle a été privée dans tant d'autres pays. Il ne m'appartient pas de juger dans quelle mesure cette dernière considération pourrait servir à adoucir les appréciations de la Cour de Rome. Ce qui, à mes yeux, n'offre pas une ombre de doute, c'est que les populations de l'Autriche trouveront une consolation à se rappeler que plus d'un pays très-catholique obéit à des dispositions légales analogues, tout en vivant en paix avec l'Eglise, et qu'il existe surtout en Europe un grand et puissant Empire dont les tendances vers le progrès et la liberté se sont toujours alliées à un attachement très-prononcé à la foi catholique et qui, régi par des lois tout aussi abominables, s'est trouvé heureux jusque dans ces derniers temps des sympathies indulgentes du Saint-Siège.

“Ma dépêche du 17 juin dernier prévoyait les suites fâcheuses que produirait l'allocution, si elle n'était pas

conçue dans des termes très-mesurés. Je regrette vivement que la Cour de Rome n'ait pas tenu plus de compte de mes prévisions. Elles se sont depuis entièrement réalisées. Je ne crois pas que les populations catholiques de l'Empire éprouvent aujourd'hui un zèle plus grand que par le passé pour les intérêts de leur religion. Par contre, nous voyons un redoublement d'ardeur dans les attaques dirigées contre l'Eglise, le clergé et le Pape. Cette hostilité serait contenue dans de plus étroites limites et s'apaiserait plus facilement, si les questions spéciales touchées par les lois du 25 mai avaient seules été abordées dans l'allocution pontificale.

“Je dois, avant de terminer, exprimer encore ici la pénible surprise que nous a causée l'appel adressé aux Evêques Hongrois dans les dernières phrases de l'allocution. Il me semble qu'on devrait se féliciter à Rome du tact parfait et de la réserve avec lesquels ces matières délicates ont été traitées jusqu'ici en Hongrie. Il ne saurait être désirable à aucun point de vue de susciter de nouveaux différends et d'augmenter ainsi les embarras qui existent déjà. Mais c'est surtout dans l'intérêt même de la Cour de Rome qu'il nous paraît peu opportun d'éveiller la susceptibilité nationale des Hongrois. L'apparence d'une pression étrangère produirait dans cette nation un résultat tout contraire aux désirs du Saint-Siège, et nous verrions se former, contre l'influence légitime de la Cour de Rome, un orage tout aussi fort que celui qui s'est déchaîné de ce côté-ci de la Leitha.

“Telles sont, Monsieur le Baron, les observations que nous ont suggérées la lecture de l'allocution pontificale. Veuillez ne point les laisser ignorer à Son Eminence le Cardinal-Secrétaire d'Etat. Nous n'en persévérons pas

moins dans la voie que nous nous sommes tracée tout d'abord. Tout en continuant à maintenir intacts les droits de l'Etat, et à faire respecter les lois, nous laisserons l'Eglise jouir en paix des libertés que nos lois lui garantissent, et nous nous efforcerons d'apporter dans les relations mutuelles de l'Etat et de l'Eglise un esprit de conciliation et d'équité qui sera, je l'espère, réciproque.

“Votre Excellence voudra bien se rendre l'organe fidèle de ces sentiments, et Elle ne fera ainsi que se conformer aux vues de l'Empereur, notre Auguste Maître.

“Recevez, etc.”

This last despatch, together with the moderation and reserve adopted by Baron Beust throughout all these negotiations, and impressed by him on the newly-appointed Austrian ambassador, Count Trauttmansdorff, seems to have had the desired effect of silencing Rome. The allocution remained, but certainly its effect has not been that which the Pope had contemplated; and this fact should have proved to him that, even in Austria, his pretended power in temporal matters is daily losing ground with the people, and that his protest against the new enactments—whose object, in the case of the marriage laws, was to improve the public morality, and in that of the educational reforms, to raise the general social condition of

the country—was as impotent to stem the tide of public opinion as was the ever-famous anathema chronicled in the “Ingoldsby Legends”:

“Never was heard such a terrible curse!
But what gave rise to no little surprise,
Nobody seem’d one penny the worse!”

The delicate consideration which Austria, and even France, observe in their relations with Rome, notwithstanding her perpetual opposition to progress, affords a striking contrast to the rough-and-ready behaviour she meets with at the hands of her own country—Italy. From this fact it can only be inferred that the long-disputed position of Rome in relation to the Catholic world can never be satisfactorily re-established through the medium either of diplomatic despatches or logical arguments. This object can alone be attained by the force of events in Italy itself.

The Eastern question cannot be strictly called ^{Policy in the East.} an exclusively European one, for three parts of the world—Europe, Africa, and Asia—are immediately interested in its final solution. We are here only called upon to consider its relation to Austria, but it is so intimately bound up with the history

and interests of our own country that we must claim our readers' indulgence if we take a broader view, and say a few words on what we conceive to be the proper policy of England in the matter. Now, what was the reason which led England to engage herself in the Crimean War? Did our peace-loving nation shed the blood of her noblest sons and spend millions of the public money for the sake of upholding Mussulman barbarism? Unquestionably not. The war of 1854 can only be justified and considered as a reasonable and sagacious act of English statesmanship, if it was waged to prevent Russia from annexing Turkey, and thereby having it in her power to bar the shortest, and what will be ere long the most important route between England and our great Indian Empire.

If we trace the road between India and Europe adopted from the earliest times till now, we find that the first (which, with the exception of the Bosphorus, was entirely by land) was both the shortest, and had the most easterly direction. When the science of navigation began to be understood, this line was converted into a purely

maritime one, and diverged more and more, until at last the road to India was across the ocean and round the Cape of Good Hope. When sailing-vessels were replaced by steamers, the great Indian track swerved once more to the East, and now goes through the Isthmus of Suez. There can therefore be little doubt that the rising generation will live to see the ancient caravan route modernized, by railroads doing the work of camels and mules. It is a positive fact that the shortest line between London and Bombay is through Constantinople, and if we follow this line from Bombay to London, we pass through the following points :—Ormuz, at the entrance of the Persian Gulf; Bassorah, at the mouth of the Euphrates; Bagdad, Aleppo, Constantinople, Sophia, Serajevo, Banjaluka, Karlstadt, Innspruck, Strasburg, Metz, Calais, and London. A great portion of a line running close to this is finished, another portion is in construction, and the third is already planned. The railway communication is complete between London and Brixen on the southern side of Innspruck, and a line is being made between Brixen and Villach, which is finished from thence to Karlstadt

and Sissek. The Austrian Government intends to construct a line from Sissek to Brod, on the Save, and Turkey has granted a concession for a railway from Brod *viâ* Banjaluka, Serajevo, and Sophia, to Constantinople. The line from Constantinople to Bassorah through Bagdad and the Valley of the Euphrates is planned; from thence, Bombay may be reached by sea in five or six days.

Now, supposing that the trains would only run at the rate of twenty-five miles an hour, the time occupied in going from London to Bassorah would be about six days; so that the journey from London to Bombay would occupy less than half the time it now takes. With the certainty of the speedy construction of this line before us, our Eastern policy ought to take a new direction. We ought not to content ourselves with seeking to protect Turkey from Russia by treaties only made to be broken, as we did by the Treaty of Paris; but we may reasonably hope to assist in regenerating the Ottoman Empire, first, by helping to carry out a system of railways which must act as channels of civilization throughout the country; second, by supporting Austria, as much as possible,

in promoting every species of improvement amongst the Turks, and in ameliorating the condition of the Slaves—shielding them from Turkish excesses on the one hand, and the protectorate of Russia on the other; third, by inducing Austria to make the defence of the interests of European civilization in the East one of the leading points of her foreign policy. These are merely our views of the Eastern question; but on studying the correspondence and acts of Baron Beust's Eastern policy, we find ourselves confirmed in our opinion by the many points of similarity which exist between his ideas on the subject and our own. From the moment of his appointment as Austrian Foreign Minister, he devoted special attention to the affairs of the East; and, reserved and passive as he always was in other directions, in this he was decided and ready to take the initiative. We have already shown, in the preceding portion of this work, how Austria sought the alliance of the Western Powers in the Eastern question, and how, failing to obtain the direct co-operation of England, owing to her strict neutrality, Baron Beust gained the support of France. He

clearly explained his views in the following despatch, addressed to Prince Metternich at Paris :—

“ Vienne, le 10 novembre 1866.

“ Nous avons pris connaissance avec un vif intérêt de votre rapport du 2 de ce mois, coté 62-D, qui nous informe de l'entretien confidentiel que vous avez eu avec M. le Marquis de Moustier sur les affaires d'Orient et particulièrement sur celles de Servie.

“ Veuillez exprimer à M. le Ministre des affaires étrangères mes sincères remerciemens pour les communications qu'il a bien voulu mettre Votre Altesse à même de me faire. Je constate avec plaisir cette nouvelle preuve des dispositions que montre le Gouvernement français de s'entendre avec l'Autriche sur les questions orientales.

“ Les troubles de Candie et la fermentation régnant dans quelques parties de l'Empire Ottoman ont fourni dans ces derniers temps à mon prédécesseur l'occasion d'entretenir souvent Votre Altesse des vues du Gouvernement Impérial sur les affaires d'Orient. A peine sortie d'une guerre désastreuse, l'Autriche éprouve, avant tout, le besoin de réparer ses forces et d'éloigner, autant que faire se peut, des complications qui menaceraient le maintien de la paix européenne. C'est vous dire, mon Prince, que nous regarderions dans ce moment comme fort inopportune toute solution radicale de la question d'Orient, et notre premier désir est donc de ne point voir se poser devant l'Europe le problème redoutable de la dissolution de l'Empire Ottoman. Nous croyons être d'accord sur ce point avec le Gouvernement français, qui nous a maintes fois témoigné le voeu de ne pas voir troublée la tranquillité de l'Europe.

Le Gouvernement Impérial joindra ses efforts sincères à ceux qui seront faits pour empêcher que le trône du Sultan ne s'écroule. D'un autre côté, l'Autriche ne saurait refuser ses sympathies et son appui dans une certaine mesure aux populations chrétiennes de la Turquie, qui ont parfois de justes réclamations à élever, et qui sont rattachées à quelques-uns des peuples de l'Empire d'Autriche par des liens étroits de race et de religion. La France aussi accorde constamment une protection généreuse aux chrétiens d'Orient quand ils renferment leurs demandes dans des bornes équitables et modérées. Les deux Gouvernemens pourront donc facilement, je l'espère, se mettre d'accord pour suivre une ligne de conduite conforme à ce double principe et tenant compte à la fois des intérêts des populations chrétiennes comme de ceux de la politique qui exige le maintien de la domination musulmane.

"C'est également à ce point de vue, il me semble, que nous devons examiner la question dont traite spécialement votre rapport du 2 de ce mois. Le Gouvernement Impérial surveille avec attention ce qui se passe en Serbie. Il n'est point étonnant que les concessions obtenues par les Moldo-Valaques y aient du retentissement et engagent le Prince Michel à présenter à son tour quelques demandes qui fortifieraient l'autonomie dont jouit la Serbie. Nous avons trop d'intérêt à cultiver des rapports de bon voisinage avec les Serbes pour nous opposer à ce qu'il leur soit accordé des satisfactions pouvant se concilier avec les droits de la Porte. Nous ne voudrions pas non plus qu'on crût à Belgrade que le Gouvernement russe est le seul qui soit disposé à montrer de la sollicitude pour la situation de la Serbie.

"L'occupation de la citadelle ne saurait avoir pour la

Turquie une importance sérieuse au point de vue militaire. Les Serbes, de leur côté, attachent un grand prix à se voir délivrés de la présence de soldats étrangers, qu'ils considèrent comme une humiliation et qui est en outre une cause permanente de rixes et de difficultés. Nous ne serions donc pas éloignés de partager le sentiment de M. le Marquis de Moustier sur cette question et de croire qu'elle pourrait être résolue à l'avantage mutuel des deux parties, si les Serbes donnaient à la Porte, en retour de cette concession, des garanties efficaces de calme et de loyauté dans l'avenir. Par égard pour l'indépendance du Gouvernement ottoman, nous ne voudrions pas le presser avec instance d'aller au devant des vœux des Serbes, mais j'engage M. le Baron de Prokesch à s'exprimer de manière à ce qu'on sache à Constantinople que nous ne sommes point opposés à l'idée de sages concessions et que nous applaudirions même à toute mesure qui, sans mettre en question la suzeraineté de la Porte, contenterait la Serbie et assurerait ainsi la tranquillité de ce pays.

“Veuillez, mon Prince, vous énoncer dans le sens de la présente dépêche, que je vous autorise même à placer confidentiellement, si vous le jugez à propos, sous les yeux de M. de Marquis de Moustier, et recevez, etc. etc.”

Baron Beust had the satisfaction of learning that the French Government not only thoroughly agreed with his opinions, but even manifested the intention of acting, if possible, in concert with Austria. England also approved his policy; and Count Kálnoky, the Chargé d'Affaires in London,

communicated this encouraging fact to Baron Beust in a despatch, from which the following is an extract :—

Le Comte de Kálnoky au Baron de Beust.

“ Extrait.

Londres, le 5 decembre 1866.

“D’après ce que Lord Stanley vient de me dire, ses rapports de Constantinople confirment qu’on doit s’attendre à une résistance tenace de la part du Gouvernement turc sur la question de Belgrade. ‘C’est pour la Porte un souvenir historique auquel elle se croit obligée de tenir dans l’intérêt de sa dignité et de son autorité.’—*Le Principal Secrétaire d’Etat constata de nouveau avec satisfaction l’accord qui existait au sujet de cette affaire entre les Cabinets de Vienne, de Paris et de Londres, en ajoutant : ‘Je connais votre manière de voir et celle de la France que j’approuve entièrement, avec la nuance peut-être que nous considérons cette question comme une affaire qui regarde essentiellement la Turquie et où nous n’avons pas à nous mêler. Nous avons conseillé à Constantinople de faire des concessions, c’est au Gouvernement turc à décider s’il croit devoir en faire. S’il refuse de sortir de Belgrade, il est dans son droit et nous devons nous borner à lui dire que c’est de la mauvaise politique et que par conséquent il a tort.’*”

We have already, in speaking of Baron Beust’s Russian policy, shown the kindly intentions of the Austrian Government towards Servia. All his propositions regarding that country were accepted, not only by the Sublime Porte, but by all the great

powers except Russia, who endeavoured, though unavailingly, to get the Prince of Montenegro recognised as Prince of Servia, as appears from the following extract :—

Le Baron de Prokesch au Baron de Beust.

“ Extrait.

Constantinople, le 16 juin 1868.

“ Mes collègues d'Angleterre, de France et de Russie trouvent l'attitude prise de prime abord par la Porte digne et sage. L'Ambassadeur de Russie, en particulier, a envoyé son premier drogman, M. le Général Bogouslawsky, à la Porte pour la féliciter de sa modération et du tact de convenance politique démontré en cette occasion. Le Général, causant avec Fuad-Pacha sur les éventualités du choix, a voulu connaître si la Porte avait ou non un candidat à elle pour le siège princier, et sur la réponse négative du Ministre ottoman, il désira savoir si elle se réservait un veto contre l'un ou l'autre candidat. Fuad-Pacha ayant répondu à cette question également par un non, *le premier drogman russe, en précisant le sens de sa pensée, demanda si la Porte admettrait par exemple le Prince de Monténégro s'il sortait du vote de la scouptchina ?* Fuad-Pacha répondit que ce cas était légalement impossible et que, certainement, la Porte refuserait de sanctionner le choix d'un Prince non-originaire du pays.”

The whole question of the election of the reigning prince was arranged according to the wishes of the Servians, for the Porte granted its “Berat” in strict conformity with the proposals made by

Baron Prokesch, the Austrian Internuncio at Constantinople, who received instructions from the Austrian Foreign Office to favour the Servians in this matter, and reported the result as follows :

Le Baron de Prokesch au Baron de Beust.

“ Constantinople, le 24 juillet 1868.

“ Je me suis rendu hier à la Porte dans l'intention de m'assurer de la rédaction et de la prompte expédition du Bérat d'investiture du Prince de Serbie, les complications au Danube engageant à éviter le retard.

“ J'ai retrouvé Fuad-Pacha dans les mêmes dispositions dans lesquelles je l'avais laissé il y a quelques jours, c'est-à-dire, convaincu comme nous, qu'il est de l'intérêt du gouvernement ottoman de faire acte de reconnaissance du principe d'hérédité et d'assurer ainsi à la dignité princière en Serbie le droit de succession.

“ Le Ministre ottoman, sur ma demande, mit sous mes yeux la traduction officielle du Bérat qui sanctionne l'avènement du Prince Milan, approuvant le vote de l'Assemblée nationale comme conforme à l'ordre de succession établi par le Bérat de 1830, qui accordait l'hérédité de la 'dignité princière à la famille Obrénovich par ordre de primogéniture.' ”

“ Dans le texte de la traduction il y avait cependant deux fois le terme 'élu.' L'élection, dans le cas présent, n'étant considérée dans le Bérat que comme la suite et la reconnaissance du titre héréditaire du Prince Milan, le terme 'élu' était au fond sans conséquence. J'ai cru, cependant, qu'il fallait le changer, et il m'a été d'autant

plus facile de disposer le Ministre à remplacer dans le premier alinéa les mots : 'a élu' par : 's'est énoncé en faveur de' et dans le second le terme élu par admis, que dans le texte turc le mot correspondant a le sens d'admission et non pas celui d'élection.

"Le Chargé d'Affaires de Serbie, auquel j'ai lu confidentiellement la pièce, l'a trouvée tout-à-fait conforme aux vœux de son Gouvernement.

"Le Secrétaire-Général du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Kiamil-Bey, porteur du Bérat, part aujourd'hui pour Varna et Belgrade. La traduction officielle sera communiquée aux Cours garantes par les organes de la Sublime-Porte auprès d'elles. Je m'empresse de la joindre dans l'exemplaire même qui m'a été remis par Fuad-Pacha, accompagnée du texte turc.

"Veuillez agréer, etc."

The cruel assassination of the reigning Prince of Servia, who died without direct issue, the accession to the throne of a minor, and the regency which followed, were circumstances that greatly tended to complicate the situation. Notwithstanding all this, absolute tranquillity was re-established, the industry of the country progressed, and the relations between Servia, Turkey, and Austria became more cordial and confidential than they ever were before; and we are bound in justice to attribute this result to the sagacious policy of

Baron Beust. That this policy was by no means one-sided is proved by the fact that, although he supported the legitimate claims of the Christian subjects of the Porte in Northern Turkey, he also espoused the cause of the Turks against the illegal and revolutionary outbreak of their discontented Christian subjects—the *Rayahs* of the South.

The revolt in Crete, backed up by Greece, was ^{The Turco-Greek} a source of real danger to the Sublime Porte and ^{Question.} to the general peace of Europe. Greece, bent upon promoting her ambitious schemes of territorial aggrandisement by planning and supporting the Cretan rebellion, did not hesitate to risk a war with Turkey; and the latter power very justly felt herself greatly aggrieved at this flagrant breach of the rights of nations.

In Salzburg, however, Baron Beust succeeded in establishing a perfect understanding between France and Austria on the Cretan question, as will be seen from the following despatch, dated the 28th of August, 1867:—

Le Baron de Beust au Prince de Metternich à Paris.

“ Wildbad-Gastein, le 28 août 1867.

“D’après ce qui a été arrêté à Salzbourg, la question de Candie doit être reprise en sous-œuvre aujourd’hui que les circonstances ont changé. *Obtenir une pacification prompte du pays en amenant la cessation des hostilités et le commencement de l’enquête, dans le but de donner satisfaction à tous les vœux des populations compatibles avec la dignité de l’Empire ottoman, voilà ce que les Gouvernemens de France et d’Autriche veulent tâcher de réaliser.* A cet effet, il a été convenu que l’on ferait une démarche auprès du Gouvernement russe pour lui demander son avis sur les moyens les plus propres à amener la solution de l’affaire crétoise. Les deux Cabinets comptent s’adresser ensuite au Gouvernement britannique afin de l’engager à unir ses efforts aux leurs pour décider le Gouvernement ottoman à adopter le mode indiqué.

“J’ai, dès à présent, fait informer le Grand-Vizir que les pourparlers de Salzbourg avaient été empreints d’un caractère de bienveillance non équivoque pour la Porte, mais qu’en même temps ils avaient tendu à la faire entrer résolument dans la voie de l’enquête proposée.

“Dans le cours des entretiens à Salzbourg, j’ai fait ressortir plus d’une fois combien il y avait d’exagération, pour ne pas dire plus, dans les nouvelles répandues à grand bruit sur les cruautés commises en Candie par les troupes d’Omer Pacha, nouvelles sur la foi desquelles les Puissances ont cru devoir envoyer des bâtimens pour recueillir les femmes et les enfans. Votre Altesse verra par le rapport ci-joint en copie de notre Chargé d’Affaires à Constantinople et que je vous engage à faire traduire afin de pouvoir le mettre sous les yeux de M. le Marquis de

Moustier, que nos appréciations sont confirmées par des autorités françaises. Il en est de même de l'état actuel de l'insurrection, que l'on prétend toujours être en voie de progrès et qui serait complètement finie sans l'appui moral que lui a donné l'envoi des vaisseaux étrangers.

"Recevez, etc. etc."

Both France and Austria were equally desirous of effecting the pacification of Crete and the amelioration of the position of the Sultan's Christian subjects by any concessions which might be compatible with his dignity. Turkey, fully convinced of the sincerity of Austria and France, sought to facilitate their mediation by the introduction of many important reforms in Crete (including, among others, the most complete religious toleration), although she had already so far quelled the insurrection that it then only raged in those districts where Greece supported it.

These concessions, which had been voluntarily made by the Sublime Porte, served to strengthen her resolve absolutely to reject any proposition relative to the cession of Crete. How greatly Baron Beust's action in the matter confirmed and supported this view will be best gathered from the following despatch:—

Fuad-Pascha à Hayder Efendi à Vienne.

“ Constantinople, le 3 janvier 1868.

“ Son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique m'a lu, il y a au-delà d'un mois, une dépêche confidentielle de M. de Beust relativement à la question de la Crète. *Il en résulte que M. de Beust, ayant reçu du Cabinet des Tuileries au sujet de la déclaration des quatre Puissances les assurances les plus satisfaisantes relativement au maintien du principe de l'intégrité de l'Empire, s'est abouché ensuite à Londres avec le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté la Reine et que c'est le résultat de cette entente qu'il veut bien nous communiquer par l'entremise du Baron Prokesch.*

“ M. de Beust nous engage donc d'accepter l'enquête proposée par les quatre Puissances, l'intégrité de l'Empire ayant été mise hors de cause. Cela posé, l'enquête servirait, d'après l'opinion de M. le Baron de Beust, à aplanir toutes les difficultés de la situation et ferait disparaître la seule question qui préoccupe en ce moment d'une manière sérieuse la Sublime Porte, savoir la question de la Crète.

“ Si donc le Gouvernement ottoman répondait dans le sens sus-indiqué à la déclaration des quatre Puissances et qu'il transmettait cette réponse aux Cabinets de Vienne et de Londres, ceux-ci seraient prêts à l'appuyer. Telle est la substance de la communication qui nous a été faite confidentiellement au nom de M. de Beust.

“ Vous comprendrez, M. l'Ambassadeur, que venant de la part du Ministre d'une Puissance dont l'appui bienveillant ne nous a fait défaut dans aucune des questions qui nous touchent de si près, et d'un des hommes d'Etat dont s'honore aujourd'hui à un si juste titre la diplomatie

européenne, cette communication ne pouvait ne pas nous trouver profondément sensibles. La Sublime Porte apprécie d'autant plus cette sollicitude pour nos intérêts qu'elle nous offre une vraie consolation et un encouragement au moment même où nos efforts pour répondre à l'attente de l'Europe, notre modération et l'esprit de conciliation dont nous avons fait preuve, sont si ouvertement méconnus. Je tiens donc tout d'abord à vous prier, M. l'Ambassadeur, d'en exprimer les remerciemens les plus vifs de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan ainsi que de Son Gouvernement tant à Sa Majesté l'Empereur François-Joseph qu'à M. le Chancelier de l'Empire. M. de Beust a donné une preuve éclatante de cette sollicitude en mettant avec tant de succès à notre profit son voyage à Paris et à Londres, car vous n'ignorez pas de quelle influence a été, au point de vue de nos intérêts, ce voyage qui a suivi de près l'entrevue de Salzbourg. Le discours de l'Empereur des Français à l'ouverture de la session du Corps législatif est venu corroborer d'une manière solennelle les dispositions favorables de la France au sujet de l'intégrité de l'Empire. Ce point est désormais acquis et nous pouvons nous féliciter de voir celles des Puissances qui se sont de tout temps intéressées à la Turquie se rencontrer dans les mêmes dispositions à cet égard.

“ La politique de la France relativement à l'intégrité de l'Empire s'étant donc nettement dessinée, nous avons dû rechercher quel pourrait être l'objet d'une enquête en Crète. Il pourrait y en avoir trois : d'abord les causes de l'insurrection, puis ses suites désastreuses pour le pays, enfin les moyens pour les réparer.

“ Les causes de l'insurrection ? mais si jamais une question a été débattue à fond et jugée irrévocablement par

l'opinion publique, c'est bien celle-là. Qui ne sait aujourd'hui que ce sont les excitations étrangères et non pas seulement les excitations, mais le privilège accordé à un pays limitrophe, en dépit du droit international et des stipulations des traités, d'introduire des moyens de guerre et de lancer des bandes sur le sol de la Candie, qui ont produit et entretenu l'insurrection ?

“ Quant aux désastres qui par suite de l'insurrection ont ravagé le pays, ils ne sont malheureusement que trop réels. Le Gouvernement Impérial qui en connaît l'étendue les déplore plus que qui que ce soit. Aussi fait-il tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour les réparer et s'emploie-t-il à mettre fin à une situation aussi déplorable, en portant d'un côté le dernier coup à l'insurrection et en inaugurant de l'autre côté pour la Candie une nouvelle ère dont les populations lui savent déjà gré et qu'aussi l'Europe appréciera sans doute. Les dernières mesures décrétées par Sa Majesté Impériale, en dotant l'île d'une organisation sage et libérale, en promulguant des réglemens qui accordent aux chrétiens une large part dans l'administration, ont ouvert aux populations la perspective d'une paix féconde en prospérité et bien-être. Les réglemens administratifs et judiciaires élaborés et décrétés tout récemment ne laissent, nous l'espérons, rien à désirer. Que pourrait-on demander davantage ? Aussi ces mesures sont-elles accueillies par les populations délivrées de la pression des bandes étrangères comme un bienfait véritable. La majorité de la population qui a toujours conservé son attitude calme et soumise se voit récompensée de sa conduite et encouragée à y persévérer, tandis que le découragement gagne de plus en plus les exaltés qui se sont laissé entraîner par les agitateurs. Cet heureux résultat sur lequel le Gou-

vernement Impérial a incontestablement le droit de compter pour mener à bonne fin l'œuvre de réparation et d'apaisement, serait gravement compromis, il est facile de s'en convaincre, par la présence d'une commission mixte sur le sol de la Candie qui remettrait tout en question. Elle aurait pour effet immédiat de relever le moral des récalcitrans et de les enhardir. En se berçant de nouvelles et dangereuses illusions, les meneurs de l'insurrection les communiqueraient à la population soumise, et vous savez combien la contagion des idées chimériques est facile sous l'empire des circonstances telles qu'en créerait l'enquête infailliblement. Laissées en présence des autorités constituées du pays, en présence de la magnanimité du Gouvernement Impérial qui se présente avec le pardon et la clémence à la main, les populations si cruellement éprouvées ne sauraient que se jeter dans leur bras. Mais qu'une commission internationale vienne s'interposer entre le Gouvernement et ses sujets avec la mission d'examiner et de statuer sur leur sort, ce fait seul serait de nature à jeter la confusion dans les esprits, à ébranler leurs sentimens et à leur inculquer la pensée que ce n'est pas de l'initiative et de l'autorité du Gouvernement Impérial que dépend leur salut. On ne manquerait pas d'ailleurs d'exploiter cette situation, de faire luire aux yeux des plus simples le mirage de concessions impossibles; les moyens subversifs feraient le reste. Le résultat en serait tel que nous ne le saurions admettre à aucun prix et que les Puissances mêmes ne le pourraient désirer. C'est pour toutes ces considérations que Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan s'est décidé à envoyer sur les lieux Son Grand-Vizir. La mission de Son Altesse Aali-Pascha n'a pas eu d'autre but que celui qu'on s'est proposé par

l'enquête, ayant en même temps l'avantage d'appliquer sans délai les remèdes aux maux retrouvés. Elle n'est donc qu'une autre forme de l'enquête, la seule qui soit exempte d'inconvénients. Le caractère de ce premier homme d'Etat de la Turquie assure d'ailleurs à son oeuvre la maturité de l'intelligence ainsi que l'impartialité et l'équité voulues. Ce n'est pas un refus par lequel nous répondons aux conseils de M. de Beust. *Ces conseils sont marqués au coin d'une trop grande bienveillance pour qu'il nous soit permis de les accueillir avec un autre sentiment que celui d'une profonde déférence. Mais cette déférence même nous fait un devoir de lui présenter nos observations. Dans sa haute perspicacité et dans sa grande expérience des affaires il ne saurait ne pas les prendre en sérieuse considération et leur accorder l'accueil que nous espérons mériter par la sincérité de notre langage et par la confiance dont il fait preuve. Dans la situation où nous sommes, la franchise et la loyauté envers nos amis est sans doute notre premier devoir ; c'est pour cela que nous avouons que leur appui nous est plus que jamais indispensable. Nous espérons qu'il ne nous fera pas défaut dans cette circonstance de la part de M. le Baron de Beust et nous le lui demandons au nom de cette bienveillance dont il est animé à notre égard, au nom des intérêts de la Turquie qui est déjà fière de le compter parmi ses amis, au nom de la justice et des grands intérêts européens qui ne sauraient être séparés de ceux de l'intégrité de l'Empire.*

“ En vous priant de donner confidentiellement lecture de cette dépêche à Son Excellence M. le Ministre des affaires étrangères de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique, je vous autorise à lui laisser une copie si Elle le désire.

“ Agreez, etc., etc.”

Every attempt at pacification proved more and more that Greece was the real and principal cause of the revolt, and this of course brought the relations between Turkey and that power to such a pitch of exasperation, that war became imminent. It is singular that notwithstanding the above authentic despatches, which clearly prove that the Austrian Foreign Minister did all in his power to prevent an outbreak, his political adversaries persisted in accusing him of fanning the just anger of Turkey with a view of making political capital of the confusion in which Eastern affairs would necessarily be plunged in the event of a rupture taking place. He felt himself called upon to refute these unjust insinuations in the following despatch :—

Le Comte de Beust au Prince de Metternich à Paris.

“ Vienne, 4 janvier 1869.

“ Sa Majesté l'Empereur et Roi Vous ayant désigné pour Son plénipotentiaire à la Conférence qui va se réunir à Paris, afin de délibérer sur le conflit turco-grec, j'ai l'honneur de Vous transmettre ci-près les pleins pouvoirs nécessaires.

“ Votre Altesse connaît parfaitement les vues du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, ainsi que le but qu'il désire

atteindre dans la Conférence. *Ce que nous devons souhaiter avant tout, c'est une solution qui termine pacifiquement le différend soulevé, qui prévienne le retour de semblables incidents et qui donne à la Porte la satisfaction qui lui est légitimement due. D'après les communications que M. le Marquis de Lavalette a bien voulu faire à Votre Altesse, le Gouvernement français envisage absolument comme nous les questions en instance, et le programme qu'il a esquissé tant pour les travaux de la Conférence que pour la participation de la Grèce à cette réunion, répond entièrement à nos propres sentiments. Aussi n'avons-nous pas hésité à donner à ce programme notre pleine adhésion et Vous voudrez bien, mon Prince, de concert avec M. le Plénipotentiaire de France Vous efforcer à le faire prévaloir. Selon nos informations, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique partage notre manière de voir et nous avons tout lieu de croire que les trois Gouvernements se présentent à la Conférence dans le plus parfait accord. Cette entente nous paraît d'un heureux augure pour les résultats des délibérations de la Conférence et Votre Altesse devra appliquer tous ses soins à la maintenir.*

“ Les Cabinets de Berlin et de St. Pétersbourg nous ont tenus moins au courant de leurs appréciations. Cependant nous sommes autorisés à penser qu'ils reconnaissent en principe la légitimité des demandes formulées par le Gouvernement ottoman. Les Représentants de ces deux Gouvernements ont donné au Gouvernement hellénique les mêmes conseils que leurs collègues et aucune divergence notable n'a pu se remarquer dans l'attitude des différentes Puissances. Nous espérons que cette même harmonie de vues régnera au sein de la Conférence et facilitera l'accomplissement de sa tâche.

“Le Gouvernement Ottoman tiendra compte, je le suppose, des dispositions bienveillantes de toutes les Puissances à son égard. Fort de leur appui vis-à-vis de la Grèce, il pourra borner ses réclamations aux points les plus indispensables et contribuer ainsi, de son côté, au résultat pacifique que nous désirons atteindre.

“Quant au Gouvernement hellénique, nous aimons à croire qu’il écoutera la voix de la raison et qu’il n’hésitera pas à se conformer aux avis de la Conférence. La dignité du Roi George et de son Gouvernement me paraît entièrement sauvegardée par la voie suivie dans cette circonstance. Du moment où ce n’est plus l’Empire ottoman seul qui impose ses conditions à la Grèce, mais l’Europe réunie qui l’invite à respecter le droit international et à satisfaire à des demandes légitimes, elle ne saurait plus avoir de motif valable pour se refuser à un accommodement.

“Ces indications, jointes à celles que je Vous ai déjà fournies, Vous permettront, mon Prince, de régler Votre attitude et Votre langage dans la Conférence d’après les vues du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal.

“ Dans l’origine du conflit turco-grec, nous nous sommes tenus à l’écart et nous avons renoncé à toute initiative, afin de ne donner aucune prise aux insinuations malveillantes qui nous représentaient comme fomentant la discorde entre les deux parties adverses et encourageant la Porte à des mesures provocatrices. Nous avons cependant, dès le premier moment, promis notre concours éventuel à toute mesure que les Puissances adopteraient en commun pour assurer le maintien de la paix. Fidèles à cette promesse, nous nous sommes empressés d’adhérer au projet de Conférence, mais, en même temps, nous avons persévéré dans notre réserve et, sans intervenir par aucune suggestion nouvelle, nous avons

simplement acquiescé aux arrangements pris à Paris, afin d'assurer la réunion de la Conférence et d'en préparer le programme. Nous ne sommes sortis de cette réserve qu'à une seule occasion, lorsque la Porte a semblé hésiter à accepter la Conférence. Alors nous avons spontanément usé de l'influence que nous pouvions avoir auprès du Gouvernement ottoman, comme ses amis sincères, pour l'engager vivement à ne pas faire naître par un refus de nouvelles difficultés. Nous croyons avoir contribué ainsi à la solution qui se prépare et donné un nouveau démenti aux accusations dirigées contre la politique du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal.

“C'est à Votre Altesse qu'il appartient aujourd'hui de confirmer une fois de plus combien nos soins tendent constamment vers un but de paix et de conciliation, en prenant au sein de la Conférence une part active aux efforts qui se feront pour arriver à un arrangement sur les bases convenues.

“Recevez, etc.”

The Greek Government well knew that these accusations were unfounded; for no sooner did France decisively communicate her views as to its illegal behaviour in the Cretan affairs, than Baron Beust addressed the following despatch to the Austrian minister at Athens, desiring him to read its contents to the Greek minister:—

Le Baron de Beust au Baron Testa à Athènes.

" Vienne, le 23 avril 1868.

"Nous apprenons que l'une des Cours protectrices de la Grèce, prenant texte de l'appui continu prêté par le gouvernement hellénique à l'insurrection en Candie, ainsi que de sa conduite dans l'affaire des réfugiés crétois, vient de lui adresser des représentations sérieuses au sujet de la voie périlleuse qu'il persiste à suivre, lui recommandant vivement de renoncer aux décevantes espérances de grandeur et de gloire qu'il semble toujours disposé à caresser et de se contenter du rôle plus utile de consacrer ses soins aux améliorations dont le régime intérieur du pays est susceptible.

"Nous n'avons pas, quant à nous, la même qualité que les Puissances protectrices du royaume hellénique pour exercer de l'influence dans ses affaires ; *mais il est d'autres titres dont nous pouvons nous autoriser pour faire entendre à Athènes des avis bienveillants. Les liens d'amitié qui unissent la Cour de Vienne à celle d'Athènes, les intérêts politiques bien entendus des deux Etats que rien n'empêche de marcher d'accord, enfin les relations multiples créées par le mouvement commercial si actif entre les deux pays et par le nombre considérable de Grecs établis dans notre empire ; toutes ces raisons, en nous défendant du soupçon de nourrir des sentiments malveillants à l'égard de la Grèce, doivent exclure toute fausse interprétation, si nous nous permettons de venir appuyer tout conseil qui lui est donné dans un sage esprit de modération.*

"Les destinées du royaume hellénique nous inspirent une sympathie sincère, mais c'est précisément pour cela que nous serions désolés de le voir se lancer dans la car-

rière aventureuse où il allait être engagé lorsque le Roi, reconnaissant dans sa haute sagesse les dangers d'une pareille politique, a appelé dans Ses conseils les hommes éminents qui dirigent actuellement les affaires.

“ Nous ne prétendons aucunement contester à la Grèce les chances que l'avenir peut lui réserver ; mais ces chances, il nous semble qu'elle ne pourrait que les affaiblir si elle ne s'abstenait de tout ce qui serait de nature à exciter les méfiances et les inquiétudes de l'Europe. *Qu'elle suive plutôt l'exemple d'autres pays, qui, entourés d'Etats plus grands et plus puissants, ont réussi, sans se bercer de rêves d'agrandissement, à atteindre un haut degré de bien-être et à se faire une situation considérable dans le monde. En développant les riches ressources dont l'a douée la nature, en encourageant la production nationale, en étendant le cercle de ses transactions commerciales, en répandant l'instruction, en prenant, en un mot, une part active aux travaux de la civilisation, la Grèce pourra devenir un objet d'envie pour les populations qui l'avoisinent et se préparer un bel avenir.*

“ Ce n'est pas à dire que nous demandions aux Hellènes d'être insensibles au sort d'un peuple auquel les rattachent des liens étroits de religion et de race. Nous-mêmes, nous nous en préoccupons vivement, non moins que les autres Puissances garantes, et cette attitude a dû nécessairement peser d'un grand poids dans les déterminations de la Porte ottomane, et hâter l'effet de ses bonnes dispositions à l'égard des Crétois. Mais l'intérêt témoigné à ce peuple ne doit jamais aller jusqu'à enfreindre les lois de la neutralité. Convient-il que la Grèce, placée comme elle est sous le protectorat de trois des grandes Cours, fasse à un Empire dont ces mêmes Cours ont garanti l'intégrité, une guerre qui, pour n'être pas déclarée, n'en est pas moins

active ni moins efficace ? Telle ne saurait être la manière de voir des hommes d'Etat qui sont au pouvoir à Athènes, et aujourd'hui que la nation grecque a prouvé, par ses dernières élections, que, dans sa grande majorité, elle ne s'associe pas aux tendances belliqueuses, ils puiseront sans doute dans cette manifestation éclatante de l'opinion une force nouvelle pour faire prévaloir cette politique d'ordre et de paix qui ne peut manquer de concilier à leur pays l'estime et l'affection de l'Europe.

“ Veuillez Vous énoncer dans le sens de ce qui précède envers les Ministres du Roi.

“ Recevez, etc.”

At the time when the idea of a European Conference for the settlement of the Turco-Greek conflict, emanating from Prussia, was proposed in Paris and transmitted by the Cabinet of the Tuileries to Vienna for the purpose of confidential discussion, Baron Beust did not for a moment hesitate to give his adhesion to the French programme. He addressed the most urgent friendly counsels to Constantinople, in order to remove the grave objections the Porte entertained to exposing Turkish grievances to Europe at large, and to submitting the ultimatum she had addressed to Greece to the verdict of a conference. He strongly advised the Porte not to prejudice her cause by an obstinate

refusal, and in this sense addressed the following telegraphic despatch to the Austrian Embassy at Constantinople on the 29th of December, 1868 :—

(*Translation.*)

Count Beust to M. de Haymerle, Constantinople.

“Do your best in order that the Porte may abandon her resistance to the Conference. The most friendly dispositions are entertained towards her in Paris, and there is every prospect that the other Cabinets will also declare themselves in favour of the fulfilment of her reasonable demands. Recommend, in the same manner as your English colleague, that the Porte should immediately put an end to the executions in Crete.”

On the next day, the 30th December, 1868, the Imperial and Royal Chargé d’Affaires reported the favourable reception of the above good advice in the following telegram to Count Beust :—

(*Translation.*)

M. de Haymerle, in Constantinople, to Count Beust in Vienna.

“In pursuance of Your Excellency’s telegram of yesterday, Aali Pasha replied that in consideration of these favourable assurances, he would lay the proposal for the Conference before the Council of Ministers, subject to certain reservations. He believes that the Porte will be able to accept it. The executions in Crete are postponed.”

And on the 1st of January he confirmed this favourable report by the following despatch :—

Le Chevalier de Haymerle au Comte de Beust.

“ Constantinople, 1 janvier 1869.

“ Les conseils et assurances, contenus dans le télégramme de Votre Excellence du 29 décembre, ont puissamment contribué à détendre la situation et à tranquilliser la Porte sur l'issue probable de la Conférence.

“ Lord Clarendon a donné des assurances plus explicites encore sur la ferme intention des Puissances amies de la Porte, de se ranger du côté de celle-ci, et de lui donner toute sécurité du côté de la Grèce.

“ En même temps arrivait la nouvelle que Petropoulaki, poussé par la faim, s'était rendu avec les siens et que le comité insurrectionnel allait quitter la Crète.

“ Hubbard Pacha a consenti à plaider contre l'Enosis, comme pirate, devant les tribunaux de Syra et le Gouvernement hellénique se porta garant que ce bâtiment ne quitterait pas le port avant d'être jugé.

“ Aali Pacha croit donc que la Porte pourra, sous des auspices favorables, entrer à la Conférence. Il ne se hâte cependant pas trop de prononcer son adhésion ; il n'en a pas encore saisi le Conseil des Ministres ; il est vrai que ce n'est que hier que des communications officielles lui sont parvenues de Paris et de Londres. Il prescrira au Plénipotentiaire ottoman de s'en tenir strictement à la discussion des cinq points de l'Ultimatum, et de quitter la séance, si on mettait d'autres questions sur le tapis.

“ Veuillez agréer, etc.”

England, Austria, and France thus entered upon

the Conference with a pre-arranged programme elaborated by the French Foreign Minister, M. de Lavalette, and with a mutual agreement as to its labours and objects. What these were will be seen from the following instructions to Prince Metternich, who represented Austria at the Conference:—

Le Comte de Beust au Prince de Metternich à Paris.

“ Vienne, 4 janvier 1869.

“ Sa Majesté l'Empereur et Roi Vous ayant désigné pour Son plénipotentiaire à la Conférence qui va se réunir à Paris, afin de délibérer sur le conflit turco-grec, j'ai l'honneur de Vous transmettre ci-près les pleins-pouvoirs nécessaires.

“ Votre Altesse connaît parfaitement les vues du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, ainsi que le but qu'il désire atteindre dans la Conférence. *Ce que nous devons souhaiter avant tout, c'est une solution qui termine pacifiquement le différend soulevé, qui prévienne le retour de semblables incidents et qui donne à la Porte la satisfaction qui lui est légitimement due.* D'après les communications que M. le Marquis de Lavalette a bien voulu faire à Votre Altesse, le Gouvernement français envisage absolument comme nous les questions en instance, et le programme qu'il a esquisé tant pour les travaux de la Conférence que pour la participation de la Grèce à cette réunion, répond entièrement à nos propres sentiments. Aussi n'avons-nous pas hésité à donner à ce programme notre pleine adhésion et Vous voudrez bien, mon Prince, de concert avec M. le

Plénipotentiaire de France, Vous efforcer à le faire prévaloir. *Selon nos informations, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique partage notre manière de voir et nous avons tout lieu de croire que les trois Gouvernements se présentent à la Conférence dans le plus parfait accord. Cette entente nous paraît d'un heureux augure pour les résultats des délibérations de la Conférence et Votre Altesse devra appliquer tous ses soins à la maintenir.*

“Les Cabinets de Berlin et de St.-Petersbourg nous ont tenus moins au courant de leurs appréciations. Cependant nous sommes autorisés à penser qu'ils reconnaissent en principe la légitimité des demandes formulées par le Gouvernement ottoman. Les Représentants de ces deux Gouvernements ont donné au Gouvernement hellénique les mêmes conseils que leurs collègues et aucune divergence notable n'a pu se remarquer dans l'attitude des différentes Puissances. Nous espérons que cette même harmonie de vues régnera au sein de la Conférence et facilitera l'accomplissement de sa tâche.

“Le Gouvernement ottoman tiendra compte, je le suppose, des dispositions bienveillantes de toutes les Puissances à son égard. Fort de leur appui vis-à-vis de la Grèce, il pourra borner ses réclamations aux points les plus indispensables et contribuer ainsi, de son côté, au résultat pacifique que nous désirons atteindre.

“Quant au Gouvernement hellénique, nous aimons à croire qu'il écoutera la voix de la raison et qu'il n'hésitera pas à se conformer aux avis de la Conférence. La dignité du Roi George et de son Gouvernement me paraît entièrement sauvegardée par la voie suivie dans cette circonstance. Du moment où ce n'est plus l'Empire ottoman seul qui impose ses conditions à la Grèce, mais l'Europe réunie qui

l'invite à respecter le droit international et à satisfaire à des demandes légitimes, elle ne saurait plus avoir de motif valable pour se refuser à un accommodement.

“ Ces indications, jointes à celles que je Vous ai déjà fournies, Vous permettront, mon Prince, de régler Votre attitude et Votre langage dans la Conférence d'après les vues du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal.

“ Dans l'origine du conflit turco-grec, nous nous sommes tenus à l'écart et nous avons renoncé à toute initiative, afin de ne donner aucune prise aux insinuations malveillantes qui nous représentaient comme fomentant la discorde entre les deux parties adverses et encourageant la Porte à des mesures provocatrices. Nous avons cependant, dès le premier moment, promis notre concours éventuel à toute mesure que les Puissances adopteraient en commun pour assurer le maintien de la paix. Fidèles à cette promesse, nous nous sommes empressés d'adhérer au projet de Conférence, mais, en même temps, nous avons persévéré dans notre réserve et, sans intervenir par aucune suggestion nouvelle, nous avons simplement acquiescé aux arrangements pris à Paris, afin d'assurer la réunion de la Conférence et d'en préparer le programme. *Nous ne sommes sortis de cette réserve qu'à une seule occasion, lorsque la Porte a semblé hésiter à accepter la Conférence. Alors nous avons spontanément usé de l'influence que nous pouvions avoir auprès du Gouvernement ottoman, comme ses amis sincères, pour l'engager vivement à ne pas faire naître par un refus de nouvelles difficultés. Nous croyons avoir contribué ainsi à la solution qui se prépare et donné un nouveau démenti aux accusations dirigées contre la politique du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal.*

“ C'est à Votre Altesse qu'il appartient aujourd'hui de

confirmer une fois de plus combien nos soins tendent constamment vers un but de paix et de conciliation, en prenant au sein de la Conférence une part active aux efforts qui se feront pour arriver à un arrangement sur les bases convenues.

"Recevez, etc."

It is a matter for congratulation that the resolutions of the Conference in favour of the Porte and of the maintenance of international rights were adopted with perfect unanimity. Having been so greatly instrumental in bringing Turkey to agree to the decisions of the Conference, Count Beust now imposed upon himself the task of smoothing the ruffled dignity of Greece, and with this intention he addressed the following despatch to Baron Testa :—

Le Comte de Beust au Baron de Testa à Athènes.

"Vienne, 21 janvier 1869.

"Vous trouverez sous ce pli le texte de la déclaration adoptée par la Conférence des Puissances signataires du traité de Paris de 1856, qui avait à se prononcer sur les griefs articulés à la charge de la Grèce dans l'Ultimatum turc du 11 décembre dernier.

"Veuillez, Monsieur le Baron, appuyer chaleureusement les conclusions de cette déclaration auprès du Cabinet d'Athènes, et lui recommander avec instance d'y donner son adhésion.

"Ainsi qu'il résulte de la teneur de ce document, la Con-

férence n'a rien négligé pour faciliter au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté les Roi des Hellènes la condescendance qui lui est demandée.

“ Cette tendance ressort, d'une manière tout particulièrement frappante, du passage correspondant au premier point de l'Ultimatum. En effet, la Déclaration, au lieu de maintenir la demande formulée par la Porte de la dispersion des bandes armées pour envahir le territoire ottoman, se contente d'engager la Grèce à empêcher la formation de pareilles bandes à l'avenir.

“ Le Gouvernement hellénique ne méconnaîtra pas, nous aimons à l'espérer, qu'en ce qui nous concerne, nous n'avons rien épargné pour obtenir que, dans la démarche à faire vis-à-vis de lui, il fût pleinement tenu compte des égards dus à une Puissance indépendante. Aussi croyons-nous avoir le droit de nous attendre à ce que la Grèce, dont la dignité est désormais hors de cause, ne refuse pas aux vœux et aux avis bienveillants de l'Europe tout entière, ce qu'elle n'avait pas cru pouvoir accorder aux exigences du Gouvernement du Sultan, lorsque les deux parties litigantes se trouvaient seules en présence.

“ L'intérêt de la tranquillité du Levant, intérêt auquel se lie celui des principaux éléments de la prospérité du Royaume hellénique lui-même, devrait aujourd'hui primer toutes les autres considérations, et l'on peut affirmer à bon droit que la Grèce, en déférant au sentiment unanime de l'Europe dans cette grave circonstance, s'assurera les sympathies de toutes les nations civilisées. Ce jeune Etat aura ainsi fourni la preuve d'une sagesse politique, qui ne peut que contribuer à rehausser grandement sa considération dans le monde.

“ Recevez, etc.”

Thus was the danger of a Greco-Turkish conflict averted by the watchfulness of the powers, and the reserved, but very efficacious action of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

It was the desire of the Austrian Foreign Office The Danubian Principalities. to maintain with Roumania and Servia the most friendly neighbourly relations. It was therefore no voluntary act, but the necessary consequence of the proceedings of the Bucharest Government during the dominion of the "red party," that obliged the Austro-Hungarian Cabinet to assume a very energetic attitude against its excesses, which not only set at defiance every conception of humanity, but also every international obligation. So long as the Roumanian Cabinet kept within the bounds prescribed by the principles of right and civilization, and prevented the people from giving way to outbursts of fanatic intolerance and religious persecution which are scarcely to be paralleled in the middle ages, it could rely upon the support of the Austrian Government; for the prosperity of the countries of the Lower Danube is entirely in the interest of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and their independence and national

development, and consequent tranquillity, are essential to counteract all the eventualities of the Eastern question. Penetrated with these views, Baron Beust expressed to Prince Stirbey, who had been sent to Vienna by Prince Charles of Roumania in March, 1867, on a special mission, his entire readiness to enter into negotiations upon the four points suggested, viz., the extradition of criminals, the facilitating of commerce and traffic, the connection of lines of railway, and the modification of the Consular jurisdiction. Shortly afterwards he wrote to this effect to Prince Stirbey, and at the same time informed him that the Emperor consented to the establishment of a diplomatic representative of the Principalities at Vienna:—

Le Baron de Beust au Prince George Stirbey.

“ Vienne, le 17 mars 1867.

“ Par la lettre que vous m’avez fait l’honneur de m’adresser le 12 de ce mois, vous avez bien voulu me signaler plusieurs questions que le Gouvernement des Principautés-Unies de la Moldo-Valachie tient à régler de gré à gré avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique.

“ Ces questions intéressent trop vivement les relations amicales que l’Autriche a à cœur d’entretenir avec le Gouvernement de Son Altesse Sérénissime le Prince

Charles, pour que je ne me sois pas empressé d'y vouer une sérieuse attention.

“Comme vous le faites justement remarquer, mon Prince, les différents objets que vous mentionnez demandent, pour la plupart, à être traités au moyen de négociations spéciales, avant de recevoir un règlement définitif. Je suis heureux, toutefois, de pouvoir vous informer que le Gouvernement Impérial n'est pas moins désireux que le vôtre de voir s'établir une entente au sujet de ces matières et qu'il est très-disposé à contribuer de son mieux à amener ce résultat.

“Ainsi, pour répondre préalablement, un à un, aux divers points articulés dans votre lettre, je puis vous transmettre l'assurance,

“1° que le Gouvernement autrichien partage le désir de celui des Principautés de stipuler un cartel d'extradition des malfaiteurs et qu'il va incessamment mettre à l'étude le projet que vous avez eu l'obligeance de m'adresser à cet effet ;

“2° qu'il ne pourra que se féliciter de la conclusion d'un arrangement tendant à assurer aux deux pays, en matière de commerce, les facilités réciproques les plus étendues ;

“3° qu'il s'occupera activement de conduire à bon terme, dans le sens qui répondra le mieux aux intérêts communs des deux pays, les délibérations ayant pour but de fixer les points de raccordement des chemins de fer de la Transylvanie et de ceux de la Roumanie ;

“4° qu'il est prêt à entrer en négociations avec le Gouvernement du Prince Charles pour régler le régime de la juridiction consulaire d'une manière conforme aux nécessités nouvelles.

“En ce qui concerne, enfin, le dernier point de votre lettre,

celui où vous exprimez le désir du Prince de Moldo-Valachie d'accréditer à Vienne un agent, à l'instar de ceux qui sont établis à Constantinople et à Paris, j'ai l'honneur de vous prévenir dès à présent que le Gouvernement de l'Empereur donne avec plaisir son adhésion à cette mesure, qui ne pourra que profiter au maintien et à la consolidation des bons rapports entre deux pays unis par tant d'intérêts communs.

“En vous priant, mon Prince, de vouloir bien porter la présente communication à la connaissance de Son Altesse Sérénissime le Prince Charles, je saisis avec empressement cette occasion pour vous offrir les assurances, etc. etc.”

The ministry of Bratiano inaugurated at Bucharest a complete change of system. This would not, however, have led to any alteration in the relations between Austria and Moldo-Wallachia, if the new advisers of the Prince of Roumania had simply declared themselves in favour of democratic, or even of radical principles in the acceptation now attached to the word in most of the European civilized States. Baron Beust declared this quite openly in a conversation which he had with two prominent Roumanians, M. Cantacuzeno and M. Stourdza, who had gone on a special mission to St. Petersburg and subsequently came to Vienna, and who endeavoured to make him believe that

the leaders of the radical party had only been entrusted with the reins of government provisionally in consequence of the internal state of the country, and that the Austro-Hungarian Government would not be justified in deducing from this circumstance any expression of ill-feeling towards it on the part of Roumania. The Chancellor subsequently addressed the following despatch to Baron Eder, describing this conversation :—

Le Baron de Beust au Baron Eder à Bucharest.

“ Vienne, le 5 avril 1868.

“ M. Cantacuzène, de passage à Vienne pour retourner dans son pays, m’a fait l’honneur de venir me voir. Il n’avait pas jugé à propos d’en faire autant lorsqu’il est allé s’acquitter de sa mission à St.-Pétersbourg. Peut-être est-il permis de voir dans ce fait une confirmation des renseignements que me transmet le Comte Revertera et qui tendent à refuser toute importance politique aux transactions des envoyés moldo-valaques en Russie.

“ J’ai eu également la visite de M. Stourdza, gendre de M. Cantacuzène.

“ Ces Messieurs se sont l’un et l’autre répandu en protestations de bons sentiments envers nous, disant que le gouvernement du Prince Charles serait heureux de cultiver des rapports de sincère amitié avec le Cabinet Impérial et Royal. Ils s’attachèrent particulièrement à m’expliquer que si, pour le moment, les chefs du parti

radical se trouvaient au pouvoir dans leur pays, cela était dû uniquement aux vicissitudes de la politique intérieure des Principautés et que l'on aurait grand tort d'y chercher un symptôme de mauvais vouloir à notre égard.

“J’ai répondu à ces déclarations en faisant observer à mes interlocuteurs que le Cabinet Impérial et Royal n’avait pas l’habitude de régler ses relations avec d’autres gouvernements sur la nature du régime établi chez eux, ni sur la couleur politique des hommes qui les dirigent. La ligne de conduite que nous suivons à l’extérieur nous est tracée exclusivement par nos intérêts, et, de fait, le gouvernement de Sa Majesté est dans les meilleurs termes avec des Etats régis par les principes les plus disparates. S’il est donc malheureusement vrai, ai-je ajouté, que l’état de nos rapports avec la Moldo-Valachie n’est pas aussi satisfaisant qu’il l’était du temps où le Prince Stirbey se trouvait placé à la tête du Ministère, la faute n’en est nullement aux opinions avancées de M. J. Bratiano et de ses collègues. Le véritable obstacle qui s’oppose à une entente franche et loyale entre nous et le gouvernement moldo-valaque, il faut le chercher dans la manière dont il envisage la situation générale de notre Empire et les éventualités de son avenir. Comment s’entendre, en effet, avec quelqu’un qui vous conteste toute vitalité et s’engage dans des spéculations ayant pour base votre faiblesse, sinon votre anéantissement? Nous voulons bien croire et nous tenons même pour fort probable que ces appréciations ne sont pas nées dans le pays même et qu’elles ne sont qu’importées du dehors. Il n’en est pas moins certain que des rapports de confiance ne pourront s’établir entre les deux Gouverne-

ments tant qu'à Bucharest, au lieu d'étudier les faits sans prévention, on continuera à accueillir avec une regrettable facilité toutes les suggestions malveillantes, tous les jugements faux et superficiels que tel Cabinet étranger se plaît à débiter sur notre compte.

"En m'énonçant dans ce sens envers MM. Cantacuzène et Stourdza, j'ai aussi pris à tâche de leur persuader que tout projet préjudiciable à leur pays était bien loin de notre pensée et que, tout au contraire, nous faisons des vœux pour voir assurer son indépendance, mais une indépendance égale dans toutes les directions.

"J'ai cru utile, M. le Baron, de Vous informer de mes entretiens avec les deux personnages en question, pour Vous donner la mesure du langage que Vous auriez à tenir de Votre côté, si l'occasion s'en présentait.

"Recevez, etc."

One of the first acts of this pretended radical democratic Government was to sanction and connive at those inhuman persecutions of the Jews which at the time excited the indignation of Europe. The account of the drowning of two aged Jews and the expulsion of nearly five hundred families, and of many other similar atrocious acts, has been fortunately so generally circulated throughout the world, to the eternal infamy of the perpetrators and of the Government who sanctioned them, that we conceive our duty to be

accomplished in merely mentioning them in connection with the names of M. Bratiano and his colleagues, without giving our readers the full details which we have in our possession. Many of the unfortunate sufferers were Galician or Hungarian Jews, Austrian subjects resident in Moldavia, whose safe abode was guaranteed by an ancient treaty with the Porte; and, moreover, they were within the jurisdiction and under the immediate protection of the Imperial Austrian consulates. The Austrian Foreign Minister deserves all praise for his energetic action in this matter, for he it was who first protested in the name of Austria against these cowardly acts of violence. It was chiefly owing to his instrumentality, too, that a protocol was drawn up and signed by the consuls of all the European powers at Jassy, confirming the truth of the reported atrocities, which Prince Charles's Government, with a mendacity equal to its barbarism, persisted in denying. The following circular despatch in connection with this subject is well worthy of note :—

“ Le Baron de Beust aux Représentants de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique à Paris, Londres, Florence, Berlin, Saint-Petersbourg et Constantinople.

“ Vienne, 10 mai 1868.

“ Depuis l'été dernier, une succession d'actes de violence et de vexations dirigés contre les Israélites dans les Principautés-Unies est venu, pour ainsi dire, périodiquement mettre en émoi l'opinion européenne.

“ Les dispositions administratives prises l'année dernière contre les Juifs habitant la Moldavie, dispositions sur lesquelles le gouvernement princier s'est vu obligé de revenir en présence de l'improbation générale ; les scènes de désordre et de pillage dont, il y a quelques mois, les villes de Kalarasch et de Berlad ont été le théâtre ; enfin les mesures d'expulsion qui viennent de frapper la population israélite dans une grande partie des communes rurales de la Moldavie, et sur lesquelles notre Agent à Bucharest signalait au Ministre des affaires étrangères du Prince Charles, dans sa note ci-jointe en copie, les particularités les plus saillantes qui lui étaient connues à cette date,— tous ces faits, indignes d'un siècle de civilisation, sont autant de symptômes d'une situation à laquelle il nous semble urgent de porter remède.

“ La plupart des victimes de cette persécution systématique étant sujets de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique, nous étions naturellement appelés en première ligne à élever notre voix à Bucharest pour réclamer contre les procédés arbitraires et injustes dont on avait usé à leur égard.

“ Au lieu de faire droit à nos réclamations, le gouvernement moldo-valaque a pris le parti de se retrancher dans

un système de dénégations, qualifiant de faussetés les nouvelles répandues sur les mesures prescrites contre les Juifs et allant jusqu'à incriminer personnellement des Agents de l'Empereur dans les Principautés de se faire l'organe d'accusations calomnieuses à sa charge. Telle est la substance d'une note adressée, le 21 avril dernier, par M. Etienne Golesco aux Consuls étrangers à Bucharest.

“ Pour faire justice de ces défaites, il suffirait de la déclaration si catégorique, signée des Agents consulaires de toutes les Puissances à Jassy. Chaque jour, au surplus, nous apporte encore de nouveaux témoignages prouvant que les mesures en question, exécutées à peu près simultanément sur beaucoup de points du territoire, ont été le résultat d'instructions générales émanées du centre du gouvernement.

“ Le Cabinet anglais doit avoir reçu, comme nous, des preuves irrécusables constatant les faits dont je viens de parler, puisqu'il a adressé le 24 du mois dernier à son Consul-Général à Bucharest la dépêche ci-jointe qui m'a été communiquée par ordre de Lord Stanley. *On ne saurait flétrir dans des termes plus énergiques la conduite de M. Bratiano et de ses organes, ni faire entrevoir plus clairement aux gouvernants moldo-valaques que, s'ils continuaient à méconnaître, comme ils le font, les obligations internationales et les égards dus aux Puissances garantes, celles-ci pourraient bien se croire déliées des engagements sur lesquels repose l'existence politique des Principautés-Unies.*

“ Nous ne mettons pas en doute que les autres Cours signataires du traité de Paris, également désireuses de réprimer des actes de barbarie qui font la honte de notre époque et dont elles doivent tenir à repousser la solidarité, ne s'empressent de s'associer à nous et à l'Angleterre pour faire entendre au

gouvernement du Prince Charles un langage empreint de cette sévérité qui peut seule encore produire sur lui quelque impression.

“Veuillez en faire la proposition formelle au gouvernement près duquel Vous êtes accrédité, s’il n’avait pas déjà transmis des ordres dans ce sens à son Représentant à Bucharest.

“Recevez, etc.”

England and France at once joined Austria, and brought their influence into play to prevent a recurrence of such outrages to humanity, and the other powers followed their example. In pursuance of the orders of Baron Beust, a peremptory demand was officially addressed to the Roumanian Government for the immediate cessation of the persecution of the Jews; for the judicial prosecution and punishment of the culpable officials; for the rehabilitation of the expelled families in their dwellings and farms; and for their indemnification for the losses they had sustained, as follows:—

(Annexe à la circulaire du Baron de Beust, en date du 10 mai 1868.)

“*Copie d’une Note du Baron Eder à M. Etienne Golesco, en date de Bucharest le 24 avril 1868.*

“Par suite des démarches réitérées que j’ai eu l’honneur de faire auprès de Vous dans l’intérêt des Israélites persécutés en Moldavie, Vous m’avez adressé le 22 du mois

courant une Note, dans laquelle Vous protestiez contre des accusations dont—*d'après Vous*—*la persistance n'a d'égal que leur fausseté.*

“ La nouvelle des dernières persécutions des Israélites en Moldavie ne m'était d'abord parvenue que par le télégraphe. A ces renseignements très-concis et incomplets, Vous opposiez des démentis formels, basés sur des rapports de M. le Préfet de Bakéou. J'ai dû attendre l'arrivée des lettres et pièces dont on m'avait annoncé l'expédition.

“ Ce n'est qu'hier que la poste m'a apporté des relations circonstanciées ; elles m'ont mis à même *d'établir la vérité et de constater d'une manière irrécusable les tristes détails qui ont accompagné les mesures prises contre les Israélites en Moldavie.*

“ *J'ai actuellement entre les mains une série de documents qui prouvent à l'évidence que la mesure de l'expulsion des Israélites des communes rurales a été appliquée dans presque tout le district de Bakéou. Les quelques familles israélites qui y sont encore tolérées ont dû acheter cette tolérance au prix d'argent.*

“ *C'est l'organe du gouvernement princier, c'est M. le Préfet Lecca qui a donné le premier l'exemple de ces persécutions, en expulsant de ses propres terres les sept familles juives qui s'y trouvaient.*

“ *Dans le district de Vaslouï, 22 familles ont été chassées, toutes ayant pris à ferme, en vertu de contrats, signalisés par les mairies de ces localités, des cabarets, auberges, moulins, ponts et branderies.*

“ Dans le district de Foltitcheni, les sous-préfets ont signifié l'ordre aux propriétaires moldaves de ne plus renouveler à la St.-Georges leurs contrats de fermage avec les Juifs, en prévenant ces propriétaires de s'y conformer

strictement, s'ils ne voulaient pas s'exposer à des mesures de rigueur.

“ A Bakéou, la garde nationale, qui s'était rassemblée à l'occasion des fêtes de Pâques, s'est portée à commettre des excès sur des sujets autrichiens de la religion mosaïque ; on ne s'est pas borné à insulter les vivants, même les lieux de sépulture ont été ignominieusement profanés. Les démarches du staroste d'Autriche auprès des autorités locales sont restées sans effet.

“ Pour mieux Vous éclairer au sujet des expulsions et Vous mettre des preuves entre les mains, j'ai l'honneur de Vous communiquer en copie trois ordres émanés de la mairie de Bérecht.

“ Je tiens aussi à Votre disposition une requête signée par 71 familles israélites, expulsées des communes rurales, une autre du comité israélite de Bakéou, puis une liste nominative sur laquelle est consigné un grand nombre de familles israélites, chassées des communes rurales de Bakéou, enfin la liste des 22 familles expulsées du district de Vaslouï.

“ Je possède, en outre, copie d'un télégramme adressé à M. J. Bratiano par M. Cracti, ci-devant préfet ; ce dernier réclame contre les mesures prises à l'égard des Israélites, et démenties par le gouvernement princier.

“ De plus, je Vous informerai, M. le Ministre, que les chefs des Consulats d'Autriche, d'Angleterre, de France, de Prusse, de Russie et de Grèce à Jassy, s'étant réunis pour entendre les dépositions des principaux Israélites et différents rapports officiels sur les regrettables événements dans le district de Bakéou, *ont constaté la fausseté des dénégations qui avaient été adressées au Ministère par les organes du gouvernement lui-même.*”

“ Je n’ai signalé ici que les documents les plus importants ; j’en ai d’autres, que je m’empresserai de produire, dès que Vous m’en aurez exprimé le désir.

“ Après la lecture de ces pièces, il serait difficile, je crois, de continuer à soutenir plus longtemps que le projet de loi contre les Israélites n’a pas reçu en fait son exécution en Moldavie.

“ Dans la Note du 22 avril, Vous accusez M. le Consul-général d’Autriche à Jassy de s’être chargé de la propagation de ce que Vous appelez des inventions, et ce que je dois appeler la reproduction exacte des faits qui se sont bien réellement passés et qui sont aujourd’hui constatés d’une manière irrécusable.

“ Il m’a été pénible, M. le Ministre, que sur la foi d’informations inexactes et accueillies sans réserve, Vous eussiez dirigé des accusations contre un fonctionnaire Impérial dont l’honorabilité ne saurait être mise en doute et qui, dans le cas donné, a fait preuve d’un zèle qui eût dû mériter Vos suffrages. A la vérité, cet organe du gouvernement Impérial a signalé le premier le commencement d’exécution d’un projet de loi que le gouvernement princier a lui-même stigmatisé du haut de la tribune.

“ Vous ne Vous êtes pas borné, M. le Ministre, à me communiquer Vos appréciations que je n’hésite pas à qualifier d’erronées. Vous êtes allé plus loin, Vous les avez fait parvenir officiellement aux Représentants des Puissances garantes à Bucharest.

“ Je me flatte de l’espoir qu’aujourd’hui mieux éclairé sur le véritable état des choses en Moldavie, Vous Vous empresserez de rectifier cette communication aussi inexacte que blessante.

“ *Il ne suffit pas, M. le Ministre, de porter à Votre con-*

naissance les violences et les excès d'autorité qui ont eu lieu en Moldavie, il est encore de mon devoir d'insister auprès de Vous à ce que Vous Vous interposiez auprès du gouvernement de Son Altesse Sérénissime, à l'effet que des ordres instantanés et péremptoires soient donnés aux autorités principales de faire cesser les persécutions dirigées contre les Israélites, que des mesures énergiques soient prises à Bakéou pour assurer l'ordre et la tranquillité dans la ville et le district, que ceux qui se sont rendus coupables des actes que j'ai eu l'honneur de Vous signaler soient traduits devant la justice et punis selon les exigences de la loi, qu'enfin les familles expulsées des communes rurales soient réinstallées dans leurs foyers et dédommées des pertes que leur expulsion violente et illégale leur a fait subir.

"Veuillez, etc."

This brought a reply from the Bucharest Government, containing most unfounded insinuations against M. Wohlfarth, the Director of the Imperial Austrian Consulate at Jassy, who, by his conduct in exposing the above infamous transactions, had earned the praise of the Austrian Foreign Office. Baron Beust, on receipt of this reply, at once addressed the following despatch to the Government at Bucharest, demanding immediate satisfaction :—

Le Baron de Beust au Baron d'Eder à Bucharest.

" Vienne, le 21 mai 1868.

" Dans une Note adressée le 21 avril dernier à Vous et à tous les Consuls étrangers résidant à Bucharest, *M. Stefan Golesco, ancien Ministre des affaires étrangères, a cru pouvoir dénoncer notre Agent à Jassy comme se faisant le propagateur d'accusations malveillantes et calomnieuses à la charge du gouvernement des Principautés-Unies à propos des violences dont les Israélites ont été récemment l'objet en Moldavie.*

" Répondant à M. Golesco dès le 24 avril, Vous avez dûment relevé cette offense, tout en fournissant les preuves des faits qu'on s'était plu à qualifier de controuvés et en exigeant une indemnité pleine et entière en faveur des victimes.

" *Cette Note donna lieu de la part du Ministère à une réplique préalable, où il persistait dans des dénégations dont, depuis, l'indignation du monde civilisé a fait justice.*

" Au lieu de la Note définitive que M. St. Golesco y annonçait et que nous sommes encore à attendre, nous avons reçu la nouvelle de la retraite de ce membre du Ministère et de son remplacement par le Général Nicolas Golesco.

" *Cet incident n'étant accompagné d'aucune espèce d'explication qui permettraient d'inférer du changement de personnes survenu un désaveu des imputations blessantes, dirigées contre notre Agent, il ne saurait être considéré comme équivalant à la réparation qui nous est due.*

" Très-éloignés de toute velléité de nous mêler des affaires intérieures d'un pays étranger, nous ne prétendons pas le moins du monde influencer les déterminations du

Prince Charles relativement au choix de Ses conseillers ; il appartient à Son Altesse seule d'apprécier les motifs qui doivent La guider dans ce choix. *En revanche, nous remplissons un devoir rigoureux en demandant satisfaction pour l'atteinte portée par un membre de Son gouvernement à l'honneur d'un de nos Agents, atteinte qui rejaillit sur la Puissance même qu'il représente. Le soin de notre dignité nous interdit de rester sous le coup d'une insulte lancée officiellement et aggravée, comme à plaisir, par la notification qu'en a été faite aux autres Puissances.*

“Vous êtes invité en conséquence, M. le Baron, à *insister énergiquement, dans la forme que Vous jugerez la plus convenable, auprès du gouvernement princier, pour que le présent titulaire du Département des affaires étrangères Vous adresse une déclaration formelle par laquelle il exprimera ses regrets de la diffamation dont M. le Chevalier de Wolfarth a été l'objet et dont le Ministre princier pourra, à son gré, rejeter la faute soit sur des informations inex-actes parvenues à son prédécesseur, soit sur une appréciation erronée. Nous désirons, en outre, que cette déclaration soit portée à la connaissance des Représentants étrangers dans la même forme que M. Stefan Golesco avait choisie pour accréditer auprès d'eux ses insinuations.*

“*Je puis ajouter que les Cabinets de Paris et de Londres se sont empressés de nous transmettre l'assurance qu'ils trouvent nos griefs contre le gouvernement moldo-valaque parfaitement fondés en droit, notre demande de satisfaction complètement justifiée, et qu'ils l'appuieront énergiquement à Bucharest.*

“Recevez, etc.”

The saying that “bullies are proverbially

cowards," was never better exemplified than in this case. The above despatch brought the Roumanian Government to its senses. It at once acceded to all the demands made by Austria in conjunction with the great powers, and the Golestro-Bratiano Ministry was summarily dismissed and replaced by a Cabinet composed of sensible moderate men, such as MM. Ghika and Cogolnitchano. As soon as this change had been made, the newly-appointed political agent and Austrian Consul-General at Bucharest, the Chevalier de Zulauf, received the following instructions to act in a conciliatory manner towards the Roumanian Government, at the same time exercising the greatest vigilance in the matter :—

(Translation from the German.)

Count Beust to Chevalier von Zulauf.

"Vienna, February 5, 1869.

"The office which you are about to enter upon is considered by the Government of his Majesty the Emperor and King for evident reasons as one of special confidence. You have been appointed to represent, under difficult circumstances, highly important interests of a political and economical character.

"By means of an attentive study of our political correspondence with the Imperial Royal Agency in Bucharest,

and especially of the copious matter contained in the last Red Book, you have been enabled to form a correct impression of the events which last year disturbed our relations with the Government of the Principality. Though these disputes have been apparently settled in a satisfactory manner, yet they have left behind a feeling of unfriendliness and distrust, the removal of which we ventured to expect from the subsequent resignation of the Bratiano Ministry. It is true that the beneficial effects of this change of Ministry have not immediately manifested themselves in a considerable degree, but we may regard as a gratifying symptom the choice of the two newly-appointed Moldo-Wallachian agents for Vienna and Paris, the first of whom especially is favourably known to us from his former negotiations. I have received from both assurances of the earnest desire of their Government to renounce the turbulent policy of the late Ministry, and instead of pursuing adventurous schemes and threats against the Porte, to direct their exertions to the raising of the internal welfare of the country by means of good administration and economical improvements.

“We look forward, as usual, with tranquillity to the development of affairs in the Principalities. *It cannot be your task to assume against the Government of the Principalities a deportment which would bear the character of harshness and express distrust. On the contrary, you will have to strive to make yourself agreeable to the authorities of that country, so far as this can be done without injury to our interests, and to use from the outset a courteous tone in your utterances. This, of course, need not prevent you from submitting the occurrences in the Principalities to an uninterrupted and strict observation. It is not*

unknown to us that in spite of the friendly temper now manifested towards us in Bucharest, the importation of arms and the preparations for war continue without impediment, and also that the revolutionary movements among the Roumanian population of Transylvania and Hungary have not ceased.

“To Prince Charles, as well as to his counsellors, you will have to declare at every suitable opportunity, in most decided terms, that nothing is farther from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy than the thought of annexation or conquest at the expense of the united Principalities, and that we entertain a sincere wish to live on good terms with the Moldo-Wallachian Government. This, of course, does not hinder us from regarding the relations between the Porte and the Prince as being necessarily based on the maintenance of the stipulated treaty obligations. We could not look on with indifference, still less with sympathy, if affairs in the Danubian Principalities should culminate in hostile or menacing proceedings against the suzerain power.

“As regards our relations with the Prince’s Government, you may openly declare that we look upon them with perfect impartiality, that we are not guided by any prepossession, and that we are not at all inclined, as we have been repeatedly accused of doing, to give credit to any alarming news relating to Roumanian machinations on our territory; but that it is not possible for us to avoid uneasy impressions in the face of undeniable facts.

“I must recommend you especially to entertain relations of the fullest confidence with the Imperial French agent in Bucharest, who, notwithstanding the comparatively short duration of his residence in that place, has already

been enabled to acquire a perfect knowledge of persons and things in the Principalities. As we now go hand in hand with France concerning Eastern questions, you must especially take care to bring your words and your actions always into perfect harmony with those of M. Mellinet. You will have to enter into a no less friendly intercourse with the English Consul-General, Mr. Green, and likewise strive to be on good terms with Count Keyserlingk, as well as your other colleagues.

“Since at the present moment it is still somewhat doubtful what shape affairs will take in the Danubian Principalities, I must content myself with enjoining you to the greatest watchfulness in all directions, reserving it to myself to provide you with proper instructions, according to the reports which you may send me.”

After the elections throughout Roumania had turned out favourably for the Ministry, Count Beust, in order once more to establish cordial diplomatic relations between the two Courts, addressed the following despatch to the Roumanian Minister, Cogolnitchano, expressing the hope that the new Ministry would be strengthened in its policy of peace and harmony with the neighbouring states, and thus enabled to avoid the bad courses of its predecessors :—

Comte de Beust au Chevalier de Zulauf à Bucharest.

“ Vienne, 26 avril 1869.

“ Votre rapport du 15 de ce mois nous présente un aperçu sommaire du résultat des élections qui viennent d’avoir lieu dans les Principautés-Unies. Il est permis d’en inférer que le Gouvernement princier pourra compter, dans la nouvelle Chambre des députés, sur l’appui d’une majorité imposante.

“ Vous voudrez bien, M. le Chevalier, *offrir au Prince D. Ghika et à M. Cogolnitchano mes sincères félicitations du triomphe qu’ils viennent de remporter.*

“ Il est clair qu’en leur décernant un vote de confiance aussi éclatant, le pays a voulu non seulement témoigner sa préférence pour les hommes éminents qui dirigent aujourd’hui ses affaires, mais encore attester le peu de sympathie que lui inspirent les tendances extrêmes de leurs prédécesseurs.

“ Cette manifestation si remarquable, en consolidant la position des conseillers actuels du Prince Charles, aura pour effet, nous n’en doutons pas, de raffermir en eux la détermination de suivre cette politique d’ordre et de paix qu’ils ont proclamée dès leur avènement et qui reçoit aujourd’hui la consécration du vœu des populations.

“ Nous avons éprouvé une satisfaction réelle en voyant prévaloir, dans la marche du Gouvernement de Bucarest, cet esprit de loyauté, de sagesse, de respect pour les droits d’autrui qui, loin d’exclure le véritable patriotisme, en est le complément nécessaire. Cet heureux revirement ne peut manquer de concilier aux Principautés-Unies le bon vouloir des Puissances que les errements du Ministère précédent étaient faits pour leur aliéner.

“ En ce qui nous concerne, nous ne demandons pas mieux

que d'entretenir avec le Gouvernement princier des rapports de bonne harmonie, tels qu'ils conviennent aux intérêts bien entendus des deux pays. Les intentions de Sa Majesté, notre Auguste Maître, à l'égard des Principautés-Unies sont les plus bienveillantes, et, pour peu que le Gouvernement du Prince Charles, de son côté, continue de se montrer animé envers nous de dispositions pacifiques et conciliantes et que surtout, fort désormais de l'assentiment populaire, il répudie franchement ces agitations dirigées contre le repos des contrées voisines et dont nous avons eu à nous plaindre antérieurement, rien ne s'opposera à ce que des relations de confiance et d'amitié durables se maintiennent entre notre Monarchie et les Principautés. C'est notre plus cher désir et Vous pouvez donner au Prince Ghika et à M. Cogolnitchano l'assurance que, pour notre part, nous mettrons tous nos soins à en faciliter l'accomplissement.

“ Recevez, etc.”

The tour in the East which the Emperor of Austria lately made, accompanied by Counts Beust and Andrassy, the Cis-Leithan Minister of Commerce, and many of the high state dignitaries, has sufficient political import to warrant our calling attention to it in these pages. We look upon it as the finishing touch which was required to complete the new and wise policy of Austria in the East. The world wondered when, a few years since, the successor of the Prophet visited the Christian

The Emperor
Francis
Joseph's
Tour in the
East.

sovereigns and their countries : may we not regard it as an equally significant sign of the times, that the successor of twenty Romish German emperors, His Majesty of Austria, should be the first reigning European sovereign to set foot on the territory of old Stamboul, and to reside in the city of Constantine the Great, as the guest of the Mussulman Sultan? We may fairly assume that these two visits consummated the official reception of Turkey amongst the great European powers; and, in truth, they are regarded in this light, not only by the Sultan and his advisers, but also by the entire Mahomedan population of Constantinople, Asia Minor, and North Africa. The Emperor of Austria, who formerly bore the title of King of Jerusalem, passed some days in the Holy City, and gained the sympathy of all religious denominations there by the interest he took in all the memorials of the past, and the liberality he evinced to the poor of all sects. The impression made upon his co-religionists was, that in future relations with the Porte, Austria would always be the advocate of religious liberty. The ultimate object which induced the Emperor to undertake this long journey

at a moment when he could be ill spared in Austria, was undoubtedly to prove by his presence at the opening of the Suez Canal, the interest he took in every undertaking which has for its object the progress of civilization and the material welfare of nations. The scene was as significant as it was brilliant: the Emperor of Austria conducting the Empress of France, surrounded by the Princes of Prussia, Italy, Holland, and Sweden, by the diplomatic representatives of England, Russia, and the United States, and all assembled together to commemorate the solution of a great civilizing problem of humanity, which, by facilitating the intercourse of the western with the eastern world, must promote the fraternal interchange of ideas, habits, and customs, and thereby disseminate the blessings of civilization amongst the people of our globe.

In the midst of the festivities which ushered in M. de Lesseps' great engineering triumph, and while the powers were making Egypt the central point of their united peaceful efforts, menacing clouds suddenly overcast the political horizon of the East. An open rupture between the Sultan and his vassal, the Khedive, seemed unavoidable,

The Turco-
Egyptian
Difficulty.

when Count Beust happily availed himself of the opportunity thus afforded to exert his diplomatic talents in aiding to avert the impending crisis. A war between Turkey and Egypt would have been attended with far more serious consequences to Eastern affairs than any conflict of the Porte with the Christian population of her dominions, as it must of necessity have greatly endangered the security of the very key-stone of her power,—the unity of the Mahomedan element. We cannot in this, as in the other questions of foreign policy which we have discussed in these pages, lay before our readers the diplomatic correspondence, because Count Beust's presence at Constantinople and Cairo rendered superfluous all documentary communications to the high personages with whom the decision rested. But we can confirm the fact which the most important and best informed English and French journals imparted to the public, of the salutary and conciliatory influence which both the Austrian Emperor and his Minister of Foreign Affairs exercised upon the Porte as well as upon the Khedive. It was Count Beust who persuaded the Ministers of the Sublime Porte to

abandon all idea of an Ultimatum, and who suggested a means of removing existing differences which should, while protecting the rights of the Sultan, confirm the Khedive in his acquired powers. As soon as the Porte had consented to adopt in all its essential points this good advice, it became all-important to induce the successor of Ibrahim Pasha respectfully to submit to the manifestation of the will of his Suzerain, as wisely and moderately expressed in the Firman. This Count Beust also accomplished, and it must be borne in mind that his diplomatic action in this matter, while it undoubtedly prevented a most dangerous war, was the means of protecting the great interests Austria has at stake in Egypt. Numbers of Austrian subjects are domiciled in Alexandria and in other localities on the great Egypto-Oriental highway, either as proprietors of prosperous commercial establishments, or as engineers, officials, and workmen in connection with the Suez Canal. To these the results of a rupture between the Sultan and Khedive must have been most disastrous.

In the foregoing pages we have endeavoured to lay before our readers a succinct account of every

phase of Austria's foreign policy during the last three years, proving every proposition we have advanced by authentic documents. We cannot think that it is necessary to recapitulate any of the facts upon which we have already dwelt, in order once again to demonstrate that Austria's present position in the councils of Europe has vastly improved, and that the policy pursued by her Foreign Minister, Count Beust, has been essentially one of "peace and goodwill," and, as such, has been eminently successful.

PART III.

QUESTION OF THE NATIONALITIES.

ELECTORAL REFORM.

THE LATE MINISTERIAL CRISIS.

PART III.

QUESTION OF THE NATIONALITIES.—ELECTORAL REFORM.—THE LATE MINISTERIAL CRISIS.

THE great work which the Imperial Chancellor had marked out as his special task, and to which he had devoted such untiring energy and zeal, was now accomplished. The compromise with Hungary had restored internal peace to the empire, forming the groundwork for its reconstruction, and the introduction of a responsible ministry was an additional guarantee for its permanent development. There can be no doubt, also, that the corner-stone of the constitutional edifice was mainly cemented by that perfect intellectual freedom of which the German element was the chief representative and champion. On the other hand, it is equally true that Austria had with giant strides resumed her position among nations,

and had thus rapidly again become a trustworthy and powerful ally to her friends and a dangerous foe to her enemies. Her present dualistic organization is not only perfectly new, but is also entirely foreign to her traditions of a thousand years back ; nor has it a parallel in the history of other nations. This fact must never be lost sight of in criticising the political events which have since occurred in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Dualism was brought about under the guidance indeed of Count* Beust, but mainly by the force of circumstances which called into action powers essentially uncontrollable. It cannot be wondered at that the dualistic organization, which is without precedent or analogy, frequently gives rise to certain arbitrary assumptions of right, on this or the other side of the Leitha, such as are not to be met with in other countries, but for which great allowances must be made. Count Beust was the originator of the above system, which, though it apparently weakened the empire by its division, in reality strengthened it (a result which he foresaw) ; and with this achievement he conceived his task

* See Note IX.

to be at an end for the present. He could not however, ignore, whilst exercising his great diplomatic skill as Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the responsible post of Chancellor of the Empire imposed upon him the duty of continuing to watch over the internal interests of the country. This was the more necessary because of Austria's extensive frontier, and the consequent complications, which are frequently inevitable, between the various nationalities composing the empire and the adjacent foreign States. Thus, the autonomy of Galicia, for instance—the government of the South Slavonic races, and the political position of Hungary in regard to the Danubian Principalities—are all determining elements which influence the relations between Austria and Russia. It must be admitted that the political traditions and sympathies of the German Provinces, and the civilising character of their intellectual life, must necessarily operate upon the position of the collective empire in its relations to the Northern and Western powers. In fact, so intimate is the connection between the internal and external policy of the empire, that its enemies have often

turned its internal squabbles and disaffections to their own advantage. But for this, who shall say that the campaigns of 1859 and 1866 might not have been attended with far different results, if indeed they would have ever taken place?

The new Constitution specially enacted that the "Delegations" should watch carefully over the common weal of the State, meaning, of course, by this its external as well as its internal policy. Count Beust's position in the Government enforced upon him the necessity of acting up to this principle; and all parties agree that no one was more eminently qualified to carry it out. For the accomplishment of this task he possessed two great qualifications: the prestige of having re-established constitutionalism in both halves of the empire, and the merit of being absolutely devoid of prejudice, and of being perfectly free from the trammels of partisanship or political cliques. These qualities enabled him to look down from a statesmanlike eminence on passing events, and to form his opinions impartially and dispassionately. If, in the pursuance of his truly enlightened policy, he failed to conciliate all parties, this was because,

belonging to no party, he identified himself with none, and devoted himself solely to the general welfare of the State. We have purposely thus set in a clear light the position of the Austrian Chancellor after the appointment of a responsible ministry, in order that his subsequent action may be the better understood.

The work of reconstruction was very different ^{The} in Hungary from that in Cis-Leithania. ^{Hungarians.} In Hungary, constitutionalism, though in another form, had existed for centuries; and both its statesmen and politicians were therefore far more experienced in the conduct of public affairs than those of Western Austria. In the latter country, moreover, the working of the new constitutional *régime* was impeded by the almost unavoidably secessionist tendencies of the nationalities in the Reichsrath, which constantly gave the policy of the State a tinge of provincialism. On the first occasion when the responsible ministers took their seats as such in the Reichsrath, their leader characterised the intimate relations between the Cabinet and the Chancellor in the following words, which were greeted with general applause :

“ Although Dualism is antagonistic to the unification of the country, yet it must be made serviceable to the unanimity of its peoples; and in all questions which concern the common weal of the State, the Ministry relies upon finding in the head of the Government of the Austro-Hungarian Empire beneficent and enlightened support.” Count Beust did all in his power to render his relations with the Cis-Leithan Ministry as cordial and intimate as possible, by exercising the influence of his high official position for the furtherance of the measures they deemed necessary.

In the foregoing portions of this work we have already taken occasion to dwell at considerable length upon the violent contest which ensued between the people and their representatives in the Reichsrath on the one hand, and the feudo-clerical party on the other, in respect of the great liberal measures of religious equality, secular education, and civil marriage. Unquestionably, Count Beust might, as a Protestant, and in his new position as Minister of Foreign Affairs, have held aloof from all participation in this contest, and thus for ever have disarmed the feudo-clerical party, instead of

exposing himself to their bitter and violent attacks. The following very interesting despatch, which expounds in a masterly manner the whole bearing of the Concordat question upon the new Constitution of the country, is so important that we consider it but fair to Count Beust to reproduce it *in extenso* :—

Le Comte de Beust au Comte de Trauttmansdorff à Rome.

“ Vienne, le 2 juillet 1869.

“ Pendant les premiers temps de Votre séjour à Rome, Vous avez pu constater à différentes reprises des dispositions plus conciliantes de la part du Saint-Siège à l'égard du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal. Quelques indices permettaient à Votre Excellence de croire que le Saint-Père, aussi bien que Ses principaux Conseillers, commençait à apprécier plus justement la situation de l'Empire austro-hongrois et les causes des dissidences fâcheuses qui s'étaient produites dans le courant de l'année 1868.

“ Nous avons accueilli ces symptômes avec une satisfaction sincère et nous nous sommes efforcés de favoriser par notre attitude le développement des tendances que Votre Excellence nous signalait.

“ D'après Vos derniers rapports cependant, il se serait produit une espèce de temps d'arrêt dans l'amélioration progressive de nos relations avec le Saint-Siège. Une circonstance récente—l'incident de Linz—a surtout contribué à réveiller les anciennes susceptibilités et à susciter de nouvelles défiances à l'égard des intentions du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal.

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“ J’ai déjà transmis à Votre Excellence les informations nécessaires pour rétablir les faits sous leur vrai jour, en ce qui concerne le cas spécial que je viens de citer. Mais je crois qu’il ne sera pas inutile, à cette occasion, de remonter plus haut et d’examiner ici, à un point de vue général, les causes de nos difficultés avec le Saint-Siège. Cet examen nous conduira peut-être à trouver le moyen, sinon d’arriver à une entente, du moins d’aplanir quelques-uns des obstacles qui s’opposent à l’établissement d’un état de choses plus satisfaisant.

“ Il me paraît d’abord indispensable de jeter un coup d’œil rétrospectif sur le passé, si nous voulons nous rendre un compte exact des faits qui se sont accomplis de nos jours.

“ Vers la seconde moitié du dernier siècle, il s’est produit dans tous les Etats civilisés une tendance manifeste à émanciper le pouvoir civil de la dépendance du pouvoir religieux. L’Autriche ne pouvait se soustraire à l’influence d’un mouvement aussi fort et aussi répandu. De là naquit le système connu généralement sous le nom de Joséphinisme. Cette désignation n’est pas entièrement justifiée aux yeux de l’histoire, puisque l’Empereur Joseph n’a pas, à vrai dire, créé ce système, bien qu’il en ait été, sans contredit, le représentant le plus énergique et qu’il l’ait appliqué dans une mesure dépassant, peut-être, les bornes voulues. La vérité nous impose le devoir de reconnaître que ce Monarque, animé des meilleures intentions, n’a fait que se conformer, en les mettant en pratique sur une plus vaste échelle, à des principes déjà introduits dans le Gouvernement par l’illustre Impératrice Marie-Thérèse et même par le père de cette Souveraine, l’Empereur Charles VI.

“ L'élan fougueux du règne de Joseph II, comme il en arrive souvent des mouvements progressifs qui ne savent pas se maîtriser, fut suivi d'une sorte de réaction. Sous les Empereurs Leopold II et François I les lois de leur prédécesseur furent considérablement adoucies dans la pratique et ces Monarques cherchèrent à établir ainsi de meilleures relations avec l'Eglise. Mais, en somme, ils ne laissèrent pas ébranler le principe de la tutelle de l'Etat sur les affaires ecclésiastiques. Ce principe répondait, en effet, trop bien à la base autocratique et bureaucratique sur laquelle le Gouvernement des Etats autrichiens était alors constitué, pour qu'on osât arracher cette pierre fondamentale de l'édifice.

“ On ne pouvait nier cependant que la législation autrichienne de cette époque ne fût en contradiction flagrante avec certains dogmes de l'Eglise catholique. Les difficultés causées par cet état de choses devinrent de plus en plus fâcheuses et sensibles dans la pratique, depuis l'élan imprimé aux idées catholiques dans toute l'Allemagne à la suite du conflit de Cologne. Ce fut surtout le Chancelier d'Etat, Prince de Metternich, qui proclama hautement, pendant les dernières années du règne de François I et tout le règne de Ferdinand I, que les choses ne pouvaient plus marcher ainsi et qu'il fallait tâcher de conclure la paix avec l'Eglise catholique sur le terrain des principes. Le Prince fit de nombreuses tentatives pour convertir à ses idées les hommes d'état placés à côté de lui à la tête des affaires et les amener à consentir à un compromis équitable avec Rome. Mais ses efforts échouèrent toujours contre une opposition qui rencontrait dans ce temps un appui très-vif même parmi certains dignitaires de l'Eglise, élevés dans l'esprit du système de la tutelle exercée par l'Etat.

“ Cette importante question resta ainsi en suspens jusqu’au moment où éclata le mouvement de 1848.

“ Dès qu’on voulait introduire dans toutes les sphères de la vie publique le principe de la liberté d’action, il devenait impossible de laisser à l’Eglise catholique seule ses lisières. Avec l’établissement d’un régime constitutionnel, quel qu’il fût, devait tomber de lui-même le système de l’omnipotence de l’Etat vis-à-vis de l’Eglise.

“ Ce fait et le changement survenu dans l’état des choses ne furent pas méconnus par les hommes qui étaient alors au pouvoir. Lorsque l’œuvre tentée par l’Assemblée dite constituante à Kremsier eut échoué, la Charte octroyée du 4 mars 1849 qui s’ensuivit contint, en opposition à toutes les traditions reçues jusqu’à cette époque, la reconnaissance formelle du principe de la liberté de l’Eglise catholique.

“ C’est donc un fait historique incontestable que les catholiques en Autriche sont redevables au principe constitutionnel seul d’être affranchis des entraves inquiétantes qu’imposait à leurs consciences l’influence souvent fort étendue que l’Etat exerçait sur les affaires de l’Eglise. On aurait dû se souvenir de cette circonstance à Rome, lorsque, dans une allocution dont nous regrettons encore l’effet, notre Constitution fut l’objet d’une condamnation acrimonieuse.

“ Développer les germes renfermés dans la Constitution de 1849 était une tâche ardue, digne d’occuper les meilleurs esprits. On avait à choisir entre deux systèmes différents pour arriver à ce but. Il était possible :

“ 1° *soit d’abolir les lois et ordonnances existantes qui ne s’appliquaient plus au nouvel ordre des choses, de la même façon qu’elles avaient été émises, c’est-à-dire par le simple exercice du pouvoir législatif ;*

“2° soit de conclure avec le Saint-Siège un arrangement formel, tel qu'un Concordat, donnant aux réformes projetées le caractère d'un acte synallagmatique.

“ Il est hors de doute que le premier de ces deux modes de procéder aurait été non-seulement le plus simple, mais aussi le plus conforme aux principes constitutionnels.

“ En effet, ceux-ci, tandis qu'ils reconnaissent un partage des pouvoirs publics entre le Monarque et les Corps représentatifs de la nation, excluent entièrement toute ingérence d'une Puissance étrangère dans les affaires qui sont du ressort de la législation intérieure.

“ C'est par ce motif que, dans presque tous les cas où des Concordats ont été conclus avec Rome par des Etats régis dans des formes constitutionnelles, les stipulations convenues ont été mises en vigueur au moyen d'ordonnances spéciales, issues de l'autorité législative agissant dans la plénitude de son indépendance. Souvent même ces ordonnances, comme les articles organiques en France, ont été rédigées dans un esprit fort différent de celui qui avait présidé aux arrangements qu'elles étaient destinées à mettre à exécution et elles ne s'y adaptaient qu'au moyen d'une interprétation tant soit peu forcée.

“ Au commencement, on parut reconnaître en Autriche la vérité des maximes que je viens d'énoncer. On régla d'abord par des ordonnances, dont quelques-unes sont encore à présent en vigueur, les nouvelles relations qu'il s'agissait d'établir entre l'Etat et l'Eglise ; ce ne fut qu'à mesure qu'on s'éloignait davantage de l'idée de gouverner selon les formes constitutionnelles, qu'il s'opéra un changement dans les vues et qu'on entra dans d'autres voies.

“ Il est positif qu'au moment même de la mission confiée à Monseigneur Rauscher, alors qu'il n'était qu'Evêque de

Lavant, mission qui conduisit à la négociation du Concordat, le Gouvernement Impérial ne pensait pas encore à conclure une transaction d'une telle importance. Il ne songeait, à cette époque, qu'à établir une entente avec le Saint-Siège au sujet de la législation matrimoniale. Ce ne fut que peu à peu, au fur et à mesure des longues négociations qui s'ensuivirent, qu'on en arriva à réunir la matière étendue qui forma l'objet du Concordat.

“Il n'est pas dans notre intention de nous livrer ici à une critique détaillée de cet Acte. Comme toute œuvre humaine, il porte l'empreinte de l'époque où il fut conçu. En 1855, l'Autriche était un Etat fortement centralisé, régi par un pouvoir absolu. Une volonté unique y faisait la loi et n'était soumise qu'au contrôle exercé par les influences momentanées de la situation. On ne peut s'étonner que le Chef de la Catholicité, ayant à traiter avec un Gouvernement ainsi constitué, ait cherché non-seulement à procurer à ses fidèles en Autriche une position qui les mit à l'abri d'une tutelle vexatoire de la bureaucratie, mais aussi à acquérir pour l'Eglise tous les privilèges qui, selon les décisions du Concile de Trente, lui appartenaient de droit au sein de cet Etat féodal qui précisément reposait sur le principe du privilège, mais qui, dans l'Etat moderne, avaient perdu, depuis plus d'un siècle, leur raison d'être.

“Ainsi que je l'ai fait ressortir avant, il faut toujours, pour comprendre l'origine et la portée du Concordat de 1855, se rappeler les idées de centralisation dominant alors à la suite des événements de 1848, tendances qui, à l'heure qu'il est, comptent encore de nombreux partisans et qui, à cette époque-là, dans l'espoir de consolider la centralisation par une concentration renforcée du pouvoir

religieux, se prêtaient à un partage qui, loin de la fortifier, devait l'affaiblir. C'est ainsi que s'expliquent les succès obtenus alors par la Cour de Rome. En effet, le Saint-Siège consentit bien vis-à-vis du pouvoir civil à quelques concessions qui ne manquent pas de valeur et qu'on fit sonner très-haut à Rome. De ce nombre est le droit de nomination à la plupart des hautes dignités ecclésiastiques. Mais, à côté de ces dispositions, le Concordat en contient une série d'autres, assurant aux Evêques et au Clergé en général une position exceptionnelle qui les place au dessus du droit commun.

"Il faut enfin remarquer que le Concordat était, en somme, loin d'être conçu dans l'esprit qui avait dicté la Constitution de 1849 et qu'il répondait plutôt à la pensée d'une religion dominante, d'une religion d'Etat qui est en contradiction avec toutes les idées modernes de liberté constitutionnelle.

"Ces défauts de la situation créée par le Concordat apparurent encore d'une manière plus éclatante à l'occasion de la loi sur les mariages publiée bientôt après. Il s'y rencontre des dispositions dont l'expérience fit ressortir des effets souvent durs et vexatoires. Aussi vit-on, dès cet instant, augmenter considérablement le mauvais effet produit déjà sur l'opinion publique en Autriche par la conclusion du Concordat.

"Cet Acte, loin de pouvoir donc être considéré comme une application impartiale du principe, inauguré en 1849, de l'Eglise libre dans l'Etat libre, n'a été conclu qu'à l'avantage exclusif d'une des parties et dans des conditions intimement liées à l'existence d'une certaine forme de gouvernement en Autriche. C'est là ce qui constituait le défaut principal et la faiblesse d'une œuvre dont l'existence même devait se trouver

menacée du moment où changeait la situation en vue de laquelle elle avait été créée.

“ Cette vérité s’est fait sentir dès le rétablissement d’un régime constitutionnel en Autriche. Déjà en 1862 et 1863 nous voyons à Rome un négociateur autrichien travaillant à obtenir des modifications essentielles au Concordat. Malheureusement, les espérances qui se rattachaient à cette négociation, entamée certainement dans un esprit de parfaite modération, n’en restaient pas moins illusoires.

“ Cet état de choses se traîna ainsi péniblement jusqu’aux événements de 1866, qui firent entrer dans une phase nouvelle la question des relations de l’Etat avec l’Eglise.

“ Il était évident aux yeux de tout vrai patriote que l’existence de l’Etat ne pouvait plus être assurée que si on entreprenait sa régénération complète au moyen des libertés constitutionnelles les plus étendues. Favoriser le libre développement de toutes les forces vives de la nation devint, en conséquence, le principe fondamental du Gouvernement.

“ On doit regretter que l’Episcopat autrichien et les rapports adressés au Saint-Siège n’aient pas tenu un juste compte de la force d’impulsion irrésistible qui produisait les changements survenus en Autriche. Cette erreur fit naturellement naître aussi à Rome plus d’une appréciation erronée. Si les organes de l’Eglise avaient compris qu’en face d’un changement total de système, fruit de la plus impérieuse nécessité, il ne pouvait plus être question de tenter des efforts infructueux, afin de sauver des privilèges frappés de caducité, mais qu’il s’agissait de faire tourner autant que possible au profit de l’Eglise catholique le nouvel ordre de choses, ainsi que, par exemple, le clergé belge l’avait si bien compris en acceptant la constitution de 1831, ils n’auraient, sans

doute, pas opposé aux réformes projetées cette résistance opiniâtre qui leur a fait reprocher d'être les antagonistes de l'organisation constitutionnelle de la Monarchie. C'est ce reproche qui rend aujourd'hui si difficile la position du clergé et qui, au grand regret du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, envénime des complications souvent peu importantes en elles-mêmes et concernant de simples questions de détail.

“ Ce qui précède explique en partie comment l'intervention du Saint-Siège a pu, malheureusement, plus d'une fois aigrir les conflits, au lieu de les apaiser. Nous ne voulons, d'ailleurs, accuser ici personne. Notre seul but est d'examiner impartialement la situation et d'introduire la sonde dans la plaie, afin de trouver, si c'est possible, un moyen de la guérir. *Nous cherchons, avant tout, à concilier et nous nous estimerions heureux, si nous parvenions à rétablir, de part et d'autre, des relations sinon satisfaisantes, du moins tolérables.*

“ *Comme nous venons de le dire, le maintien du Concordat, dans le sens où il avait été conclu en 1855, était devenu pour le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal une impossibilité de la nature la plus absolue. Contre un fait aussi incontestable il est oiseux d'opposer des arguments tels que ceux auxquels on a souvent recours, tantôt en alléguant le caractère bilatéral de cette transaction, tantôt en rendant responsables de ce qui s'est passé certaines individualités parmi les hommes placés à la direction des affaires. Du moment où, par suite du rétablissement de la Constitution en Hongrie, tout ce pays, sans se mettre en opposition avec l'Episcopat, se refusait à reconnaître la validité du Concordat, il n'était plus possible de soutenir la thèse contraire dans la partie occidentale de la Monarchie où*

l'agitation contre le Concordat existait dans des proportions beaucoup plus intenses. Même un Ministère composé des chefs les plus marquants du parti, dit cléricale ou réactionnaire, aurait été tout aussi peu capable d'apporter en cela un changement à l'état de choses que les hommes actuellement au pouvoir.

“ Quelque douloureux qu'il puisse être pour la Cour de Rome d'entendre ces paroles, nous ne pouvons dissimuler les vérités suivantes :

“ Les stipulations les plus essentielles du Concordat sont devenues inexécutables en Autriche ; la position privilégiée que cet Acte accordait au clergé ne peut plus lui être conservée et elle ne ferait désormais que lui nuire ; enfin, il est illusoire d'espérer que cet état de choses ne soit que passager et puisse être modifié par un changement de Ministère.

“ Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal est loin de rechercher la lutte avec l'Eglise ; il appelle, au contraire, de tous ses vœux une entente. Au milieu des difficultés dont il est assailli, son calme et son impartialité ne se sont jamais démentis. Il a donné à tous les partis des conseils de prudence et de modération et il a toujours tenu à se réserver la possibilité d'établir à l'avenir de meilleures relations avec la Cour de Rome.

“ On peut trouver la preuve de ce que j'avance dans le double fait que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal s'est soigneusement abstenu de se prononcer sur la question de la validité du Concordat dans son ensemble et qu'il a montré une grande réserve précisément dans les questions qui ont provoqué le plus d'irritation à Rome, c'est-à-dire les réformes apportées aux lois sur le mariage et sur l'enseignement.

“ Si l'on admet que les circonstances, ainsi que les maximes dont elles avaient amené l'adoption, ne permettaient

plus au Gouvernement de continuer à se placer au point de vue exclusif de l'Etat catholique et qu'il était obligé, au contraire, de conformer sa législation au principe de l'égalité des cultes devant la loi, on doit rendre au Cabinet Impérial la justice de reconnaître qu'il s'est efforcé de ménager autant que possible les intérêts catholiques.

“ En ce qui concerne les lois sur le mariage, personne n'ignore qu'une fraction très-influente de nos Corps représentatifs s'était prononcée en faveur de l'introduction du mariage civil obligatoire. Même beaucoup d'hommes appartenant au parti le plus imbu des idées catholiques pensaient que cette institution offrait le seul moyen de résoudre la difficulté et d'éviter des conflits avec l'Eglise. Cependant des autorités dont le Gouvernement croyait devoir tenir compte se prononcèrent en sens inverse et de manière à donner la préférence au mariage civil subsidiaire.

“ Ce n'est pas parce qu'il partageait cette opinion que le Gouvernement se prononça pour l'adoption d'un projet de loi conçu dans le sens que je viens d'indiquer. Mais, après ce qui s'était passé, il n'en fut que plus péniblement surpris de voir l'Episcopat commencer par des lettres pastorales et d'autres manifestations un combat qui devait malheureusement aboutir à des résultats tels que ceux que nous voyons se produire, à notre grand regret, dans l'incident de l'Evêque de Linz.

“ *En ce qui concerne la loi sur l'enseignement, il faut remarquer, avant tout, que ces nouvelles dispositions législatives admettent parfaitement la création et l'existence d'écoles ayant un caractère confessionnel. Le clergé catholique peut, de même que les laïques, profiter de ces dispositions et en retirer pour la foi catholique des avantages précieux. Si on jette un coup d'œil sur les résultats obtenus dans des circonstances*

analogues en France, en Belgique et dans les provinces rhénanes, si on considère, en outre, les ressources abondantes dont dispose l'Episcopat en Autriche, on doit s'étonner qu'il ne se soit pas emparé de suite avec empressement des facilités qui lui sont accordées à cet égard. Elles permettraient certes à l'Eglise catholique de s'assurer une influence propre à la dédommager amplement de la perte qu'elle éprouve en étant privée de sa position privilégiée.

“Même si on ne veut pas faire entrer en ligne de compte de semblables avantages, il n'en reste pas moins incontestable que la nouvelle législation sur l'enseignement est loin d'avoir été conçue dans un esprit systématiquement hostile à l'Eglise catholique. Elle précise, il est vrai, davantage la part qui doit revenir à l'Etat dans la surveillance des écoles et elle restreint l'influence directe exercée par le clergé aux matières qui sont de son véritable ressort, c'est-à-dire à l'enseignement de la religion. Mais il ne dépend que du clergé de conserver par une attitude habile une influence considérable, principalement sur les écoles populaires. On n'a pas, en effet, enlevé entièrement à ces dernières, comme on le prétend souvent à tort, leur caractère confessionnel. On a seulement assuré leur développement progressif et leur amélioration, en tenant compte avec soin de toutes les conditions d'une saine morale.

“Nous croyons avoir tracé ainsi avec une exacte impartialité le tableau de ce qui s'est fait jusqu'ici. Il me reste maintenant à examiner encore une question.

“Est-ce qu'une entente est possible entre le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal actuel et le Saint-Siège, lorsqu'ils sont, l'un et l'autre, placés à des points de vue aussi divergents et séparés par des questions de principe aussi importantes ?

“Nous n'hésitons pas à répondre par l'affirmative : tout-

fois, ce résultat ne saurait être atteint qu'à une première condition.

“ On doit, avant tout, se décider à Rome à ne plus regarder l'Autriche comme un pays prédestiné à servir les vœux du Saint-Siège ; il faut dorénavant placer l'Empire austro-hongrois sur la même ligne que d'autres Etats constitutionnels modernes, et ne pas demander, par conséquent, au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de se plier à des exigences qu'on ne songerait pas à imposer à des pays tels que la France ou la Belgique, parce qu'on sait d'avance que de pareilles prétentions n'y rencontreraient que des refus et ne feraient que compromettre inutilement le Saint-Siège.

“ Ce qui a pu être fait dans d'autres pays, sans amener pour cela de rupture avec Rome, doit aussi être possible en Autriche. Telle est la première règle fondamentale dont le Gouvernement, aussi bien que la nation, est résolu à ne point se départir.

“ Je ne disconviens pas qu'il pourra encore s'écouler quelque temps avant qu'on admette à Rome cette vérité dans une mesure suffisante pour permettre d'en retirer quelque fruit. On y aimera mieux, peut-être, tergiverser encore, se maintenir sur le terrain de certains points de droit formels et protester contre ce qu'on appelle des infractions aux engagements contractés. On peut assurément, de cette façon, prolonger la lutte et susciter maint embarras au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal. Mais, en réalité, on fera surtout ainsi un tort immense aux intérêts de l'Eglise catholique dans la Monarchie austro-hongroise. On devra finir par se rendre aux leçons amères de l'expérience et il faudra bien en revenir au point de départ que je viens d'indiquer plus haut comme le seul qui puisse être raisonnablement adopté.

“Ne vaudrait-il donc pas mieux prendre dès-à-présent une détermination énergique, et mettre ainsi le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal à même d’offrir à l’Eglise catholique la pleine et entière jouissance des droits et des libertés dont elle a besoin pour accomplir sa divine mission, et que nul ne songerait alors à lui contester ?

“La Constitution de Décembre 1867, contre laquelle le Saint-Siège a élevé si vivement la voix, contient toutes les dispositions qui, en 1849, ont été accueillies à Rome avec une véritable joie et qui ont été acclamées par tous les catholiques autrichiens comme une charte d’affranchissement qui les libérerait du joug du Joséphisme.

“Les trois grands postulats de l’Eglise catholique :

“1° la liberté des rapports entre les Evêques et le Saint-Siège ;

“2° la liberté des rapports entre les Evêques et leurs diocésains en matière de foi ; enfin,

“3° la protection et la conservation des biens ecclésiastiques ;

se trouvent actuellement accordés dans l’Empire austro-hongrois et entourés de garanties constitutionnelles.

“Si cette semence déposée dans nos institutions n’a pas porté jusqu’ici d’aussi heureux fruits qu’on était en droit de l’espérer, il faut s’en prendre uniquement à l’influence fâcheuse de cette prévention qui fait persévérer dans une fausse voie, lorsqu’on y est engagé par malheur, au lieu de chercher une autre et meilleure issue.

“Les difficultés contre lesquelles le Concordat s’est heurté ne prouvent nullement que la liberté de l’Eglise catholique ne puisse pas prospérer dans notre pays. *Mais, je le répète, qu’on ne s’y méprenne pas, et qu’on*

sache bien que nous entendons parler d'une véritable liberté d'action et non pas du maintien de doctrines incompatibles avec le développement de l'Etat et d'une valeur qui doit désormais être assez problématique, même aux yeux de la Cour de Rome.

“ Si les efforts de l'Eglise catholique se portaient dans cette direction, le Gouvernement irait avec empressement au devant de ses vœux : il considérerait comme un devoir sacré d'appuyer avec zèle l'Eglise dans l'accomplissement de sa tâche et d'écarter les obstacles et les préjugés qui entravent son action. *Dans l'état de choses actuel, le Gouvernement est, au contraire, paralysé dans ses meilleures intentions et il doit rester spectateur d'un combat qui quel que soit son dénouement, ne pourra jamais avoir des suites salutaires.*

“ *Un changement dans l'attitude de l'Episcopat autrichien serait le premier pas désirable vers une amélioration de la situation.* Nous croyons ne pas nous tromper en présumant que les Evêques diffèrent sous plus d'un rapport dans leurs appréciations. Nous en voyons qui appartiennent par leurs sympathies au parti de l'opposition politique et qui se laissent souvent entraîner à faire, en vertu de leur position officielle, des démarches que nous ne saurions y trouver profitables.

“ D'autres, exaltés dans leurs croyances, font beaucoup de mal par leur exagération, sans qu'on puisse toutefois révoquer en doute ni la sincérité de leurs convictions, ni la loyauté de leurs intentions. Avec ces deux fractions de l'Episcopat il sera, sans doute, difficile d'arriver à un compromis. Par contre, nous avons de fortes raisons de croire que la plus grande partie des Evêques comprend maintenant qu'en persistant dans la voie d'une résistance

implacable, on ne saurait arriver à de bons résultats. Si l'attitude de ces Prélats ne témoigne pas encore plus ouvertement d'une pareille persuasion, c'est d'abord à cause de leur désir très-légitime de ne point dévoiler des dissidences et puis, parce qu'ils craignent peut-être de s'attirer un désaveu. Nous ne croyons pas nous abuser en supposant que plusieurs Evêques s'estimeraient heureux de pouvoir abandonner avec honneur une position qui devient tous les jours moins tenable. Quelques-uns d'entre eux et des plus éminents sont des hommes infiniment trop éclairés pour ne pas sentir la nécessité de prendre à temps les mesures opportunes qui peuvent rendre en Autriche la paix à l'Eglise et prévenir les conséquences incalculables qu'entraînerait la prolongation des conflits actuels.

“ Si on ne veut pas, à Rome, fermer les yeux à l'évidence, si on ne s'y refuse pas à voir la situation sous ses vraies couleurs, on devra s'appliquer avant tout à donner un appui efficace à la fraction modérée de l'Episcopat autrichien.

“ Amener le Saint-Siège à se pénétrer de ces idées et de cette conviction, doit être la tâche principale de tout bon patriote auquel les circonstances permettent de faire entendre sa voix à Rome avec quelque succès.

“ C'est aussi vers ce but que doivent tendre tous les efforts de Votre Excellence, et en retraçant, comme je l'ai fait, un tableau exact de la situation, des causes qui l'ont amenée et des moyens de remédier à certains de ses maux, j'espère avoir fourni quelques données utiles.

“ Veuillez faire valoir auprès de Son Eminence le Cardinal Secrétaire d'Etat toutes les considérations que j'ai développées et ne négligez aucun moyen pour rendre le

Saint-Père ainsi que ses principaux Conseillers accessibles aux vues qui sont exposées dans la présente dépêche.

“Recevez, etc.”

It is greatly to Count Beust's honour that the feelings of the man in this case gave way to those of the minister. He placed himself in the foremost ranks of the defenders of these salutary reforms, at the risk of losing his political position in the Empire, and unmoved by the anathemas of Rome. This self-sacrifice at the shrine of social and religious liberty was not left unrequited. He received the reward dearest to every truly liberal statesman: the unqualified approbation of the people.

Count Beust next felt himself called upon to intervene in an affair of internal policy, and to bring the full weight of his influence with his Imperial master to bear in order to protect the Constitution of the country from a very serious danger. In the autumn of 1868, the Emperor and ~~The~~ Poles. Empress, animated by the kindest feelings towards the Poles, had resolved to visit Galicia. But while suitable preparations were being made for their cordial reception, intelligence reached Count Beust

to the effect that the famous resolution of the Galician Diet (see note II.) had been laid before that body. This document commenced with the portentous declaration "That the fundamental laws of the 21st of December, 1867, had created an organization of the monarchy which in no way corresponded with the views and wishes of the Poles; that the longer duration of this state of things must become exceedingly prejudicial to the welfare of the province as well as to that of the State; and that, consequently, the said laws, together with all others connected therewith, must necessarily undergo modification." Under these circumstances, Count Beust immediately pointed out to his Majesty the expediency of postponing the intended visit, and communicating by telegraph to the then Governor of Galicia that the passing of such a resolution must necessarily render the proposed journey of their Majesties a matter of impossibility. When, notwithstanding this, the resolution was carried, Count Beust took it upon himself to urge upon his Majesty that he should abandon the visit altogether, as to undertake it after what had passed

would be to endanger the Constitution. The journey accordingly did not take place.

Count Beust did not, however, limit his action to questions of such momentous importance as these, which could not fail to secure to him increased popularity. His assistance and support were at all times freely and unreservedly placed at the disposal of the Cis-Leithan Ministry, in all questions where Constitutionalism was at stake. A striking instance of this is afforded in the matter of the Commercial Treaty* between England and Austria, and its supplementary Convention. An erroneous impression for a time prevailed in England that the Count was opposed to this treaty; whereas it is patent that, as Prime Minister in Saxony, he had always consistently advocated the principles of free trade since the establishment of the Zollverein, and had consequently witnessed the immense advantages accruing therefrom. He never ceased to use his utmost efforts to get the measure passed in the Reichsrath, and the more so as he well knew that by its ratification Austria's honour was pledged to our Government for its

The Anglo-Austrian Commercial Treaty.

* See Note X.

execution. It is, nevertheless, a lamentable fact that great delays and unforeseen disappointments did occur in its progress through the House. These, however, were entirely due to the opposition of members representing the manufacturing interest. In order clearly to understand the nature of this opposition, we may here explain that the vast majority of all industrial undertakings in Cis-Leithania are carried on by the German element, the representatives of which likewise constitute the majority in the Reichsrath, and are the very party upon whose political support the Cis-Leithan Cabinet is mainly dependent. It will therefore be easily understood that, under these circumstances, the passing of the treaty became an almost vital question with the Ministry.

The Czechs. Count Beust, like every other statesman, was not exempt from unjust attacks: a striking instance of this occurred on the occasion of the Emperor's visit to Prague for the inauguration of the new bridge across the Moldau. His Majesty availed himself of this opportunity to communicate with MM. Palacky and Rieger, the leaders of the Czech opposition; and there is no doubt that he

very plainly gave them to understand that in his estimation their special federalistic pretensions to autonomy were contrary to the spirit, if not to the letter, of the Constitution. With a view to impress the correctness of this opinion on the minds of the Czech leaders and their party, his Majesty requested Count Beust's presence at Prague. On his arrival, the Count, acting in pursuance of the special commands of the Emperor, took upon himself the task of explaining to the Czechs the legal and strictly constitutional bearings of the question, and assured them there was no prospect whatever of their plans being realized. At this announcement the Czech party outstepped all bounds of propriety. They vented their anger in tumultuous and rebellious gatherings in the streets of Prague, which shortly afterwards led to the suspension of the civil power and to other exceptional measures. Unfortunately, Count Beust's action in this matter was wholly misunderstood. The national party henceforth regarded him in the light of a powerful and dangerous opponent, exclusively identified with the German element; while some members of the Cis-Leithan Cabinet, and more

especially its then President, Prince Carlos Auersperg, considered themselves excessively aggrieved at what they erroneously conceived to be an unwarrantable attempt at surreptitious negotiation with the Czechs. To sum up the position in a sentence: the Germans reproached Count Beust with having gone too far in his supposed conciliatory communications with the Czechs, while the latter accused him of not having gone far enough. It was thus that the performance of an imperative duty was misconstrued by both parties as an act of unjustifiable interference with their rights. This interpretation of Count Beust's action appears to us altogether inconceivable. We are at a loss to understand how a nobleman of such eminent statesmanlike capacity as Prince Carlos Auersperg could fail to recognise that the Imperial Chancellor was placed in a position which did not admit of his acting otherwise than he did; that his proceedings had originated in the immediate command of the Emperor; that they proved in an indisputable manner his fidelity to the principles of the Constitution; and, finally, that the idea of interfering with the prerogatives of the Cabinet was, in a man

Prince
Carlos
Auersperg.

of his well-known character, antecedents, and unquestionable loyalty, which should have placed him above suspicion, altogether out of the question. Still more extraordinary was the unfortunate event which followed, and which up to the present moment has remained unexplained—the retirement of the Prince from the presidency of the Ministry. This extravagant susceptibility on the part of Prince Auersperg and his colleagues appears the more unaccountable when it is compared with the action of Count Andrassy and the Trans-Leithan Ministry on a similar occasion. We refer to the visit of the Emperor, accompanied by Count Andrassy, to Agram, when the question of incorporating Croatia with the Hungarian monarchy was being discussed there with the leaders of the political opposition. The Emperor, finding that the question was beset with grave difficulties, adopted the same cautious line of conduct which he had observed at Prague; he sent for the Imperial Chancellor in order to have the full benefit of his counsel. Count Beust arrived at Agram, and there, by order of his Majesty, took up the thread of the pending negotiations, the

ultimate solution of which was materially promoted by his diplomatic talents and his great powers of conciliation. These services were highly appreciated by all concerned, and it never occurred to Count Andrassy to take umbrage at this interference by resigning his Trans-Leithan premiership. Both Prince Auersperg and Count Andrassy are noblemen of the highest class; but though they are equals in rank, yet there cannot, we think, be two opinions as to whose conduct was the most correct under almost identical circumstances. There can be no doubt that, in order to justify so serious a step, even to his own astute mind, Prince Carlos Auersperg must have been influenced by motives quite extraneous to those ostensibly put forward. But we will not attempt to penetrate into the secrets of this unfortunate affair, which had better, perhaps, be permitted to remain in the mystery which surrounds it.

The sad consequences produced by the sudden retirement of Prince Auersperg from the Ministry, the state of semi-rebellion in Bohemia, and the passing of the "Polish Resolution" at the Diet of Lemberg, severally and collectively aggra-

vated to a considerable extent the general condition of affairs in the Empire. This serious crisis, which the Cis-Leithan ministry chiefly attributed to the immediate and intimate connection (which we have explained in a former portion of the work) of the seventeen "Landtags," or Provincial Diets, with the "Reichsrath," caused them earnestly to contemplate the introduction of sweeping measures; and electoral reform appeared to them to afford the most practical remedy for the evil. ^{Electoral Reform.} This was not, however, the first time that the above idea had been mooted; for already in the previous session Dr. Brestel, the present Finance Minister, had brought forward a similar resolution. Dr. Brestel's resolution was negatived, owing to the opposition of Dr. Kaiserfeld (the President of the House) and his party, who argued that the Provincial Diets could not be legally deprived of their constitutional privilege of sending delegates, elected from among their members, to serve in the Reichsrath. The organs of the German party in the press had never ceased to advocate this great change of the electoral system; and yet great surprise was expressed in all political circles when

the Ministry had so far decided upon its introduction as to adopt the preliminary step of addressing a circular note* to all the Diets, calling upon them to take the question into their immediate consideration and to report thereon. As may be imagined, the greatest diversity prevailed in the answers given by the Diets. It would lead us too far were we to enter into the details of their replies. Suffice it to say, that a certain number declared themselves in favour of the general principle of the projected Reform, and others were totally opposed to it; whilst a third group declined to enter upon the question at all until their claims to national autonomy should have been satisfactorily settled. But even the first group qualified their acceptance of the proposed Bill by so many conflicting suggestions in respect of details that their adherence could not be relied upon. The result, therefore, of this circular was anything but satisfactory. The question of Electoral Reform became exceedingly complicated, and gave rise to serious contentions between the German and National parties. The predominating appre-

* See Note XI.

hensions of the former were founded on the idea that direct elections (especially if based on universal suffrage), in lieu of the present system of election by groups, would have the effect of giving the non-German element an overwhelming majority in the Reichsrath. Then, again, great difference of opinion existed as to whether it would be a constitutional proceeding to introduce and pass such a measure in the Reichsrath without the consent of the Provincial Diets. The great majority, however, of the legal authorities held that such a right was constitutionally vested in the Reichsrath.

By this brief sketch of the Reform agitation in Austria we do not pretend to throw much light on the subject. As will be seen, it is at present only in embryo; but, imperfect as was its development, it still had sufficient importance to bring about the late ministerial crisis. During the absence of the Emperor and his Prime Ministers in the East this crisis had already assumed very grave proportions. The Cabinet of eight ministers was divided into two parties, the majority consisting of Giskra, Herbst, Hasner, and Brestel, who were joined by M. de Plener on his return from Suez,

The Ministerial Crisis.

and the minority, of Count Taaffe (Minister President), Count Potocki, and Dr. Berger.

As the subject of their dissensions has already been alluded to in the preface to the present work, and has been fully discussed in the press, we will here content ourselves with briefly stating that both parties proved themselves equally faithful and zealous adherents of the Constitution, and that the essential point of their dissent simply consisted in the period at which they thought Electoral Reform should be introduced. The majority conceived that the proposed reform should be proceeded with at once by the present Reichsrath, irrespectively of the consideration of the claims to national autonomy of those who have until now refused to recognise the Constitution, or who were opposed to it. The minority, on the contrary, though equally desirous to further Electoral Reform, were absolutely opposed to the introduction of that measure, except in immediate connection with such other enactments as should facilitate a revision of the Constitution with a view to the general conciliation of the malcontent Nationalities. Notwithstanding these differences,

the Cabinet came to an agreement which enabled it to prepare the required speech for the throne in anticipation of the Emperor's speedy return. A critical observer could not, however, fail to remark that the tenour of this document bore palpable evidence of a merely temporary compromise of the dissensions that were rife amongst the Ministers. These internal quarrels, to which Count Beust was evidently a perfect stranger, became public immediately on his return. It then became his duty, as first adviser of the Crown, to act as mediator, which position was rendered especially difficult on account of the very serious complications—now happily quelled—which had arisen at the same time in Dalmatia. Without attempting to reproduce the various phases of this remarkable crisis, we desire simply to record that the proceedings of the Ministers were characterised by the adoption of most unparliamentary forms. We need only refer to the publication, by the two parties in the Cabinet, of their respective memoranda in the Official Gazette, and their representations to the Emperor, urging him in a most pressing manner to decide on their relative merits, at the

very moment when the Upper House was engaged in debates on the address in answer to the speech from the throne. Count Beust, nevertheless, persisted in advising his Majesty to delay his decision on the resignations tendered by the whole Cabinet, until at least one of the representative bodies of the country should, by a debate and division, have proved which of the two parties could command a majority. This thoroughly constitutional advice was steadfastly adhered to by the Emperor, who did not accept the resignations of the minority until it had become evident, by the vote of the Upper House on the address, that the Giskra-Herbst party were supported by a decided majority. As the solution of the crisis is of such recent date that it must be in the recollection of our readers, we abstain from tracing the various incidents which led to the present result. Those who have attentively followed the debates in both Houses of the Reichsrath cannot have failed to remark that they were characterised by very severe animadversions on the political action of the Imperial Chancellor. The attacks made upon him were twofold : on the one hand, his opponents

Attacks on
Count Beust.

did not hesitate to rake up the old grievance of the visit to Prague, from which they drew the extraordinary conclusion that he favoured the views of the three Ministers who had retired from the Cabinet; and on the other, his interference in the internal affairs of Cis-Leithania was stigmatised as quite incompatible with his position as Minister of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, thus altogether ignoring the grave responsibility of his high office as the first adviser of the Crown in his capacity of Chancellor.

We consider it a duty to our readers briefly to examine the justice of these accusations. We have already explained the nature of the incident at Prague, and proved that Count Beust's action upon that occasion was perfectly constitutional. We do not for a moment believe that Count Beust was or is averse to a reasonable compromise with the Nationalities, if such a one be possible. On the contrary, we conceive that he would be faithless to his successful antecedents, and unworthy of the high reputation he enjoys, were he to ignore the absolute necessity of endeavouring to bring about a harmonious unison amongst the Nationalities, with

a view to the speedy consolidation of the internal power of the Empire. But between this and favouring Federalism, one of the first and most dangerous effects of which would be to invalidate the Dualistic basis of the compromise with Hungary, there is unquestionably a vast difference. Why should the liberal German party see in his conciliatory spirit towards the Nationalities an antagonism to their interests? Are they not all integral parts of one realm, and subjects of one and the same monarch, and therefore bound to work for and with each other for the common benefit of the constitutional empire? Is not Count Beust a German? Was he not mainly instrumental in giving to the country a liberal German constitutional Ministry? and though no man is infallible, have his political opponents forgotten what Austria was after Sadowa, and what she is now? We scarcely know whether to attribute such charges to defective memory, political rivalry, or the excitement of a heated debate. To prefer them against Count Beust, seems to us as absurd and as unjust as if in our own country we were to accuse Mr. Gladstone of wishing to act inimically


towards England because he conceived it his duty to go great lengths in his concessions to Ireland.

Count Beust, in his recent speech in the Reichsrath in reply to the attacks made upon him, fully and ably exonerated himself from all these unfounded charges, and proved that the policy of a true statesman is uninfluenced by party feelings, and must be exclusively devoted to the general welfare of the State.

“Be just, and fear not:

Let all the ends thou aims't at be thy country's,
Thy God's, and truth's.”

APPENDIX.



APPENDIX.

NOTE I.

THE various Nationalities in the Austro-Hungarian Empire,
with their population, are as follow :—

Germans		9,300,000
Slaves in the	{ Czechs in Bohemia	6,500,000
North-western	{ Moravians	
Empire	{ Slovacks in North-west- ern Hungary	
Poles in Western Galicia		2,200,000
Ruthenians in Eastern Galicia and North- eastern Hungary	}	2,900,000
Slaves in the	{ Croatians	4,100,000
South-western	{ Servians	
Empire	{ Slavonians	
	{ Dalmatians	
	{ Slovenes	
Carried forward		<u>25,000,000</u>

	Brought forward .	25,000,000
Magyars	{ Hungary Transylvania }	4,800,000
Roumanians in the Bukovina, North-eastern Hungary, and Transylvania. }		2,900,000
Italians in Dalmatia and Goritz		500,000
Hebrews		1,200,000
Bulgarians		30,000
Armenians		20,000
Gipsies		200,000
	Total .	<u>34,650,000</u>

NOTE II.

MOST NOBLE COUNT,

In the sitting of the Diet of the 24th September, 1868, the following resolution has been passed, in virtue of the 19th paragraph of the provincial statute :—

“The Diet of the kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, and of the Grand Duchy of Cracow, declares, in virtue of § 19 of the provincial statute, that the organization of the Monarchy, as established by the fundamental laws of the 21st December, 1867, does not confer upon our country so much legislative and administrative independence as is due to the same,

in consideration of its historico-political past, its separate nationality, civilization, and territorial extent, whence it results that it does not respond to the wishes of the country in respect of its national development, or to the conditions necessary thereunto, nor to its real requirements; and as a continuance of this state of affairs must give rise to general dissatisfaction, it follows that great prejudice to the prosperity of our province and to the welfare of the whole Monarchy must accrue therefrom.

“The Diet of the kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, and of the Grand Duchy of Cracow, makes the following proposition, in virtue of the 19th paragraph of the provincial statute:—

“National self-government shall be granted to the kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, and to the Grand Duchy of Cracow, in such wise as shall respond to the requirements and to the particular conditions of the country.

“Above all:

“1stly. The Diet shall exclusively determine the mode of electing its members for the Reichsrath.

“2ndly. The delegation of the Galician Diet shall participate in the deliberations of the Reichsrath only in respect of such affairs of this kingdom as are in common with the other parts of the Monarchy represented in the Reichsrath.

“3rdly. The hereinafter enumerated affairs, in so far as they concern the kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, and the Grand Duchy of Cracow, are withdrawn from the sphere of action of the Reichsrath, as determined by the fundamental

law; and, in virtue of § 12 of the same law, they shall be transferred to the competency of the Diet,—to wit:—

- “(a.) The institution of the chambers and organs of commerce.
- “(b.) The legislation concerning credit and assurance institutions, banks and savings banks; but banks of issue excepted.
- “(c.) The legislation concerning the rights of natives or naturalized persons.
- “(d.) The establishment of the principles of national education, in respect of primary schools and the gymnasias, and the legislation concerning the universities.
- “(e.) The legislation concerning criminal jurisprudence, correctional police, and civil laws, and mining laws.
- “(f.) The legislation concerning the principles of the organization of the judicial and administrative authorities.
- “(g.) All enactments requisite for the execution of the fundamental laws, in respect of the common rights of the subjects of the state, and in respect of the judicial, governmental, and executive authority therein referred to.
- “(h.) The legislation on such matters as have reference to the duties and circumstances of our country, in its connexion with other countries of the Monarchy.
- “(i.) The legislation on corporations (commonalties) without the limitation provided in the 4th article of

the fundamental law of the 21st December, 1867, concerning the common rights of the subjects of the state.

“4thly. For the provision of the expenses of the civil and judicial administration, for public instruction and worship, for the public safety, and the culture of land in Galicia, a sum sufficient to cover the real requirements shall be taken out of the state treasury, and placed at the disposal of the Diet, and the details of its application shall be removed from the competency of the Reichsrath.

“5thly. The estates belonging to the kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, and the Grand Duchy of Cracow, the so-called Cameralistic estates, shall be incorporated into the public fund of this kingdom, as property belonging to the country.

“6thly. The saltworks (salines, mines, and salterns) in the kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, and in the Grand Duchy of Cracow, shall not be sold or given in exchange, or encumbered, without the consent of the Diet of this kingdom.

“7thly. The kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, and the Grand Duchy of Cracow, shall have its own supreme court of judicature and court of cassation.

“8thly. The kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, and the Grand Duchy of Cracow, shall have a local administration responsible to the local Diet in all matters pertaining to internal affairs, to public justice, instruction, and safety, and to the culture of the land, as also a minister of the country in the council of the crown.”

Whereof I have the honour to make this communication to your Excellency, in order that this resolution may be laid before the Imperial Royal Government.

Receive, most noble Count, the expression of our most distinguished high esteem.

The Land Marshal,

L. SAPIEHA.

Countersigned,

PFEIFFER.

Lemberg, 24th September, 1868.

NOTE III.

(Extract.) 20th September, 1865.

“Imperial Patent.—In consideration of the imperative necessity of entering into an understanding with the legal representatives of the countries of the Hungarian crown, for the purpose of obtaining the permanent foundations of a constitutional form of the Empire, and of submitting for this purpose to the acceptance of the respective estates the diploma of the 20th October, 1860, and also the law concerning the representation of the Empire, issued with the Letters Patent of the 26th February, 1861; in further consideration that a simultaneous treatment of these documents as a law, binding on the whole Empire, is thereby excluded,

we ordain, after consultation with our Cabinet Council, as follows :—1. The efficacy of the fundamental law concerning the representatives of the Empire is established, provided that the results of the debates of the Hungarian and Croatian Diets—should they contain a modification of the above-mentioned laws, compatible with the unity and power of the Empire—*shall be submitted, before a final decision is arrived at, to the legal representatives of the other kingdoms and provinces, in order that their opinion, which is of equal weight, may be ascertained and considered.* 2. During the time that the representatives of the Empire are not assembled, it will be the duty of our Government to decide on those measures which cannot be postponed, and especially on such as are requisite for the financial and economical interests of the Empire.”

NOTE IV.

Confessional Laws of the 25th May, 1868.

Marriage Law.

Whereby the regulations of the second section of the general civil code on the rights of marriage for Catholics are restored, the jurisdiction in matrimonial affairs of Catholics is assigned to the civil courts of justice, and decrees are issued relative to the conditional admissibility of solemnizing marriage before the civil courts (civil marriage in cases of necessity).

Educational Laws.

Separation of schools from the church ; subordination of the schools to the superintendence of the state, whereby only the management, guidance, and immediate inspection of religious instruction and of religious practice for the pupils of the different denominations in the lower and middle class schools are left to the care of the churches or religious societies to which they respectively belong.

Inter-confessional relations of the People.

1. Primary education with regard to the confession of faith.
2. Change of religion.
3. Functions of Divine service and of the spiritual ministry.
4. Contributions and acts for Divine service and institutions of charity.
5. Funerals.
6. Days which are to be kept as holidays.

NOTE V.

Fundamental Laws of the State, of the 21st December, 1867.

Statute whereby the fundamental law of the 26th February, 1861, concerning the representation of the empire is modified.

Fundamental law on the general rights of the people for the countries represented in the Imperial Diet.

(a.) Law for the protection of personal liberty.

(b.) Law for the protection of domestic right.

Fundamental law for establishing an Imperial court of justice.

Fundamental law concerning the judicial power.

Fundamental law concerning the practice of the administrative and executive power.

Law relating to all the common affairs of all the countries of the Austrian monarchy, and the mode of their treatment.

NOTE VI.

“Friedensvertrag von Prag zwischen Preussen und Oesterreich vom 23 August, 1866.

“Im Namen der Allerheiligsten und Untheilbaren Dreieinigkeit, S^t. Majestät der König von Preussen und S^t. Majestät der Kaiser von Oesterreich, beseelt von dem Wunsch, ihren Ländern die Wohlthaten des Friedens wiederzugeben, haben beschlossen, die zu Nikolsburg am 26 Juni, 1866, unterzeichneten Präliminarien in einen definitiven Friedensvertrag umzugestalten. Zu diesem Ende haben Ihre Majestäten zu ihren Bevollmächtigten ernannt und zwar der König von Preussen Karl Freiherrn von Werther, etc., und der Kaiser von Oesterreich Adolf Maria Freiherrn von

Brennerfelsach, etc., welche in Prag zu einer Conferenz zusammengetreten sind und nach Auswechslung ihrer in guter und richtiger form befundenen Vollmachten über nachstehende Artikel sich vereinigt haben. Art. 1. Es soll in Zukunft und für beständig Friede und Freundschaft zwischen S^t. Majestät dem König von Preussen und S^t. Majestät dem Kaiser von Oesterreich, sowie zwischen deren Erben und Nachkommen und den beiderseitigen Staaten und Unterthanen herrschen. Art. 2. Behufs Ausführung des Art. 6, der in Nikolsburg am 26 Juli d. f. abgeschlossenen Friedenspräliminarien, und nachdem S^t. Majestät der Kaiser der Franzosen durch seinen bei S^t. Majestät dem König von Preussen beglaubigten Botschafter amtlich zu Nikolsburg am 29 Juli ejusdem hat erklären lassen: "Qu'en ce qui concerne le Gouvernement de l'Empereur la Vénétie est acquise à l'Italie pour lui être remise à la paix"—tritt S^t. Majestät der Kaiser von Oesterreich dieser Erklärung auch seinerseits bei und gibt seine Zustimmung zu der Vereinigung des Lombardo-Venetianischen Königreichs mit dem Königreich Italien ohne andere lästige Bedingung als die Liquidirung derjenigen Schulden, welche als auf den abgetretenen Landestheilen haftend werden erkannt werden, in Uebereinstimmung mit dem vorgang des Tractates von Zürich. Art. 3. Die Kriegsgefangenen werden beiderseits sofort freigegeben werden. Art. 4. S^t. Majestät der Kaiser von Oesterreich erkennt die Auflösung des bisherigen Deutschen Bundes an, und gibt seine Zustimmung zu einer neuen Gestaltung Deutschlands ohne Betheiligung des Oesterr. Kaiserstaates. Ebenso ver-

spricht S^c. Majestät das engere Bundes verhältniss anzuerkennen, welches S^c. Majestät der König von Preussen, nördlich von der Linie des Mains begründen wird und erklärt sich damit einverstanden, dass die südlich von dieser Linie gelegenen Deutschen Staaten in einen Verein zusammentreten, dessen nationale Verbindung mit dem Norddeutschen Bunde der näheren Verständigung zwischen beiden vorbehalten bleibt, und der eine internationale unabhängige Existenz haben wird. Art. 5. S^c. Majestät der Kaiser von Oesterreich überträgt auf S^c. Majestät den König von Preussen alle seine im Wiener Frieden vom 30 October, 1864, erworbenen Rechte auf die Herzogthümer Holstein und Schleswig mit der Massgabe, dass die Bevölkerungen der nördlichen Districte von Schleswig, wenn sie durch freie Abstimmung den Wunsch zu erkennen geben, mit Dänemark vereinigt zu werden, an Dänemark abgetreten werden sollen. Art. 6. Auf den Wunsch S^c. Majestät des Kaisers von Oesterreich erklärt S^c. Majestät der König von Preussen sich bereit, bei den bevorstehenden Veränderungen in Deutschland den gegenwärtigen Territorialbestand des Königreichs Sachsen in seinem bisherigen Umfang bestehen zu lassen, indem er sich dagegen vorbehält, den Beitrag Sachsens zu den Kriegskosten und die künftige Stellung des Königreichs Sachsen innerhalb des norddeutschen Bundes, durch einen mit S^c. Maj. dem König von Sachsen abzuschliessenden besonderen Friedensvertrag näher zu regeln. Dagegen verspricht S^c. Majestät der Kaiser von Oesterreich die von S^c. Majestät dem König von Preussen in Norddeutschland herzustellenden neuen

Einrichtungen, einschliesslich der Territorial Veränderungen, anzuerkennen. Art. 7. Behufs Auseinandersetzung über das bisherige Bundeseigenthum wird binnen längstens sechs Wochen nach Ratification des gegenwärtigen Vertrages eine Commission in Frankfurt a. M. zusammentreten, bei welcher sämtliche Forderungen und Ansprüche an den Deutschen Bund anzumelden und binnen sechs Monaten zu liquidiren sind. Preussen und Oesterreich werden sich in dieser Commission vertreten lassen, und es steht allen übrigen Bundesregierungen zu, ein gleiches zu thun. Art. 8. Oesterreich bleibt berechtigt, aus den Bundesfestungen das Kaiserliche Eigenthum und von den beweglichen Bundeseigenthum den matricularmässigen Antheil Oesterreichs fortzuführen oder sonst darüber zu verfügen : dasselbe gilt von dem gesammten beweglichen Vermögen des Bundes. Art. 9. Den etatsmässigen Beamten, Dienern und Pensionisten des Bundes, werden die ihnen gebührenden beziehungsweise bereits bewilligten Pensionen pro rata der Matrikel zu, gesichert ; jedoch übernimmt die Königl. Preuss. Regierung die bisher aus der Bundesmatricularcasse bestrittenen Pensionen und Unterstützungen für Officiere der vormaligen Schleswig-Holsteinischen Armee und deren Hinterlassene. Art. 10. Der Bezug der von der Kais. Oesterr. Statthalterschaft in Holstein zugesicherten Pensionen bleibt den Interessenten bewilligt. Die noch in Gewahrsam der Kais. Oesterr. Regierung befindliche Summe von 449,500 Thalern Dänischer Reichsmünze in 4 procentigen Dänischen Staats obligationen, welche den Holsteinischen finanzen angehört, wird denselben unmittelbar

nach der Ratifikation des gegenwärtigen Vertrages zurück-
erstattet.

“Kein Angehöriger der Herzogthümer Holstein und Schleswig und kein Unterthan Ihrer Majestäten des Königs von Preussen und des Kaisers von Oesterreich wird wegen seines politischen Verhaltens während der letzten Ereignisse und des Krieges verfolgt, beunruhigt oder in seiner Person oder seinem Eigenthume beanständet werden. Art. 11. S^o. Majestät der Kaiser von Oesterreich verpflichtet sich, behufs Deckung eines Theils der für Preussen aus dem Kriege erwachsenen Kosten, an S^o. Majestät den König von Preussen die Summe von 40 millionen Preuss. Thaler zu zahlen. Von dieser Summe soll jedoch der Betrag der Kriegskosten, welche S^o. Majestät der Kaiser von Oesterreich laut Art. 12 des gedachten Wiener Friedens vom 30 October, 1864, noch an die Herzogthümer Schleswig und Holstein zu fordern hat, mit 15 millionen Preussischer Thaler und als Aequivalent der freien Verpflegung, welche die Preussische Armee bis zum Friedensschlusse in den von ihr occupirten Oesterr. Landestheilen haben wird, mit 5 millionen Preussischer Thaler in Abzug gebracht werden, so dass nur 20 millionen Preuss. Thaler baar zu zahlen bleiben. Die Hälfte dieser Summe wird gleichzeitig mit dem Austausch der Ratificationen des gegenwärtigen Vertrages, die zweite Hälfte drei Wochen später zu Oppeln baar berichtet werden. Art. 12. Die Räumung der von den Königl. Preuss. Truppen besetzten Oesterr. Territorien wird innerhalb drei Wochen nach dem Austausch der Ratificationen des Friedensvertrags vollzogen sein.

Von dem Tage des Ratificationstausches an werden die Preuss. Generalgouvernements ihre Functionen auf den rein militärischen Wirkungskreis beschränken. Die besonderen Bestimmungen, nach welchen diese Räumung statt zu finden hat, sind in einem abgesondertem Protocoll festgestellt, welches eine Beilage des gegenwärtigen Vertrags bildet. Art. 13. Alle zwischen den hohen vertragsschliessenden Theilen vor dem Kriege abgeschlossenen Verträge und Uebereinkünfte werden, insoferne dieselben nicht ihrer Natur nach, durch die Auflösung des Deutschen Bundesverhältnisses ihre Wirkung verlieren müssen, hiemit neuerdings in Kraft gesetzt. Insbesondere wird die allgemeine Cartell-Convention zwischen den Deutschen Bundesstaaten vom 10 Februar, 1831, sammt den dazu gehörigen Nachtragsbestimmungen ihre Giltigkeit zwischen Preussen und Oesterreich behalten. Jedoch erklärt die Kais. Oesterr. Regierung, dass der am 24 Jänner, 1857, abgeschlossene Münzvertrag, durch die Auflösung des Deutschen Bundesverhältnisses seinen wesentlichsten Werth für Oesterreich verliere, und die K. Preuss. Regierung erklärt sich bereit, in Verhandlungen wegen Aufhebung dieses Vertrages mit Oesterreich und den übrigen Theilnehmern an demselben einzutreten. Dessgleichen behalten die hohen Contrahenten sich vor über eine Revision des Handels- und Zollvertrags vom 11 April, 1865, im Sinne einer grösseren Erleichterung des gegenseitigen Verkehrs, sobald als möglich in Verhandlung zu treten. Einstweilen soll der gedachte Vertrag mit der Maassgabe wieder in Kraft treten, dass jedem der hohen Contrahenten vorbehalten bleibt, denselben nach

einer Ankündigung von sechs Monaten ausser Wirksamkeit treten zu lassen. Art. 14. Die Ratificationen des gegenwärtigen Vertrages sollen zu Prag binnen einer Frist von acht Tagen, oder wenn möglich früher, ausgewechselt werden. Urkund dessen haben die betreffenden Bevollmächtigten gegenwärtigen Vertrag unterzeichnet und mit dem Insiegel ihrer Wappen versehen. So geschehen in Prag am 23 Tage des Monats August im Jahre des Heils achtzehnhundert sechs und sechzig. (L. S.) gez. WERTHER. (L. S.) gez. BRENNER.

“ Angelegt sind ein Protocoll, betreffend die Auslieferung der Kriegsgefangenen und die Räumung des Kaiserl. Königl. Oesterreichischen Territoriums durch die Königl. Preussischen Truppen, und die folgende Erklärung :

“ Die Regierungen von Preussen und Oesterreich, von dem Wunsche geleitet, die Eisenbahnverbindungen zwischen ihren beiderseitigen Gebieten zu vermehren, haben auss Anlass der Friedensverhandlungen die unterzeichneten Bevollmächtigten beauftragt, nachstehende Erklärung abzugeben, welche am heutigen Tag in doppelter Ausfertigung unterzeichnet und ausgewechselt wurde : 1. Die Königl. Preussische Regierung verpflichtet sich, die Herstellung einer Eisenbahn von einem geeigneten Punkt der Schlesischen Gebirgsbahn bei Landshut nach der Oesterreichischen Grenze bei Liebau in der Richtung auf Schadowitz zuzulassen und zu fördern, wogegen die Kaiserl. Oesterreichische Regierung ihrerseits die Herstellung einer Eisenbahn von einem geeigneten Punkte der Prag-Brünner Eisenbahn bei Wildenschwert bis zur Preussischen Grenze

bei Mittenwalde in der Richtung auf Glatz in gleicher Weise gestatten und fördern wird. 2. Die Kaiserlich Oesterreichische Regierung wird, wenn die Königl. Preussische es in ihrem Interesse finden sollte, die Führung der Schlesischen Gebirgsbahn nach Glatz über Braunau gestatten, ohne eine Einwirkung auf die Leitung des Betriebs der in ihrem Gebiete belegenen Strecke dieser Bahn in Anspruch zu nehmen, wobei jedoch die Ausübung aller Hoheitsrechte vorbehalten bleibt. 3. Die zur Ausführung dieser Eisenbahnen erforderlichen Einzelbestimmungen werden in einem besondern Staatsvertrag zusammengefasst werden, zu welchem Behuf, Bevollmächtigte beider Regierungen in kürzester Frist, an einem noch näher zu vereinbarenden Ort, zusammentreten werden. Prag, 23 August, 1866. (gez.) WERTHER. (gez.) BRENNER."

(Translation.)

"The Treaty of Peace of Prague concluded between Prussia and Austria on the 23rd of August, 1866.

"In the name of the most Holy and indivisible Trinity. His Majesty the King of Prussia and his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, animated by the desire of restoring to their respective countries the benefits of peace, have resolved to convert the preliminaries signed at Nikolsburg on the 26th of June, 1866, into a definite treaty of peace. For this purpose their Majesties have appointed their plenipotentiaries, as follows:—The King of Prussia has appointed Charles, Baron von Werther, &c., and the Emperor of Austria has appointed

Adolf Maria, Baron von Brennerfelsach, &c., who have met in conference at Prague, and, after exchanging their credentials, which were found to be in good and correct form, have agreed upon the following articles :

“ Art. 1. There shall prevail in future lasting peace and friendship between his Majesty the King of Prussia and his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, as also between their heirs and descendants and their respective states and subjects.

“ Art. 2. In order to carry out Article 6 of the Preliminaries of Peace concluded at Nikolsburg on the 26th July of the present year,—his Majesty the Emperor of France, on the 29th July of the same year, having caused to be officially declared at Nikolsburg by his ambassador accredited to his Majesty the King of Prussia : ‘*qu’en ce qui concerne le gouvernement de l’Empereur la Vénétie est acquise à l’Italie pour lui être remise à la paix,*’ his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, on his side, also accedes to this declaration, and gives his consent to the union of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom with the kingdom of Italy on the sole condition that it shall be bound to liquidate those debts which are acknowledged, in accordance with the proceedings of the Treaty of Zurich, to be attached to the ceded territories.

“ Art. 3. The prisoners of war are to be released immediately on both sides.

“ Art. 4. His Majesty the Emperor of Austria acknowledges the dissolution of the hitherto existing German confederacy, and gives his consent to a new organization of Germany

without the participation of the Austrian Empire. His Majesty likewise promises to acknowledge the more restricted Confederation which his Majesty the King of Prussia will establish to the north of the line of the Main, and declares his consent that the German States, situated to the south of this line, should unite in a league, the national connection of which with the North-German Bund is reserved for a further agreement between both parties, and which will have an international independent existence.

“ Art. 5. His Majesty the Emperor of Austria transfers to the King of Prussia all his rights acquired by the peace of Vienna on the 30th October, 1864, in regard to the Duchies of Holstein and Schleswig, with the restriction that the populations of the northern districts of Schleswig shall be ceded to Denmark if they intimate, by a free vote, that they wish to be united with Denmark.

“ Art. 6. At the desire of his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, his Majesty the King of Prussia declares himself ready to consent, in view of the impending changes in Germany, that the present territorial possessions of the kingdom of Saxony shall remain within the limits in which they have hitherto existed, but reserves to himself the right of regulating more minutely the contribution of Saxony towards the expenses of the war, and the future position of the kingdom of Saxony within the North-German Bund, by means of a special treaty of peace to be concluded with his Majesty the King of Saxony. On the other hand, his Majesty the Emperor of Austria promises to recognise the new arrangements

to be established in North Germany by his Majesty the King of Prussia, including the changes of territory.

“ Art. 7. For the purpose of coming to an understanding as to what has been hitherto the common property of the Bund, a commission shall, not later than six weeks after the ratification of the present treaty, meet at Frankfort-on-the-Main, to which notice is to be given of all claims and demands upon the German Bund, which are to be liquidated within six months. Prussia and Austria will be represented in this commission, and the right to be so represented belongs to all the other Governments of the Bund.

“ Art. 8. Austria is entitled to take possession of the Imperial property in the fortresses of the Bund, and also of her registered share in the moveable property of the Bund, or to dispose of the same in any other way; this principle applies to the whole moveable property of the Bund.

“ Art. 9. The public officers, servants, and pensioners of the Bund, shall have the pensions due or already granted to them, guaranteed according to their proportionate shares in the register. The royal Prussian Government, however, undertakes to pay the pensions and stipends of the officers of the late Schleswig-Holstein army, and of their surviving families, which have hitherto been defrayed from the registered funds of the Bund.

“ Art. 10. The parties concerned are to be allowed to draw the pensions which have been assured to them by the Imperial Austrian Governor in Holstein. The sum of 449,500 current rixdollars in the 4 per cent. Danish State bonds, which

is still in the keeping of the Austrian Imperial Government, and which belongs to the finances of Holstein, will be restored to the same immediately after the ratification of the present treaty. No one belonging to the Duchies of Holstein and Schleswig, and no subject of their Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria, shall be persecuted, disturbed, or molested in his person or property, on account of his political conduct during the late events and war.

“ Art. 11. For the purpose of reimbursing part of the expenses entailed on Prussia by the war, his Majesty the Emperor of Austria binds himself to pay to his Majesty the King of Prussia the sum of forty millions of Prussian thalers. From this sum is, however, to be deducted the amount of the war expenses which his Majesty the Emperor of Austria has still to claim in regard to the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein by virtue of Article 12 of the Treaty of Peace of Vienna, dated 30th October, 1864, viz., fifteen millions of Prussian thalers; and also five millions of Prussian thalers are to be deducted as an equivalent for the free maintenance which will be enjoyed by the Prussian troops in those parts of the Austrian territories which are occupied by them, until the conclusion of peace, so that there only remains to be paid twenty millions of Prussian thalers in ready money. One-half of this sum is to be paid simultaneously with the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, the other half in cash three weeks later, at Oppeln.

“ Art. 12. The evacuation of the Austrian territories which are occupied by the Royal Prussian troops will be effected

within three weeks after the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Peace. From the date of the exchange of the ratifications, the Prussian Governors-general will limit their functions to purely military proceedings. The special regulations, according to which this evacuation is to take place, are established by a separate protocol, which forms an appendix to the present treaty.

“ Art. 13. All the treaties and conventions which have been concluded between the high contracting parties before the war are hereby renewed, in so far as they do not naturally lose their effect by the dissolution of the Germanic Confederation. In particular, the general cartel-convention for the exchange of prisoners between the States of the Germanic Confederation, dated the 10th February, 1831, together with the thereto appertaining and annexed regulations, will retain their validity between Prussia and Austria. The Imperial Austrian Government declares, however, that the coinage treaty, concluded on the 24th January, 1857, has lost its essential value for Austria in consequence of the dissolution of the Germanic Confederation, and the Royal Prussian Government declares itself ready to enter into negotiations for the abrogation of this treaty with Austria and the other parties concerned. In like manner, the high contracting parties reserve to themselves the right of commencing negotiations as soon as possible relative to a revision of the commercial and customs treaty, dated the 11th of April, 1865, with a view to affording greater facilities for mutual intercourse. Meanwhile, the said treaty is to come again into

force, with the proviso that each of the high contracting parties shall have the right of making it invalid by giving six months' notice.

“ Art. 14. The ratifications of the present treaty are to be exchanged at Prague within the space of eight days, or, if possible, earlier. In testimony of which the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty, and impressed upon it their armorial seals.

“ Done at Prague, on the 23rd day of the month of August, in the year of our Lord 1866.

“ (L. S.) (Signed) WERTHER.

“ (L. S.) (Signed) BRENNER.

“ Appended are a protocol concerning the release of the prisoners of war and the evacuation of the Imperial Royal Austrian territories by the Royal Prussian troops, and also the following declaration :—

“ The Governments of Prussia and Austria, moved by a desire to increase the railway communication between their respective territories, have, with reference to the peace negotiations, empowered the undersigned plenipotentiaries to deliver the following declaration, duplicates of which have this day been signed and exchanged :

“ 1. The Royal Prussian Government undertakes to authorize and promote the construction of a railway from a suitable point of the Silesian mountain-line at Landshut to the Austrian frontier at Liebau, in the direction of Schadowitz. On the

other hand, the Imperial Austrian Government will, in like manner, authorize and promote the construction of a railway from a suitable point of the Prague-Brünn line at Wildenschwert, to the Prussian frontier at Mittenwalde in the direction of Glatz.

“ 2. The Imperial Austrian Government will, if the Royal Prussian Government should find it to their interest, authorize the construction of the Silesian mountain railway to Glatz through Braunau, without claiming any influence in the management of that part of the line which is situated in Austrian territory, all rights of royalty, however, being fully reserved.

“ 3. The detailed regulations required for the execution of these railways will be drawn up in a special treaty, for which purpose plenipotentiaries of both Governments will meet as early as possible at a place to be agreed upon hereafter.

“ Prague, 23rd of August, 1866.

“(Signed) WERTHER.

“(Signed) BRENNER.”

NOTE VII.

General Lamarmora, in the course of a speech in the Italian Lower House, interrogating the Government in regard to certain statements about Italy contained in the report of the Prussian general staff on the war of 1866, read an unpublished note from the Prussian ambassador, Herr von

Usedom, dated the 19th June, 1866, in which the then Italian Government is asked not to allow itself to be stopped by the fortresses of the Quadrilateral, but "to push its troops forward to the Danube and join hands with Prussia in the very centre of the Imperial Monarchy—in a word, to march upon Vienna. For the purpose of securing the permanent possession of Venice, it will first be necessary," pursues the despatch, "*to strike the Austrian power to the heart.*" What would be the consequence if Italy were to limit her warlike action to Udine or Belluno in order afterwards to undertake the siege of the fortified places? This would infallibly cause a check to the whole war, for it would allow to the Austrian army an unmolested retreat towards the north, thereby strengthening the Imperial arms against Prussia. Perhaps, with the assistance of Bavaria, the combined forces could put a stop to the attack of Prussia, and compel her to remain on the defensive. Being thus deprived of the fruits of her former successes, a peace might perhaps be concluded, which—for Prussia, as well as for Italy—would neither answer the original idea of the campaign, nor the immense sacrifices made by the two countries. In order to avoid such an unfortunate contingency, which, sooner or later, would compel the allied powers to resume the task they had set themselves, Prussia considers that she cannot insist too strongly on the necessity of both sides pursuing the attack *à outrance*, namely, to the very walls of the capital."

NOTE VIII.

“ Bündniss-vertrag zwischen Preussen und Bayern.

“ S^o. Majestät der König von Preussen und S^o. Majestät der König von Bayern, beseelt von dem Wunsche, das künftige Verhältniss der Souveraine und ihrer Staaten möglichst innig zu gestalten, haben zur Bekräftigung des zwischen Ihnen abgeschlossenen Friedens-Vertrages vom 22 August, 1866, beschlossen, weitere Verhandlungen zu pflegen, und haben mit dieser beauftragt, und zwar

“ S^o. Majestät der König von Preussen :

“ Seinen Minister Praesidenten und Minister der auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, Grafen Otto von Bismarck-Schönhausen, Ritter des schwarzen Adler-Ordens, u. s. w. u. s. w.

“ Und Seinen wirklichen Geheimen Rath, Kammerherrn und Gesandten, Carl Friedrich von Savigny, Ritter des Rothen Adler-Ordens I Classe, u. s. w. u. s. w.

“ S^o. Majestät der König von Bayern :

“ Seinen Staatsminister des Königlichen Hauses und des Aeussern, Ludwig Freiherrn von der Pfordten, Ritter des Hausordens vom heiligen Hubertus und Grosskreuz des Verdienstordens der Bayerischen Krone, etc. etc.

“ Und Seinen Ausserordentlichen Gesandten und be-

vollmächtigten Minister am Kaiserlichen Oesterreichischen Hofe, Otto Grafen Bray-Steinburg, Staatsminister a. D. und erblichen Reichsrath, Grosskreuz des Verdienstordens der Bayerischen Krone und vom heiligen Michael, etc. etc.

“ Dieselben haben ihre Vollmachten Ausgetauscht und haben sich, nachdem diese in guter Ordnung befunden worden waren, über nachfolgende Vertragsbestimmungen geeinigt.

“ Art. 1. Zwischen S^t. Majestät dem Könige von Preussen und S^t. Majestät dem Könige von Bayern wird hiermit ein Schutz- und Trutz-Bündniss geschlossen.

“ Es garantiren Sich die hohen Contrahenten gegenseitig die Integrität des Gebietes Ihrer bezüglichen Länder, und verpflichten Sich im Falle eines Krieges Ihre volle Kriegsmacht zu diesem Zwecke einander zur Verfügung zu stellen.

“ Art. 2. S^t. Majestät der König von Bayern überträgt für diesen Fall den Oberbefehl über Seine Truppen S^t. Majestät dem Könige von Preussen.

“ Art. 3. Die hohen Contrahenten verpflichten Sich, diesen Vertrag vorerst geheim zu halten.

“ Art. 4. Die Ratification des vorstehenden Vertrages erfolgt gleichzeitig mit der Ratification des unter dem heutigen Tage abgeschlossenen Friedens Vertrages, also bis spätestens zum 3 k. Mts.

“ Zu Urkund dessen haben die Eingangsgenannten Bevollmächtigten diesen Vertrag in doppelter Ausfertigung am

heutigen Tage mit ihrer Namens-Unterschrift und ihren Siegel versehen.

“ So geschehen Berlin, 22 August, 1866.

“ (L. S.)	GEZ. VON BISMARCK.
“ (L. S.)	GEZ. FREIHERR VON DER PFORDTEN.
“ (L. S.)	GEZ. VON SAVIGNY.
“ (L. S.)	GEZ. GRAF VON BRAY STEINBURG.”

(Translation.)

“ *Treaty of Alliance between Prussia and Bavaria.*

“ His Majesty the King of Prussia and his Majesty the King of Bavaria, animated by a desire to establish the future relations between the two Sovereigns and their respective States on the most intimate possible terms, have decided, in order to confirm the Treaty of Peace concluded between them on the 22nd of August, 1866, to enter into further negotiations, and have empowered for this purpose:—

“ On the part of his Majesty the King of Prussia :

“ His Minister, President and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Otto von Bismarck-Schönhausen, Knight of the Order of the Black Eagle, etc. etc.

“ And his Privy Councillor, Chamberlain, and Ambassador, Charles Frederick von Savigny, Knight of the Order of the Red Eagle of the First Class, etc. etc.

“ On the part of his Majesty the King of Bavaria :

“ His Minister of the Royal Household and of Foreign Affairs, Louis, Baron von der Pfordten, Knight of the domestic Order of St. Hubert, and Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the Bavarian Crown, etc. etc.

“ And his Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at the Imperial Austrian Court, Otto Count Bray-Steinburg, retired Minister of State and hereditary State Councillor, Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the Bavarian Crown and of St. Michael, etc. etc.

“ Who have exchanged their credentials, and, these having been found correct, have agreed on the following stipulations :—

“ Art. 1. An offensive and defensive alliance is hereby concluded between his Majesty the King of Prussia and his Majesty the King of Bavaria.

“ The high contracting parties mutually guarantee to each other the integrity of the territory of their respective countries, and bind themselves, in case of war, to place at each other's disposal their entire military forces for this object.

“ Art. 2. His Majesty the King of Bavaria transfers for such an eventuality the supreme command of his troops to his Majesty the King of Prussia.

“ Art. 3. The high contracting parties bind themselves primarily to keep this treaty secret.

“ Art. 4. The ratification of the above treaty will take place simultaneously with the ratification of the treaty of peace signed this day, and therefore by the 3rd proximo at the latest.

“ In testimony of which, the before-named plenipotentiaries have this day attached their signatures and seals to this treaty in duplicate.

“ Done at Berlin, 22nd August, 1866.

“ (L. S.) (Signed) VON BISMARCK.

“ (L. S.) (Signed) BARON VON DER PFORDTEN.

“ (L. S.) (Signed) VON SAVIGNY.

“ (L. S.) (Signed) COUNT VON BRAY-STEINBURG.”

NOTE IX.

The following autograph letter was addressed by the Emperor to Baron Beust, dated Buda, December 5th, 1868 :

“ Lieber Freiherr von Beust. Das verflossene Jahr erwarb Ihnen neue Ansprüche auf meine Anerkennung.

“ Mein Vertrauen sei Ihnen eine stäte Mahnung, treu und unerschrocken auszuharren in Ihrem Berufe. Zum Beweise Meines besonderen Wohlwollens erhebe Ich Sie in den erblichen Grafenstand mit Nachsicht der Taxen.

“ Ofen, am 5. December, 1868.

“ FRANZ JOSEPH M. P.”

(*Translation.*)

“DEAR BARON BEUST,

“The past year has greatly augmented your claims to my gratitude. Let my confidence prove a perpetual encouragement to you faithfully and unswervingly to persevere in your labours. In testimony of my special regard, I raise you to the rank of an hereditary Count.

“(Signed) FRANCIS JOSEPH.”

NOTE X.

“TREATY OF COMMERCE.

“His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, etc., on the one part, and her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, on the other part, being equally animated by the desire of regulating and extending the commercial relations between their respective States and possessions, have resolved to conclude a Treaty for that purpose, and have named their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say :

“His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia :

“Alexander, Count Mensdorff-Pouilly, Grand Cross of the Order of Leopold with the military decoration belonging to the Commander's Cross of the same Order, Knight of the Order of Maria Theresa, and possessor of the Cross of Military

Merit, Knight Commander of the most honourable Order of the Bath, Lieutenant-General in his Imperial Majesty's army, Privy Councillor and Chamberlain, Minister of the Imperial House and of Foreign Affairs, and Bernhard Baron Wüllerstorff-Urbair, Knight of the Order of the Iron Crown of the second class, Rear-Admiral in his Imperial Majesty's navy, Privy Councillor and Minister for Commerce.

"Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland:

"The Right Honourable John Arthur Douglas, Baron Bloomfield of Oakhampton and Redwood, a Peer of Ireland, a member of her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Knight Grand Cross of the most honourable Order of the Bath, her Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty.

"Who, after having communicated to each other their respective credentials, have agreed upon and concluded the following articles:

"Article I.

"During the continuance of the present Treaty the subjects and commerce of Austria shall enjoy within all the dominions and possessions of her Britannic Majesty, including her Majesty's colonies and foreign possessions, the same advantages as have been conceded to French subjects and commerce by the Treaty between her Majesty and the Emperor of the French, signed at Paris on the 23rd of January, 1860, and to the subjects and commerce of the

States of the Zollverein by the Treaty between her Majesty and his Majesty the King of Prussia, representing the sovereign States and territories united to the Prussian system of customs and contributions, signed at Berlin on the 30th of May, 1865, and, further, Austrian subjects and commerce shall be placed in all other respects on the footing of the subjects and commerce of the most favoured nation.

“ Article II.

“ From and after the 1st of January, 1867, British subjects and commerce shall, within the dominions of his Imperial and Royal Majesty, be placed in every respect upon the footing of the most favoured nation, and share in all the advantages and favours which are enjoyed by the commerce and subjects of any third power.

“ From this rule are excepted :

“ (a.) Advantages such as those which for the sole purpose of facilitating frontier traffic are at present conceded, or may hereafter be conceded to the States of the German Zollverein, or to other neighbouring States ; and also those reductions of or exemptions from Customs duties which are valid only at certain parts of the frontier or for the inhabitants of particular localities.

“ (b.) Those advantages which belong or may hereafter be conceded to the subjects of the German Confederation in virtue of Federal Treaties and Federal laws.

“(c.) Those special and ancient privileges which are enjoyed by Turkish subjects, as such, for Turkish commerce in Austria.

“ *Article III.*

“The Austrian Customs Tariff (the present system of calculating Customs duties by weight being maintained) shall be so regulated, that the duty to be levied upon articles the produce or manufacture of the dominions of her Britannic Majesty, upon their importation into the Austrian States shall, from the 1st of January, 1867, not exceed 25 per cent. of the value, with the addition of the cost of transport, insurance, and commission necessary for their importation into Austria as far as the Austrian Customs frontier, and for this purpose the basis shall be taken of the average value of the articles included under one and the same denomination in each position of the future Austrian Tariff.

“From and after the 1st of January, 1870, the maximum of these duties shall not exceed 20 per cent. of the value, with the additions above defined.

“The articles of State monopoly (tobacco, salt, gunpowder), and further, the goods comprised in Classes I. and VII. of the present Austrian Tariff, are excepted from these maxima.

“ *Article IV.*

“Commissioners from both Governments shall meet not later than the month of March, 1866, for the purpose of ascertaining and determining the values and the additional

charges, and they shall take as the basis of their calculations the average prices at the principal centres of production and commerce of the United Kingdom for the year 1865.

“ Three years after the duties fixed by Treaty shall have come into operation, each of the contracting parties shall have the right to claim a revision of the values.

“ *Article V.*

“ Those duties of the future Austrian Tariff, to come into operation on the 1st of January, 1867, to which England attaches a special interest, shall form the subject of a supplementary Convention to be concluded between the two contracting parties.

“ The articles of State monopoly, as also the goods subject to fiscal duties included in Classes I. and VII. of the present Tariff, remain also here excepted.

“ *Article VI.*

“ Internal imposts which are levied in the territory of one of the contracting parties on the production, preparation, or use of any article, whether on account of the State or on account of municipalities and corporations, shall under no pretext affect the productions of the other party in a higher or more onerous degree than the same productions of native origin.

“ *Article VII.*

“ The contracting parties agree that every reduction in their Tariffs of import or export duties, and every privilege, favour,

or immunity which either contracting party may hereafter grant to the subjects and commerce of a third power, shall be extended immediately and unconditionally to the other contracting party, reserving, however, the exceptions enumerated in Article II. *a* and *b*.

“ Article VIII.

“ The subjects of one of the contracting parties shall enjoy in the dominions and possessions of the other, equality of treatment with native subjects in regard to charges on loading and unloading, to warehousing, and to the transit trade, as also in regard to bounties, facilities, and drawbacks.

“ Article IX.

“ The subjects of one of the two high contracting parties shall, in the dominions of the other, enjoy the same protection as native subjects in regard to the rights of property in trade-marks, and other distinctive marks, as well as in patterns and designs for manufactures.

“ Article X.

“ The high contracting parties reserve to themselves to determine hereafter, by a special Convention, the means of reciprocally protecting copyright in works of literature and the fine arts within their respective dominions.

“ Article XI.

“ The present Treaty shall remain in force for the space of ten years, to date from the 1st of January, 1867, and in case

neither of the high contracting powers shall have notified to the other twelve months before the expiration of the said period of ten years, the intention to put an end to its operation, the Treaty shall continue in force for another year, and so on from year to year, until the expiration of a year counting from the day on which one or other of the high contracting parties shall have announced its intention to put an end to it.

“The high contracting parties reserve to themselves the right to introduce by common consent into this Treaty any modification which is not opposed to its spirit and principles, and the utility of which shall have been shown by experience.

“Article XII.

“The present Treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Vienna in three weeks, or sooner if possible.

“In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto their armorial seals.

“Done at Vienna the sixteenth day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-five.

“(Signed)

FRANCIS JOSEPH.

COUNT MENSENDORFF-POUILLY.

BLOOMFIELD.

BARON WÜLLERSTORFF.

BARON GAGERN.”

“ FINAL PROTOCOL.

“ Upon proceeding to the signature of the Treaty of commerce concluded this day between Austria and Great Britain, the plenipotentiaries of the two powers made the following declarations :

“ I.

“ The plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor of Austria declared that, in virtue of Article XIII. of the Treaty of Customs and Contributions Union of the 23rd of December, 1863, between Austria and Lichtenstein, the Treaty of commerce concluded this day would apply equally to the principality of Lichtenstein, and the British plenipotentiary accepted this declaration.

“ II.

“ In order to avoid any future doubt as to the intention of Article III., the plenipotentiaries of the two powers have agreed to the following explanation :

“ In the construction of a Tariff of specific duties by weight at the within fixed *ad valorem* rates, it is necessary to determine what shall be the unit of value to which each specific duty shall be applied.

“ In adopting the basis of value established by Article III., it is understood that it is not intended to depart from the general principle of the article, viz., the application of certain

'maximum' *ad valorem* rates of duty to all articles of British produce and manufacture, but to guard against the necessity of making separate provision for every variety of each article, thereby creating minute and inconvenient subdivisions in the tariff.

" With this view it becomes necessary to group together those different qualities and descriptions of the same article or of similar articles, which, from their approximation in value and general resemblance in character, it is found possible to include under one and the same denomination in one position of the Tariff.

" But it is understood, that in fixing the denominations in each position of the future Austrian Tariff, they shall be so arranged that the duty affixed to any one position shall not exceed the 'maximum' rates fixed by Article III. of the Treaty upon the average value of any kind of goods of commercial importance included under any one denomination in such position, unless by common consent it is considered expedient or necessary.

" III.

" With reference to Article IV., the plenipotentiaries likewise agreed, that if it shall be found that the prices of any description of goods have been essentially disturbed by exceptional causes during the twelve months of the year 1865, the Commissioners of the two Governments shall endeavour to find such a basis of value for such goods as shall be considered a fair average value for future years.

“ In the case of textile manufactures (the prices of which have been seriously deranged during the late war in the United States of America), it is agreed, that if the average prices of the year 1865 be taken as a basis of value, either contracting party may claim a revision of such valuation after the 1st of January, 1868.

“ IV.

“ The British plenipotentiary then declared that :

“ Her Britannic Majesty engages to recommend to Parliament the abolition of the duties payable on the importation of wood and timber into the United Kingdom, and also the reduction of the duties payable on wine in bottle to the amount of those payable on wine in wood upon importation into the United Kingdom.

“ V.

“ The Austrian plenipotentiaries, on their part, declared, that the duty upon the export of rags from the States and Possessions of his Imperial and Royal Majesty shall, from and after the 1st of July, 1866, be reduced to two florins the zoll-centner, and that

“ The duty upon the importation of salt herrings into the States and Possessions of his Imperial and Royal Majesty shall, from the 1st of February, 1866, be reduced to fifty kreuzers the zoll-centner gross weight.

“ In witness whereof, the undersigned plenipotentiaries

have drawn up the present Protocol in duplicate form, to which, after it had been duly read, they affixed their signatures.

“ Vienna, this sixteenth day of December, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-five.

“ (L. S.) BLOOMFIELD.”

“ *Supplementary Treaty.*

“ His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic King of Hungary, on the one part; and

“ Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, on the other part; have resolved to conclude the following Convention in lieu of the Supplementary Convention stipulated in Article V. of the Treaty of Commerce of the 16th of December, 1865, and have named their plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

“ His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty :

“ Frederic Ferdinand, Count Beust, his Imperial Majesty's Privy Councillor, Chancellor of the Empire, and Minister of the Imperial House and of Foreign Affairs, Grand Cross of the Orders of St. Stephen and Leopold; and

“ Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland :

“ The Right Honourable John Arthur Douglas, Baron Bloomfield of Oakhampton and Redwood, a Peer of Ireland, a Member of her Majesty's most Honourable Privy Council, Knight Grand Cross of the most honourable Order of the

Bath, her Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty :

“ Who, after having communicated to each other their respective credentials, which were found to be in due and proper form, have agreed upon and concluded the following articles :—

“ *Article I.*

“ During the continuance of the present Convention, British produce and manufactures shall be admitted upon importation into both the dominions of his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty at the rates of duty enumerated in the Tariff annexed to the Treaty of Commerce between his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty and his Majesty the King of Prussia, representing the sovereign states and territories united to the Prussian system of Customs and Contributions of the 9th of March, 1868.

“ *Article II.*

“ His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty further engages, that on and after the 1st of January, 1870, the following articles of British manufacture shall be admitted upon importation into both the dominions of his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty at the rates of duty hereafter specified :

“ Cotton goods, viz. :—woven or knitted goods of cotton or of cotton and linen, also in combination with metal threads or spun glass, but without admixture of silk, wool, or other animal hair.

Florins.

“(a.) Commonest kinds, viz. :—

“ Woven wicks, gitter (marline) girths, nets
(fish, horse, bird, and similar coarse nets), also
stiffened nets for linings (stiff nets) 12 0

“(b.) Common, viz. :—

“ 1. Plain, not figured, unbleached (made of unbleached yarn), close woven tissues, also twills <i>croisées</i> , napped or dressed, and bleached . . .	} 16 0
“ 2. Figured, unbleached, close woven tissues .	

“ All the goods named under 1 and 2, except
velvets (with cut or uncut naps), and those comprised
under (f).

“(c.) Middling, *i. e.* :—

“ 1. Plain close-woven tissues, dyed. . . .	} 20 0
“ 2. Figured close-woven goods, bleached or dyed	

“(d.) 1. Open woven tissues, unbleached . . .	} 30 0
“ 2. All parti-coloured and all red close-woven goods	
“ 3. All velvet and velvety woven goods (with cut or uncut naps)	
“ 4. Ribbons, button-makers', haberdashery and hosiery wares, also bobbinet-like curtain stuffs (furniture and curtain nets)	
“ 5. All printed close-woven goods	

Florins.

“ All the above-named goods under 2, 3, 4, and 5, so far as they are not comprised under (*c*) and (*f*).

“ (*e.*) Fine, viz. :—

“ All open woven goods, except those named under (*d*) and (*f*) 45 0

“ (*f.*) Finest, viz. :—

“ Tulle, English style (bobbinets, pettinets), except those of furniture and curtain nets named under (*d*) 4, laces and embroidered woven goods, and all goods in combination with metal threads or spun glass 60 0

“ Woollen goods, viz. :—All woven and knitted goods of wool or other animal hair, also in combination with metal threads or spun glass, or with other weaving and knitting materials (except silk).

“ (*a.*) Commonest, viz. :—

“ Horse-cloths, halina cloths, matrosen cloths (sigona cloth), coarse unfulled cloths (Loden), oil cloths, press cloths (filtering cloths), sieve bottoms and plaitings (cords, ropes) of horse hair, not combined with other materials; hat-chippings, cloth-list, carpets of dog, calf, or cow-hair, felts (also tarred and lacquered), not printed; cylinder covers (endless felts), network and knitted nets, both

Florins.

undyed ; hair soles (for boots and shoes of felt, also
lacquered on one side) and girths . . . 4 50 ($4\frac{1}{2}$ fl.)

“(b.) Common, viz. :—

“ Fulled, not printed and not velvety tissues ;
felt wares unprinted, also carpets, except those
named under (a) 18 0

“ And from January 1st, 1871 15 0

“(c.) Middling, viz. :—

“ 1. All velvet like, all unfulled, close, and all printed woollen goods, except those named under (d) and (e)	} 35 0
“ 2. Haberdashery, button-makers', and hosiery goods	

“(d.) Fine, viz. :—

“ Tulle and other open woven goods, except those
named under (e), also shawls and scarfs (without
mixture of silk) 50 0

“(e.) Finest, viz. :—

“ Lace, (also lace cloths), embroidered woven
goods, and all goods in combination with metal
threads or spun glass 60 0

“ Article III.

“ The Third, Fourth, and Fifth Article of the Treaty of
Commerce between his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty

and her Britannic Majesty, of the 16th of December, 1865, and the Second and Third Articles of the final Protocol annexed to the Treaty, are hereby suppressed.

“ Article IV.

“ This Convention shall have the same duration as the Treaty of the 16th of December, 1865.

“ Article V.

“ The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Vienna, within six weeks, or sooner if possible.

“ In witness whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto their armorial seals.

“ Done at Vienna, this thirtieth day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine.


“ (L. S.) BLOOMFIELD.”

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List showing the extent of Territory under Cultivation in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Produce of such Territory.

Corn-fields	47,434,315 acres	English.	
Rice-fields	1,186	,,	,,
Vineyards	1,510,649	,,	,,
Meadows and gardens	18,809,603	,,	,,
Olive, laurel, and chesnut woods	76,045	,,	,,
Pasture-ground	21,502,364	,,	,,
Forests	47,601,395	,,	,,
	<hr/>		
	136,935,557	,,	,,
	<hr/>		
Wheat	7,906,090 quarters	English.	
Rye	10,440,010	,,	,,
Wheat and rye mixed	3,538,933	,,	,,
Barley	7,582,701	,,	,,
Oats	13,494,666	,,	,,
Maize	8,500,195	,,	,,
Other kinds of corn	1,294,254	,,	,,
Rice	24,852	cwt.	,,
Potatoes	15,847,726	,,	,,
Turnips, carrots, and beet-roots	9,313,113	,,	,,
Herbs and green vegetables } (salads, cabbage, &c.) . . }	19,618,333 scores	,,	,,
Other vegetables	986,068 quarters	,,	,,
Fruits	4,174,800	,,	,,
Wine	674,708,157 gallons	,,	,,



Hay.	235,633,124 cwt.	English.
Straw	317,505,936 ,,	,,
Tobacco	950,247 ,,	,,
Flax	1,049,253 ,,	,,
Hemp	1,388,130 ,,	,,
Flax and hemp seeds . . .	1,209,662 ,,	,,
Flax and hemp-seed oil . .	225,784 ,,	,,
Hops (exclusive of Hungary)	45,000 ,,	,,
Walnuts	1,210 ,,	,,
Olives	73,000 ,,	,,
Rape-seed	90,216 ,,	,,
Honey and wax	322,882 ,,	,,
Butter and cheese	2,717,420 ,,	,,
Cows' and goats' milk . .	101,384,397 gallons	,,
Timber	20,000,000 cubic fathoms.	
Cocoons	2,060,000 lbs. avoirdupois.	

NOTE XI.

(Translation from the German)

“Circular from the Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department to Governors of Provinces relative to Direct Elections.

“As you are aware, the questions of the direct election of the House of Deputies of the Reichsrath, and of an increase in the number of deputies, were raised in the course of last session, and were much discussed, not only in the Reichsrath, but also more especially in the public press.

“Some of the Diets have also been engaged in discussing this subject.

“The Diet of the Archduchy of Lower Austria, at its sitting of the 9th of October, 1868, arrived at the following resolution: ‘The Diet recognises, in the mode of sending deputies to the Lower House by means of direct election, an important principle tending to invigorate and promote the development of the Constitution, provided this system of direct election be established by constitutional means, and in such a manner that the common interests of constituencies with regard to the countries represented in the Reichsrath be not encroached upon.

“‘The Diet, declaring its readiness to abandon in this case the right of sending deputies from among its own members, makes the following motion under Art. 19 of the regulations of the Diet: The Government is invited to act by constitutional means with a view to a modification of the laws on the representation of the Empire, so that a system of direct elections for the Reichsrath may be established, and the number of deputies increased in an adequate proportion.’

“The Diet of Styria, in its sitting of the 21st of October, 1868, discussed a motion which is favourable to the direct election of members for the Reichsrath. According to this motion, if an Imperial law were passed, by which the members of the Lower House were elected directly from and by the people, the Diet would abandon its right of sending 13 members to the House of Deputies, as established by the funda-

mental law on the representation of the Empire. This motion was negatived by 25 votes against 25.

“The Diet of Carniola, in its sitting of the 2nd of October, 1868, negatived a motion which was made for the purpose of discussing the question whether the introduction of direct elections for the Reichsrath was necessary and desirable.

“Numerous petitions in reference to this subject have been presented to the House of Deputies, and referred to its constitutional committee to be reported upon. The latter was induced to deliberate on these questions, which are also connected with that of shortening the duration of a deputy's mandate. Ultimately it laid a report on this subject, together with its opinion, before the House; but it could not at the time be taken into consideration, in consequence of the importance of the subject and the approaching end of the session.

“The proceedings in this matter of the constitutional committee of the House of Deputies, as also the declarations made in regard thereto by the Government, are contained in the ‘Vienna Abendpost’ of the 22nd; in the ‘Vienna Gazette’ of the 23rd; and in the ‘Abendpost’ of the 23rd and the 30th of April, 1869. As the recommendations made by the sub-committee of the constitutional committee contain provisions which touch more or less upon the right of the Provincial Diets, the Government has expressed the hope that the Provincial Diets would state their opinions on the subject. It may be assumed that the Provincial Diets will do so, and the Government can only regard this as desirable.

“In the discussion of the questions connected with this

matter, it is of importance that they should not be decided by catch-words and general phrases, but be considered in detail, always keeping in view their special bearings upon the resolutions to be arrived at on the subject. They may be defined as follows :

“ 1. Is the establishment of direct elections for members of the Reichsrath to the interest of the Constitution ?

“ 2. Should this be the case, is the delegation by the Provincial Diets of the number of members specified in the Constitution to the Lower House of the Reichsrath to be replaced by the direct election of deputies by the people ?

“ 3. Are these direct elections to take place by the population in general, or according to individual districts, towns, and corporations, as defined in the Appendix to the rules for the general organization of the country ?

“ 4. Is it found necessary, or at least suitable and desirable, to make the number of deputies in the Lower House of the Reichsrath greater than 203, which is the number fixed by the Constitution ?

“ 5. Should this be the case, is the number of deputies in the Reichsrath to be doubled, or increased by one-half, or in what other proportion ?

“ 6. In case public opinion should not pronounce itself in favour of direct elections, in what manner is the increase of deputies in the Reichsrath to be effected ? Are they to be selected primarily from among the members of the Diet ? Is the system of election by groups to be adhered to ? In the latter case—leaving out of consideration the cases where an

even number of deputies is returned--how is the distribution to be accomplished in those groups of whose representatives only one or an odd number of deputies is to be elected for the Reichsrath?

"7. What period is to be fixed for the sitting of deputies in the Lower House of the Reichsrath without re-election?

"As soon as this subject, either by the motion of an individual member or of the committee, shall have arrived at the stage of parliamentary discussion which I again designate as very desirable, I have the honour most urgently to request that you will--either by conversing with individual members, or participating in the deliberations of the committee--endeavour to cause the cardinal points mentioned in the above questions to be kept in view, and duly considered in connection with the further treatment of the subject.

"Accept, etc. etc.

"Dr. K. GISKRA.

"*Vienna, 9th September, 1869.*"

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